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ABSTRACT 
 
Latino Descriptive Representation in Municipal Government: 
An Analysis of Latino Mayors 
 
by 
 
Carlos E. Cuellar 
 
 
Various questions regarding Latinos’ descriptive representation in the mayoralty are 
examined in this dissertation including: Where and why are Latino mayors elected? Why 
do Latino mayoral candidates emerge and win? And, is there is a link between Latino 
ethnicity and electoral outcomes in municipal elections?  
The empirical results of a cross-sectional analysis of U.S. cities from 1981-2006 
suggest that institutions such as term limits and mayor-council governments influence the 
representation of Latinos in the mayoralty. These effects, however, are conditioned by 
Latinos’ numerical strength in a city – which suggests that Latino descriptive 
representation in the mayoralty is largely a function of population size. Despite the 
prominence of this factor, the results further reveal that Latinos need to swell the ranks of 
the city council to provide a steady supply of qualified Latino candidates to ultimately 
win the mayoralty. 
An analysis of 648 mayoral elections in 113 cities in the Southwest further tests 
theories of Latino candidate emergence and success based on city-level factors – that 
supply elections with Latino candidates – as well as strategic factors in elections – that 
influence Latino candidates’ cost-benefit decision calculus. The results reveal a combined 
effect of supply and strategy on candidate emergence and success. For example, in cities 
where Latinos are sizeable (+40 percent) and the electoral context is more competitive 
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(i.e., where turnout is high, more candidates are on the ballot, and when incumbents are 
not vying for reelection), Latino candidates are more likely to emerge. A similar pattern 
occurs with regard to the success of Latino candidates except that the individual 
candidate’s previous political experience is particularly influential in improving their 
chances of winning. 
Given the theoretical expectation regarding the impact of ethnicity on electoral 
outcomes in municipal elections, I also examine whether Latino ethnicity shapes turnout 
rates and the margin of victory. Latino ethnicity is not statistically associated with these 
outcomes. However, other factors such as the election timing and the type of election 
(i.e., runoff election, open seat) seem to be more influential. In sum, the research here 
examines various aspects of Latino representation in the mayoralty that is the most 
comprehensive to date. 
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CHAPTER 1  
 
A VOICE AT THE TOP: THE CASE FOR EXAMINING LATINO DESCRIPTIVE 
REPRESENTATION IN THE MAYORALTY 
 
 
Racial and ethnic minority political incorporation1 in government has been examined by 
scholars since the late 1960s. These studies have sought to explain how and why 
minorities have gained influence in the decision-making process following the civil rights 
struggles that ensued during the early part of that decade (see Browning, Marschall, and 
Tabb 1984). Contemporary research has continued to investigate the extent to which 
racial and ethnic groups are represented in Congress, state legislatures, city councils, 
school boards, and various bureaucratic agencies. Although this research primarily 
focuses on examining African American representation in government (see Marschall 
2010), many studies do analyze Latino representation (see Lublin 1997b; Marschall, 
Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011). Despite the contribution of this 
research, no systematic study of Latino mayors exists to date. Additionally, there is no 
research that examines why Latino mayoral candidates emerge and why they win. This 
dissertation fills these gaps in the scholarly literature by using data on Latino mayors in 
the U.S. as well as an unprecedented original dataset on a large sample of mayoral 
elections in 113 cities in the Southwest.  
However, before I delve into describing this unique data and methodology used to 
answer various unexplored questions about Latinos’ representation in the mayoralty, in 
this chapter I will introduce the subject of my study by: 1) describing various population 
characteristics of Latinos in the United States 2) presenting recent developments in 
                                                
 
1 Although the concept of political incorporation defined by Browning, Marshall, and Tabb (1984), is very 
specific as to whether and how racial and ethnic groups are included in policymaking (i.e., candidate 
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American politics that make Latino Politics a relevant area of study 3) explaining what 
descriptive representation is and why previous research indicates that it can help improve 
the status of racial and ethnic groups 4) reviewing the literature on Latino representation 
and 5) outlining the plan of the dissertation and the components of each chapter. 
 
Latinos & American Politics 
Latinos (or Hispanics2) in the United States are individuals of any race that identify with 
Spanish-speaking countries through ancestry or birth. These are individuals living in the 
United States that are either U.S.-born or foreign-born; native-Spanish speakers or native-
English speakers; dark-skinned or light-skinned; working-class or wealthy – and 
everything in-between. Hispanics do not always identify with the pan-ethnic terms: 
Hispanic or Latino. In fact, some strongly identify with the national origin of their 
ancestry such as, Mexican, Honduran, Cuban – or some hyphenated variant (i.e., 
Mexican-American, Cuban-American, etc.). Despite the ongoing academic debate about 
whether and why Hispanics identify with the pan-ethnicity (see Garcia and Sanchez 
2008, Sanchez 2006a, Sanchez 2006b, Sanchez and Matsuoka 2010), Hispanics share 
many commonalities such as cultural traditions (language, food, customs, religiosity, etc), 
various demographic characteristics (income, education, wealth, occupation, 
discrimination based on language and ancestry), and in some cases historical experiences 
of disenfranchisement (Garcia 2003; Garcia and Sanchez 2008, Barreto et al. 2009). 
 The perception of shared cultural experiences among Hispanics has influenced 
how religious, economic, and political institutions have identified and interacted with this 
                                                
 
2 The terms, Hispanic and Latino, are often used interchangeably by scholars in the discipline of political 
science to identify people of Spanish-speaking heritage.  
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ethnic group through laws, practices, policies, and advertisements. These interactions, 
both past and present, create a strong argument for why Latinos are a politically 
identifiable group. For example, Garcia-Bedolla (2009) points to how Latinos have been 
placed into the racial and ethnic hierarchy of society throughout U.S. history. The 
categorization and essentially the “racialization” of Latinos have historically impacted 
their “social, political, and economic opportunities” (Garcia-Bedolla, 2009, 4).  
Since the civil rights and Chicano movements of the 1950s & 60s, racial and 
ethnic minorities have become protected under the law to not only do away with these 
exclusionary practices, but also to prevent future discriminatory laws from being 
implemented by the U.S. government. In fact, to ensure that social, economic, and 
political opportunities are distributed as equitably as possible, the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) as well as the U.S. Census Bureau enumerates individuals from 
different racial and ethnic backgrounds. According to the OMB it gathers racial and 
ethnic data to “enforce requirements of the Voting Rights Act, review state redistricting 
plans, evaluate federal affirmative action plans, monitor the access to minorities of home 
mortgage loans, and assist minority-owned businesses” (OMB 1994). 
Additionally, Latinos are increasingly becoming part of the political discourse 
taking place in contemporary American society. For example, in presidential politics, 
Latinos are non-trivial proportion of the population in key swing states such as, Colorado, 
Nevada, Florida and Arizona. Given that Latinos are continuously being courted by both 
Republicans and Democrats – they can potentially help deliver victories in those states 
and determine the winner in the upcoming presidential election (Scherer and Dias 2012). 
Tied to this courtship, are the political parties’ stances on the issue of immigration. 
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Barreto et al. (2009) describe estimates of the 2006 immigration protests containing 
between 3.5 to 5.1 million Latinos protesting congressional legislation that would 
increase the penalties for undocumented immigrants. Barreto et al. (2008) demonstrate 
why such a law was a call to action: 
 
“A key provision of the House bill made any organization or person liable for 
criminal penalties and up to 5 years in prison for knowingly assisting any 
undocumented immigrant “to reside in or remain” in the United States. Not only 
would educators and health care workers be affected but so too would priests and 
pastors, family and friends, and anyone providing aid of any kind (Barreto et al. 
2008, 747).” 
 
These types of laws have passed in state legislatures in Arizona, Alabama, Oklahoma, 
Utah, Indiana, South Carolina, and Georgia – and are being pursued in Alaska, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming (Budoff Brown 2010; 
Gordon and Raja 2012). In fact, Brown (2010) explains that of the 37 gubernatorial 
elections, candidates in 20 states, have endorsed anti-immigration laws that restrict public 
resources in schooling, housing, and healthcare to immigrants. However, there are states 
that have passed legislation that permit undocumented students to qualify for in-state 
tuition (Gordon and Raja 2012). 
 Additionally, Latinos are receiving increased attention in political campaigns by 
both major political parties via Spanish-language advertisements during congressional 
and presidential elections (Hero, Garcia, Garcia, and Pachon 2000; Segal 2004; 
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Connaughton and Jarvis 2006; DeFrancesco Soto and Merolla 2006). This courtship is a 
response to the increased Latino population in key demographic regions of the country 
that can determine whether one party gains (or loses) power. Given this attention, 
Latinos’ opinion about other issues in political campaigns besides immigration (e.g., the 
economy, foreign policy, taxes, and education) will continue to play a role in 
contemporary American politics. 
 In summary, the current policy debates over immigration as well as the areas of 
the country with substantial Latino populations that are located in swing states suggest 
that Latinos are becoming incorporated into the political system as voters. However, in 
this dissertation, I will investigate a complimentary and perhaps more significant aspect 
of political incorporation that involves gaining access to political power through office 
holding in decision-making making bodies. 
 
Latino Population Characteristics 
To be more specific about how much the Latino population has helped to change the 
demographic composition of the country – which contributes to their increased role in 
politics – a U.S. Census Bureau report released in May 2011 shows that there are 50.5 
million U.S. residents that self identify as Hispanic, Latino, or Spanish of any race. That 
is, 16 percent of the 308.7 million people in the United States are Latinos that have some 
immediate or ancestral connection to Spanish-speaking countries, such as Mexico, Puerto 
Rico, El Salvador, Dominican Republic and Honduras (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 
2011). What is particularly fascinating about the Latino population in the United States is 
that it grew by 43 percent since the year 2000. The U.S. Census Bureau estimates that 
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over half of the overall population growth in the previous decade (2000-2010) is 
specifically attributed to the growth of the Hispanic population (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and 
Albert 2011, 2; Fry 2008). The speculation as to why the Hispanic population grew so 
much over the past decade can be summarized into one word: immigration. However, Fry 
(2008) points out that international migration from Latin America only accounts for a 
small proportion of the more recent growth patterns among the Hispanic population. 
Instead, the fact that Latinos, who are currently living in the U.S., are very young; and 
that contributes to the high fertility rates and low mortality rates that fuel the overall 
population growth. That said, Hispanic population growth during the decade between 
1990 and the year 2000 was primarily due to international migration (Fry 2008). 
 In addition to the Hispanic population growth that has occurred over the past 
decade, Hispanic populations tend to be concentrated in certain parts of the country. 
Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert’s (2011) analysis of Census data find that nearly 77 
percent of Hispanics are concentrated in two regions defined by the U.S. Census: the 
West3 and the South4. As for differences in terms of population growth over the past 
decade, the authors find that states in the South (which includes Texas) experienced a 
larger proportion of Hispanic growth rates compared to the West. Specifically, all states 
in the South experienced a 57 percent increase in the number of Hispanics; and the 
Hispanic population in the West grew by 34 percent (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 
2011, 4-5). These growth rates suggest that new Hispanic settlement patterns are 
                                                
 
3 The U.S. Census bureau includes the following states in this category: Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. 
4 The U.S. Census bureau includes the following states in this category: Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, 
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. 
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developing outside of traditional destinations in California, Arizona, and New Mexico to 
include states such as Louisiana, North Carolina, and Tennessee. In fact, Fry (2008) 
explains that this trend of population growth outside of traditional destinations began to 
occur in the 1990s. 
Figure 1.1 shows that Hispanics continue to be concentrated in California, Texas, 
Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and New Mexico. If Texas is considered part of the 
Southwest, then 54 percent of all Hispanics in the U.S. currently reside in this region 
(Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011, 5-7). Other states with sizeable Hispanic 
populations include: Florida, New York, Illinois, and New Jersey. In addition to 
differences in terms of sheer numbers, Figure 1.1 shows that there are several states that 
have sizeable proportions of Hispanics. For example, New Mexico, Texas, California, 
and Arizona have Hispanic populations that are nearly over 30 percent of the entire 
state’s population. States such as Colorado and Nevada have limited population sizes 
compared to states like New York and Texas, but the proportion of Hispanics in Nevada 
and Colorado is 26.5 and 20.7 percent, respectively. This non-trivial proportion of the 
states’ population is also seen in Florida (23%), New York (18%), New Jersey (18%), 
and Connecticut (13%). 
In terms of the national-origin group that dominates the Hispanic population in 
these states (and regions), we find variation. Figure 1 shows the dominance of Mexican-
origin Hispanic populations in the West, Midwest, and the South – except in Florida, 
which is dominated by Cuban-origin Hispanics. In the Northeast, including Pennsylvania, 
New York, New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire, the Hispanic population is 
primarily of Puerto Rican descent. The only state in that region that has a significant 
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proportion of Hispanics that is not dominated by Puerto Rican-origin Hispanics is Rhode 
Island, where 12.5 percent of the Hispanic population is predominantly of Dominican-
origin. 
 
To further investigate where most of the Hispanic population resides within those states, 
the 2005-2009 American Community Survey Population Estimates described in Table 
1.1, show the 20 largest cities by Hispanic voting-age population. New York, Los 
Angeles, Houston, San Antonio, and Chicago are the five cities with the largest 
population of voting-age Hispanics in the United States. The proportion of Hispanics in 
those cities ranges from 24-43 percent of all persons over the age of 18. With the 
exception of the New York, Chicago, Hialeah and Miami, 80 percent of the largest 
Hispanic populated cities are located in the Southwestern region of the country. Fry 
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(2008) indicates that 18 of the 25 counties with the largest Hispanic population growth 
from 2000-2007 are located in the Southwest United States (Fry 2008, 4). 
Table 1.1 
 
20 Largest Cities by Hispanic Voting-Age Population 
City State Region Hispanic VAP Pct. Hisp. VAP 
New York  New York Northeast 1,630,010 25% 
Los Angeles  California Southwest 1,236,328 43% 
Houston  Texas Southwest 594,185 37% 
San Antonio  Texas Southwest 552,098 58% 
Chicago  Illinois Midwest 516,726 24% 
Phoenix  Arizona Southwest 392,525 36% 
Dallas  Texas Southwest 345,561 37% 
El Paso  Texas Southwest 323,357 78% 
San Diego  California Southwest 235,158 23% 
Miami  Florida South 231,529 70% 
San Jose  California Southwest 198,316 28% 
Austin  Texas Southwest 176,856 30% 
Santa Ana  California Southwest 169,265 74% 
Hialeah  Florida South 166,279 95% 
Albuquerque  New Mexico Southwest 158,692 41% 
Tucson  Arizona Southwest 142,284 35% 
Fort Worth  Texas Southwest 140,125 29% 
Fresno  California Southwest 128,170 40% 
Denver  Colorado Southwest 128,071 28% 
Laredo  Texas Southwest 126,224 93% 
Total 
  
7,591,759 4.5% 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2005-2009 Estimates 
 
In the South, 4 of the 25 counties with the largest Hispanic population growth in terms of 
the number of Hispanics are in the state of Florida. The only county outside of Florida, 
located in the Southern region, with the largest Hispanic population growth is Gwinnett 
County – where the Hispanic population grew by nearly 67,986. The growth of Hispanics 
as a proportion (rather than sheer numbers) is primarily seen in the Southern region. 
Counties in states like Virginia and Georgia experienced over 300 percent Hispanic 
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population growth from 2000-2007. Although the Hispanic population is around 5,000 – 
it grew exponentially over the past decade or so in counties such as Frederick County, 
Virginia, and Paulding County, Georgia (see Fry 2008, 7). Overall, these findings 
indicate that most of the Hispanic population growth takes place in Southwestern (in 
terms of sheer numbers) states and in the South (in terms of proportion). 
Because this dissertation investigates the representation of Latinos in municipal 
government, it is important to understand where Latino populations are most likely to be 
politically incorporated. The section above suggests that although the Latino population 
is growing in non-traditional immigrant destinations such as in Louisiana and North 
Carolina, a majority of Latinos are located in the Southwest region that includes states 
such as California, Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, and Texas. The question remains, 
however, whether Latino political representation is proportionate to their voting strength. 
As I will point to in the following chapter, an analysis of Latino mayoral representation 
does not exist and therefore, this question has not been answered. Given this void in the 
literature, in the following section I define the major concept of interest that is to be 
investigated in this dissertation: descriptive representation. Additionally, I will not only 
describe what the previous literature finds about this concept, but point to how 
descriptive representation in the city mayoralty plays such an important role in advancing 
the political incorporation of Latinos.  
 
Descriptive Representation & It’s Consequences 
The changing demographic composition of the United States is partly responsible the 
scholarship on how racial and ethnic minorities fit into in the political system – which 
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focus racial/ethnic minorities’ interactions with government (e.g., voting behavior and 
public opinion) and how national, state, and local governments are responding to these 
groups via immigration, healthcare, and education policies – to name a few (Espino et al. 
2007; Barreto et al. 2009; Preuhs 2007; Rocha & Espino 2009; Martinez-Ebers et al. 
2000). Recent research in racial and ethnic politics also concentrates on exploring the 
representation of African Americans and Latinos in government (Leal et al. 2004; 
Casellas 2009; Preuhs and Hero 2009; Rocha and Hawes 2009; Spence and McClerking 
2010; Scherer and Curry 2010). The representation of racial and ethnic minority groups 
by those who share their racial/ethnic traits (descriptive representation) has been argued 
as an effective mechanism to have minority group interests represented in the 
policymaking process (Pitkin 1967; Mansbridge 1999).  
Specifically, Mansbridge (1999) argues that descriptive representation facilitates 
the communication of interests, needs, and preferences between racial/ethnic minority 
constituents and their coethnic representatives. Historical exclusion from the decision 
making process as well as social discrimination experienced by racial and ethnic minority 
groups may preclude minorities from fully trusting (or relying on) non-minority 
representatives – which can impede their needs and preferences from being voiced in 
deliberative bodies.  
Additionally, the very experience that coethnic representatives have of being a 
member of a racial/ethnic minority group may allow them to understand and advocate for 
the interests without being lobbied by their coethnic constituents. Since constituents are 
not always aware of the issues and policies being discussed in government, having a 
coethnic representative arguably helps to have a friendly voice in the decision making 
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process. Descriptive representation may also allow for interests, concerns, and needs to 
be voiced within government more effectively because issues salient to racial minorities 
may have been previously neglected or misunderstood (Mansbridge 1999). Thus, many 
scholars agree that descriptive representation – although not a perfect means of 
representation – can be one effective method for incorporating racial and ethnic 
minorities into the political process (Pitkin 1967; Phillips 1998; Mansbridge 1999). 
Scholars have examined how descriptive representation influences political 
attitudes and behavior (Canon 1999; Tate 2003; Whitby 1997; Bobo and Gilliam 1990; 
Marschall and Ruhil 2007; Marschall and Shah 2007; Barreto 2007; Barreto, Villarreal, 
and Woods 2005). In particular, work by Abney and Hutcheson (1981) and Howell and 
Fagan (1988) suggests that the election of African American mayors (in Atlanta and New 
Orleans, respectively) is associated with higher levels of trust in government. Bobo and 
Gilliam (1990) find that blacks residing in black-empowered cities exhibit higher levels 
of political trust, efficacy, and knowledge. Additionally, descriptively represented 
African American residents were statistically more likely to participate in political 
elections than African Americans living in cities with no coethnic representation.5 
Marschall and Shah (2007) explore whether representation impacts trust in local 
government and in local police (in varying social, demographic, and institutional 
contexts). Their results point to the importance of descriptive representation on the police 
force and substantive policies that serve the needs of the minority community as 
positively associated with blacks’ trust in local police.  
                                                
 
5 More recent evidence on race-based participation rates suggest that minority representation may yield 
asymmetric effects on political behavior, “both engaging (some black) and disengaging (many white) 
constituents in the electoral process” (Gay 2001, 600). 
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 Other work has found a positive association between minorities in local elective 
offices and minority public sector employment (Mladenka 1989; Browning Marschall, 
and Tabb 1984; Eisinger 1982; Meier and Stewart 1991; Meier, Stewart, and England 
1989), the distribution of government expenditures (Karnig and Welch 1980), and a 
variety of policies and reforms thought to be beneficial to minority residents (Browning 
et al. 1984). This research suggests that black mayors positively influence black 
representation in city administrative and professional positions (Mladenka 1989; Eisinger 
1982). For Hispanics the effect of representation in city government is stronger for 
employment in administrative, professional, and protective services jobs (Mladenka 
1989; Dye and Renick 1981). Black mayors also tend to promote public sector 
contracting with minority businesses (MacManus 1990; Nelson 1987; Browning et al. 
1984) and policing policies that are responsive to the needs of minority communities, 
such as minority hiring policies and police review boards (Saltzstein 1989).  
Another stream of research inquires about whether descriptive representation 
produces policy outputs favorable to the group they represent. For example, 
representation has been found to play an important role in improving the quality, 
effectiveness, and equality of school outcomes, particularly for minority students. For 
example, descriptive representation in schools (teachers and principals) reduces grouping 
and placing minority students in programs that label them as inferior to other students6 
(Meier and England 1984; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Longoria 1990). Student performance 
on tests has also been linked to black and Hispanic representation in teacher faculty and 
                                                
 
6 These policies and practices refer to the overrepresentation of minority students in certain types of classes 
or outcomes (bilingual and special education classes; dropout, suspensions) and their underrepresentation in 
other classes or outcomes (gifted/talented and advanced placement classes; graduation, college, or 
vocational school attendance).  
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school administration (Meier 1993; Meier and Stewart Jr. 1991a; see also Meier, Winkle, 
and Polinard 1999; Polinard, Wrinkle, and Meier 1995). Other studies focusing on 
descriptive representation in a bureaucracy suggest that having females teachers is 
associated with improved standardized test scores among female students (Keiser et al. 
2002). Also, increased representation of females on the police force is associated with 
more females willing to report sexual assault crimes and more arrests made related to that 
type of crime (Meier & Nicholson-Crotty 2006). Rocha and Wrinkle (2011) also show 
that increased representation of female Hispanic school board members is a critical 
determinant of increased expenditures on bilingual education in school districts. 
In addition to the empirical research describing the effects of descriptive 
representation, it is most poignant to examine Hispanic candidates’ reflections about the 
importance of descriptive representation. For example, in Políticas, by Garcia et al. 
(2008) Houston City Council Member, Graciela Saenz explained why she though it was 
important to have Hispanic leaders in city government. 
 
“Houston was faced with a Hispanic leadership void. I saw where the political 
elite were always trying to tell the community that they needed to have designated 
leaders that could speak for them. If there were any issues in the community that 
needed to be addressed such as education, healthcare, jobs, they would ask, ‘Who 
is your leader so we can speak with them?’(Garcia et al. 2008, 116).” 
 
This quote exemplifies how minority elected officials can have a mindset that specifically 
considers the needs and preferences of their coethnic constituency. Granted, the mere 
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descriptive representation of racial and ethnic minorities does not always translate into 
substantive policies that benefit these communities. However, there is some level of 
agreement among scholars that descriptive representation has benefits (either symbolic or 
substantive) for historically excluded racial and ethnic groups. Because Latino 
populations continue to be understudied, particularly in term of their descriptive 
representation in municipal government (and specifically the city’s top executive office), 
further research is needed to specifically investigate where Latino mayors are located and 
what factors determine whether Latino mayoral candidate emerge and win. In the 
following section, I describe the state of the research examining Latino descriptive 
representation in the mayoralty.   
 
Research on Latino Mayors 
Studies of minority representation have almost exclusively focused on African American 
representation (Marschall 2010). More recently, however, many studies have increasingly 
examined the determinants of Hispanic representation. Albeit this research focuses on 
studying Latino representation in legislative contexts such as school boards (Stewart, 
Meier, and England 1989; Leal et al. 2004; Rocha 2007; Shah 2009), city councils 
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984; Zax 1990; Welch 1990; Bullock and MacManus 
1990b; Hero 1990; Alozie & Manganaro 1993; Sass 2000; Hero and Clarke 2003; 
Trounstine and Valdini 2008), state legislatures (Bullock 1992; Thompson and Moncrief 
1993; Fraga et al. 2003; Scola 2006; Casellas 2009), and U.S. Congress (Welch and 
Hibbing 1984; Vigil 1996; Lublin 1997b; Santos and Huerta 2001; Casellas 2007; 
Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011; Branton 2009). But, none systematically explore where 
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and to what extent Latinos are represented in U.S. mayoralties beyond single-city studies 
or small-N analyses. 
It is imperative to examine how Latinos fare in local government, particularly in 
the chief executive office, because leaders at this level are intimately involved with 
addressing policies that directly impact individuals, such as protective services, 
transportation, education, and economic development (see Trounstine 2009; Trounstine 
2010; Peterson 1981; Svara 1990; Garcia et al. 2008). Additionally, mayors are typically 
seen as leaders in their communities; and regardless of their administrative authority they 
often play a role in the policymaking process by acting as entrepreneurs to define 
problems, offer solutions, broker deals, and create consensus between various interest 
groups (see Stein 2003; Marschall and Shah 2005). Thus, Latino descriptive 
representation in the mayoralty can help improve the social, economic, and political 
status of the Latino population in cities across the country. Given the wide variation in 
local institutions and demographic contexts, focusing on local-level politics helps to 
reveal what combination of factors helps or hinders Latino representation in government.  
The research outlined in Table 1.2 shows that most studies examine some aspect 
of a single mayoral election (racial/ethnic voting patterns, turnout) with one notable 
Hispanic candidate in a select number of cities – mainly San Antonio, TX, Denver, CO, 
Los Angeles, CA, and Miami, FL. For example, Hero (1987), Muñoz and Henry 1990, 
and Hero (1992) examine the election and reelection of Federico Peña, Denver, 
Colorado’s first Latino mayor in 1983 and 1987 (see also Kaufmann 2003). Geron 
(2005), Rosales (2000), and Muñoz and Henry (1990) also provide a descriptive account 
of Henry Cisneros’s bid to be San Antonio’s first Latino mayor in 1981. Rosales (2000) 
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also describes the politics surrounding the 1991 mayoral election when Latina candidate, 
Maria A. Berriozábal, made a competitive, yet unsuccessful bid to be San Antonio’s first 
Latina mayor.  
Other research has focused on examining the 2001 and 2005 mayoral elections in 
Los Angeles – Antonio Villaraigosa’s bid to become this city’s first Latino mayor in 
modern history (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002; Sonenshein 2003; Geron 2005; Sonenshein 
and Drayse 2006; Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005). Mollenkopf et al. (2006) also 
study the racial/ethnic electoral support that led to the outcome of the New York mayoral 
elections in 2001 and 2005, where Fernando “Freddy” Ferrer twice made unsuccessful 
bids to be New York’s first Latino mayor. Geron (2005), Hill, Moreno, and Cue (2001) 
and Warren and Moreno (2003) examine Miami-Dade County mayoral elections and 
Hispanic candidates’ bids for the mayoralty there. Barreto (2007) examines two elections 
in five large cities (Los Angeles, Houston, New York, San Francisco, and Denver) to 
focus on the determinants of Latino turnout and Latino candidate vote share in mayoral 
elections.  
In addition to research focusing on a select number of elections in one city, Garcia 
et al. (2008) examine the political experiences of three Latina mayors in Texas, namely 
Blanca Sanchez Vela in 1999 (Brownsville, TX), Betty Flores in 1988 (Laredo, TX), and 
Olivia Serna in 1979 (Crystal City, TX). Garcia et al. (2008) also trace the political 
trajectories of two Latina city council members that made unsuccessful bids for mayor 
(Graciela Saenz, in Houston, TX (1997) and Maria A. Berriozábal (1991) in San Antonio, 
TX). Thus, this approach provides in depth knowledge about why Latina candidates 
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decided to run for elective office and further investigates what the major challenges they 
faced throughout their political careers. 
The research focusing on a select number of cities and elections has taken two 
different approaches to examining electoral outcomes for contexts with prominent 
Hispanic mayoral candidates. For example, there are those that take a qualitative 
approach using interviews and news coverage of the election to explain the Latino/a 
candidate’s background how they won or lost (Rosales 2000; Geron 2005; Garcia et al. 
2008). Additionally, there are studies that take a quantitative approach to examine 
racial/ethnic voting patterns to understand the coalitions that formed during a Latino 
candidate’s bid for the mayoralty. These quantitative studies use two types of data, 
namely surveys/exit polls (Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002; 
Sonenshein 2003; Kaufmann 2003) or precinct-level election results (Hero 1987; 1992; 
Barreto, Villarreal, & Woods 2005; Barreto 2007). Despite the use of these two 
approaches (surveys vs. precinct analysis), these studies have the specific goal to study 
electoral outcomes. For example, they either aim to examine the electoral coalitions that 
occur during an election with a Latino mayoral candidate or they want to know whether 
the presence of a Latino candidate influences coethnic voting patterns such as turnout and 
vote choice (see Barreto, Villarreal, and Woods 2005; Barreto 2007). However, these 
studies do not aim to understand what contributes to the emergence and ultimate success 
of the Latino candidates – which is the principal aim of this dissertation. 
On a different note, Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) and Hajnal and Trounstine 
(2010) examine whether a different candidate would win based on even turnout among 
racial/ethnic minorities in mayoral elections in two samples of cases: the 10 largest U.S. 
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cities and the largest 20 U.S. Cities, separately. The authors simulate a candidate’s vote 
share based on exit polls, precinct election results, and aggregate election results. 
Although they do have elections with Hispanic candidates in Houston, TX (Orlando 
Sanchez), San Antonio, TX (Ed Garza), and Los Angeles (Antonio Villaraigosa), and 
black candidates in other cities, they simulate whether a different winner, based on 
partisanship or ideology, is successful, rather than strictly focusing on the success of an 
African American or Latino candidate. Additionally, they predict a candidate’s vote share 
and not their actual success. That is, if a candidate’s simulated vote share reaches at least 
50.1% (as a function of increased turnout) then the authors argue that minority 
representation is more likely or occur. The research in Hajnal (2010) does not, however, 
examine the determinants of minority candidate success in mayoral elections.  
Beyond a few case studies or a few cases where Hispanics have been successful in 
their bids for the city’s top executive office there is no systematic study of Hispanic 
mayors. Specifically, there is no research detailing the extent to which Hispanics are 
represented in the mayoralty nor is there research exploring where Hispanic mayors are 
geographically located. Given that we do not know these two critical features of the 
political landscape, we also do not know where and why Hispanics are likely to emerge 
in mayoral elections and why they are more likely to win. It is possible that elections are 
more competitive where Hispanic candidate. But, there is simply no research that details 
the conditions under which this is likely to occur.  
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Table 1.2  
 
Empirical Studies of Latino Mayors 
Citation Goal of Study Cities, Elections, Yrs Data 
Hero (1987) Examine mayoral 
election outcome; 
racial/ethnic voting 
patterns; campaign 
strategy 
Cities=1, Elecs=1: Denver, CO, 
Federico Peña (1983) 
Personal interview 
with Peña strategists; 
analysis of newspaper 
reports on election; 
precinct voting data 
Hero (1992) Examine racial/ethnic 
voting patterns in 
mayoral election 
Cities=1, Elecs=2: Denver, CO, 
Federico Peña (1983 & 1987) 
Precinct voting data 
Muñoz and 
Henry (1990) 
Examine historical 
context of Latino 
political incorporation in 
San Antonio and Denver.  
Cities=4, Elecs=4:  
San Antonio, TX, Henry Cisneros 
(1981 & 1987); 
Denver, CO, Federico Peña (1983 
& 1987) 
Descriptive account 
of election outcomes 
& subsequent 
political 
consequences 
Browning et al. 
(1990) 
Examine black & Latino 
political incorporation 
(representation in gov, 
makeup of governing  
coalition, and policy 
responsiveness) 
Cities=10; Elecs=0:  
San Jose, Hayward, Stockton, 
Daly City, San Francisco, 
Sacramento, Vallejo, Berkeley, 
Oakland, and Richmond, CA 
(1975-1978; 1988) 
Descriptive stats of 
representation on 
council & mayoralty 
in each northern 
California city. 
Rosales (2000) Examine context of 
Latinos’ political 
inclusion in San 
Antonio, TX 
Cities=1, Elecs=2:  
San Antonio, TX: Henry Cisneros 
(1981) &  
Maria Berriozábal (1991)  
Historical, descriptive 
account of candidates 
and politics of San 
Antonio elections. 
Hill, Moreno, 
and (Cue 2001) 
Examine mayoral 
candidate preference by 
ethnicity & partisanship 
in mayoral election 
Cities=1, Elecs=1; Miami-Dade 
County, FL, Alex Penelas, Xavier 
Suarez, Maurice Ferre (1996) 
Three-wave survey of 
Dade County voters 
in 1996 
Sonenshein and 
Pinkus (2002)   
Examine racial/ethnic, 
SES, and Partisan voting 
patterns in mayoral 
elections 
Cities=1, Elecs=2;  
Los Angeles, CA (2001 primary 
& runoff) 
Exit Polls 
Browning et al. 
(2003) 
Examine black & Latino 
political incorporation 
(representation in gov, 
makeup of governing  
coalition, and policy 
responsiveness) 
Cities=10; Elecs=0:  
San Jose, Hayward, Stockton, 
Daly City, San Francisco, 
Sacramento, Vallejo, Berkeley, 
Oakland, and Richmond, CA 
(1970-1994-2002) 
*does not specify cities w/ Latino 
mayor 
Descriptive stats of 
representation on 
council & mayoralty 
in each northern 
California city. 
Sonenshein 
(2003) 
 
 
 
Examine racial/ethnic 
voting patterns in 
mayoral elections 
Cities=1, Elecs=5; Los Angeles 
(1993, 1997, 2001) primaries & 
runoffs 
Exit Polls 
Kaufmann 
(2003) 
Examine racial/ethnic, 
voting patterns 
(aggregate group support 
& turnout) in mayoral 
elections & examine 
perceptions of the city’s 
Cities=1, Elecs=4; 
Denver, CO (1983, 1987, 1991, & 
1995) 
Exit Polls 
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Table 1.2  
 
Empirical Studies of Latino Mayors 
Citation Goal of Study Cities, Elections, Yrs Data 
status during black/latino 
leadership 
Mollenkopf 
(2003) 
Examines why bi-racial 
coalition failed in NY in 
2001 
Cities=1, Elecs=4; New York 
(2001 party primaries, 1 party 
runoff, and general) – Fernando 
Ferrer (DEM) & Herman Badillo 
(GOP) 
Historical & 
descriptive account of 
election outcome 
Geron (2005) Examine Latino political 
incorporation 
Cities=4, Elecs=6: Miami, FL 
(2001); San Antonio, TX: Henry 
Cisneros (1981); Maria 
Berriozabal (1991); Ed Garza 
(2001); Los Angeles, CA: 
Antonio Villaraigosa & Xavier 
Becerra (2001). Salinas, CA: 
Anna Caballero (1998). 
Historical analysis & 
descriptive account of 
election outcomes 
(e.g., racial voting 
patterns) and 
candidate 
background. 
Barreto, 
Villarreal, & 
Woods (2005) 
What influences Latino 
turnout and Latino 
candidate vote share in 
mayoral elections? 
Cities=1; Elecs=2: 
Los Angeles (2001) & 
presidential election (2000) 
Precinct election 
returns in 2001 
mayoral and 2000 
presidential election 
Mollenkopf et al. 
(2006) 
Examine immigrant 
voting patterns in 
mayoral elections to 
examine turnout and 
vote choice 
Cities =2; Elecs=4 
Los Angeles, Antonio 
Villaraigosa (2001 & 2005); 
New York, Freddy Ferrer (2001 
& 2005) 
Precinct election 
results 
Barreto (2007) What influences Latino 
turnout and Latino 
candidate vote share in 
mayoral elections? 
Cities 5, Elecs=10; 
Los Angeles (2001&1997) 
Houston (2001&1999) 
NY (`01 primary & runoff) 
San Francisco (2003&1999) 
Denver (2003&1999) 
Precinct election 
results 
Garcia et al. 
(2008) 
Examine political 
experience of Latina 
politicians in Texas 
Cities=5: Cands=5; 
Brownsville, TX: Blanca Vela; 
Laredo, TX: Betty Flores; 
Crystal City, TX: Olivia Serna; 
Houston, TX: Graciela Saenz; 
San Antonio, TX; Maria 
Berriozábal 
Candidate interviews 
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Table 1.2  
 
Empirical Studies of Latino Mayors 
Citation Goal of Study Cities, Elections, Yrs Data 
Hajnal & 
Trounstine 
(2010) 
Simulate winner (vote 
share and success) of 
“different” candidates 
(racial/ethnic/partisanshi
p/ideology) given even 
turnout among 
racial/ethnic groups. 
2 samples: 
(ONE) Cities=10, Elecs=10: 
Chicago, Dallas, Detroit, 
Houston, Los Angeles, New 
York, Philadelphia, Phoenix, San 
Antonio, San Diego (2003) 
 
(TWO) Cities=17, Elecs=51: 
 
Note: Elections do not all have at 
least 1 minority candidate; 
Partisanship & ideology of 
candidates  
2 data sets: 
(ONE) 10 mayoral 
elections in 10 largest 
US cities in 2003 
using exit polls & 
precinct returns.  
 
(TWO) “any 
contested primary or 
general election in the 
nation’s twenty 
largest cities over the 
past decade” (p.54) 
using precinct 
returns.  
 
 
Dissertation Plan 
This dissertation specifically contributes to the literature in subnational politics, elections, 
and Latino Politics by examining various fundamental questions about Latino 
representation in the mayoralty. Specifically, I ask descriptive questions regarding where 
and why have Latino mayors been elected in the United States? Second, I examine causal 
questions about why Latino mayoral candidates emerge & win. Third, I investigate 
whether there is a link between Latino ethnicity and electoral outcomes. 
In Chapter 2, I provide an account of the total number of Latino mayors serving 
from 1984 to 2009. I also describe where Latino mayors are located geographically and 
the population and institutional characteristics of the 247 cities with Latino mayors in 
2009. Since no studies to date systematically explore where and to what extent Latinos 
are represented in the mayoralty, this chapter introduces readers to Latino mayoralties in 
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the U.S. and helps clear a path to empirically examining the determinants of Latino 
candidate emergence and success. In Chapter 3, I specifically examine the social, 
political, and institutional determinants of cities with Latino mayors. I rely on a large and 
representative sample of cities to examine this phenomenon – which is unprecedented. 
This empirical chapter is designed to provide the reader with a broad overview for why 
some cities have Latino mayors and why others do not.  
Because there are no Large-N studies that examine Latino representation in the 
mayoralty, we also do not know why Latino candidates emerge and why they win. 
Chapter 4 answers these questions by systematically examining the factors that determine 
the likelihood for Latino candidate emergence, success, and vote share in mayoral 
elections. I specifically employ a unique dataset of 657 elections in 113 cities in 6 
Southwestern states. In Chapter 5, I analyze how the presence of a quality Latino 
candidate influences electoral outcomes, such as city-level turnout and the margin of 
victory in mayoral elections. I conclude the dissertation in Chapter 6 by providing an 
overview of the major empirical contributions of this study. In addition, Chapter 6 
describes the implications of the empirical investigation by outlining the research 
questions that need to be further studied. 
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CHAPTER 2 
A DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF CITIES WITH LATINO MAYORS 
  
The focus of this dissertation is to systematically examine Latino mayoralties in the 
United States. The various demographic patterns of the Latino population outlined in the 
previous chapter suggest that the concentration of the Latino population in the Southwest 
(including the state of Texas) should point to substantial Latino representation in that 
region. Here, I descriptively examine where and to what extent Latinos are represented in 
the mayoralty. I specifically track where Latino mayors have been represented in 
mayoralties across geographic regions and states from 1984-2009. Additionally, I include 
a cross-sectional descriptive analysis of Latino mayors in 2009 to examine the 
contemporary demographic and institutional characteristics of cities with Latino 
representation in the mayoralty. 
To examine Latino representation over time, I specifically rely on the directories 
of Latino Elected Officials compiled by the National Association of Latino Elected & 
Appointed Officials (NALEO) from 1984-2009. In this chapter, I also incorporate recent 
demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau by relying on the American Community 
Survey 2005-2009 population estimates to describe the demographic characteristics of 
cities with Latino mayors. Finally, I rely on the International City and County 
Management Association’s Form of Government Surveys to describe the institutional 
characteristics of Latino-mayor cities. Given that Latino mayoralties have never been 
systematically examined beyond a few select cities and elections, it is imperative that a 
general overview is provided about where Latino mayors are located and what factors are 
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associated with their presence. Knowledge about where Latino mayors have recently 
served will inform the empirical studies described in the following chapters that 
particularly examine the causal determinants of Latino representation in the city’s top 
executive office as well as Latino mayoral candidate emergence and success. 
 
Latino Elected Officials in the U.S. 
First, I describe the level of government where most Latino elected officials serve. This 
will not only reveal the where we expect Latinos to be most politically incorporated, but 
also determine whether Latinos are sufficiently represented in the city’s chief executive 
office. Table 2.2 shows that of the 5,667 Latino elected officials, 5,390 serve in local 
government (County Government, Municipal Government, School Board), 252 serve in 
state-wide office (Governor, State Auditor, State Senator, State Representative), and only 
25 serve in Congress. In other words, nearly 95 percent of Hispanic elected officials serve 
in governments below the state-level.  
Inspecting the statistics on Latino local government officials more closely in 
Table 2.1, the NALEO data reveal that 548 Hispanic elected officials serve in county 
government (County Assessor/Treasurer, County Commissioner, and County Clerk) and 
842 serve as judges or elected law enforcement officers (Sheriff, County, Municipal, 
District Court Judge, and Justice of the Peace). However, most Hispanic elected officials 
serve in school districts. In 2009, 2,037 Latinos served as school board members. The 
next largest office where a large portion of Latino elected officials serve is in municipal 
government. Of the 1,713 Latinos elected at this level, 86 percent are city council 
members and about 14 percent are mayors. 
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Table 2.1 
 
Latino Elected Officials in 2009 
Office Held Num. Latinos Percent 
Congress 25 0.4% 
State Government 252 4.4% 
County Government 548 9.7% 
Judicial 842 14.9% 
City Council 1,466 25.9% 
Mayoralty 247 4.4% 
School Board 2,037 35.9% 
Special District 250 4.4% 
Total 5,667 
 This table describes the level at which Hispanic elected officials serve 
(Congress, State government, Municipal government) 
 
Source: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials  
 
 
A Focus on Latino Mayoralties (Over Time) 
Given that Latinos seem to be underrepresented in the mayoralty relative to other local 
level elective offices, it is imperative to describe the extent to which Latinos have been 
represented in the mayoralty over time. Combining the NALEO directories of Latino 
elected officials from 1984-2009, the data reveals an overall increase in the number of 
Latino mayors. Overall, Figure 2.1 shows that the number of Latino mayoralties has 
increased by 87 percent in the total 26 year period. Figure 2.1 also shows that throughout 
this period, nearly 88 percent of Latino mayors serve in Southwestern states including 
California, Colorado, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas.7 
                                                
 
7 The sudden decline in the number of Latino mayors in 1995 reflects a different accounting method used 
by NALEO after that period. 
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Focusing on regions outside the Southwest U.S., the trendlines in Figure 2.2 indicate a 
steady increase in the number of Hispanic mayors in the Northeast and the South. Over 
the past 26 years the Northeast region has seen an uptick in the number of Latino mayors 
from having zero in 1984 to six in 2009. The Southern region (not including the state of 
Texas) has experienced the largest increase in the number of Latino mayors compared to 
any of the four regions (outside the Southwest). Specifically, the South only had five 
Latino mayors in 1984 – which nearly tripled in 2009 to 14 Latino mayors. This 
phenomenon may be associated with the fact that the Southern region has experienced the 
largest Hispanic population growth rate in the last decade (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and 
Albert 2011). In the West region, there seems to be a period where very few Hispanic 
mayoral candidates were successful, particularly from the mid 1990s to 2007. The 
Midwest region gained some momentum in the early 1990s with regard to having more 
Latinos serving in the mayoralty, but it quickly leveled off (and declined) in 2009.  
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The Location of Latino Mayors Within Each State 
In addition to describing the total number of Latino mayors serving over a 26 year period 
in various regions, it is important to show where Latino mayors serve within those 
regions, and particularly within each state. In this section, I show which states have the 
most Latino mayors and also describe the demographic characteristics of cities with 
Latino representation (or Latino-mayor cities). 
Figure 2.3 shows that in 2009, approximately 87 percent of Latino mayors served 
in Southwestern municipalities (within the states of California, Arizona, Colorado, New 
Mexico, and Texas). Given the concentration of the Latino population in this area, it 
makes sense that most mayors of Latino descent are located there. Within each state, 
Figure	  2.2	  HispanicMayors	  Over	  Time	  in	  U.S.	  Regions
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
N
um
.	  o
f	  L
at
in
o	  
M
ay
or
s
West
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
N
um
.	  o
f	  L
at
in
o	  
M
ay
or
s
Midwest	  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
Northeast	  
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009
South
West	  Region:	  ID,	  MT,	  OR,	  WA,	  WY,	  UT
Midwest	  Region:	  ND,	  SD,	  NE,	  KS,	  MN,	  IA,	  MO,	  WI,	  IL,	  IN,	  MI,	  OH,	  OK
Northeast	  Region:	  PA,	  NY,	   NJ,	  CT,	  RI,	  MA,	  VT,	   NH,	  ME
South	  Region:	  AR,	  LA,	  MS,	  AL,	  TN,	  KY,	  WV,	  VA,	  MD,	  DE,	  NC,	  SC,	  GA,	  FL,	  Wash	  DC
Source:	  National Association	  of	  Latino	  Elected	  &	  Appointed	  Officials	  (NALEO)
29 
 
 
 
however, there are specific areas with large concentrations of Latino mayors. For 
example, in Texas, most of the Latino mayors are located in the southern part of the state 
(just south of San Antonio) – where there is a historically large concentration of Latinos. 
In New Mexico, most of the Latino mayors are located in the state’s north-central region. 
Arizona’s southern region (closer to the Mexican border) has its highest concentration of 
Latino mayors. California, on the other hand, has Latino mayors as far north as Daily 
City, CA and as far south as La Mesa, CA (near the U.S.-Mexico border). 
  
 
 
There are pockets of Latino mayors outside the Southwest region. These areas mainly lie 
in south Florida (Miami and surrounding communities), New England (New Jersey and 
Connecticut), and in the state of Washington. Figure 2.3 points to a major commonality 
Total Latino Mayors = 247
Figure 2.3 Geographic Location of Latino Mayors in 2009
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among these places: high concentrations of Latino populations are more likely to have 
Latino mayors. Despite the concentration, these non-Southwestern areas of the country 
only house 12 percent of the population of Latino mayor cities (compared to the 
Southwest – which holds 88 percent). The areas outside the Southwest also have the 
smallest proportion of Latinos in the country. For example, in Florida the Latino 
population is 8.4 percent of the total population and in New Jersey it is 3.1 percent 
(Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011, 7). 
 
Demographic Characteristics of Cities with Latino Mayors 
The descriptive statistics outlined in Figure 2.4 show that in all but one region (the 
Midwest) cities with Hispanic mayors have very high concentrations of Hispanics. More 
specifically, Hispanic mayor cities (on average) are 68 percent Hispanic. Cites in the 
West and the Southwest regions are the two regions that typically have the largest 
Hispanic voting-age population. Hispanic mayor cities in the Northeast and the South 
also have high concentrations of Hispanics. However, most cities in these regions have a 
slightly lower concentration (55-60 percent) of Hispanics. In the Midwest, the region 
with the fewest Hispanic mayor cities relative to the other regions has the smallest 
proportion of Hispanics. Specifically, the Hispanic mayor cities in the Midwest have a 20 
percent Hispanic voting-age population. What makes this region interesting is that 
Hispanics rarely compose a majority of the population, whereby potentially affecting the 
electoral strategies of Hispanic candidates. 
Figure 2.4 also shows the average city size for places represented by Hispanic 
mayors. Cities with Hispanic mayors located in the West region are likely to have less 
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than 6,000 inhabitants. In the Southwest, cities with Hispanic mayors are substantially 
larger in population size, where the average city is nearly 44,000. The region where 
Hispanic mayors represent larger cities (i.e., cities with a population over 73,000) is the 
Northeast in places like Patterson, NJ and Hartford, CT. Hispanic mayor cities in the 
Southern region have the second highest average in terms of population size.  
 
 
 
Searching For Possible Hispanic Mayor Cities 
The figures above clearly indicate that the average Hispanic population is relatively high 
in Hispanic mayor cities. However, exactly how many Hispanic mayor cities have 
majority Hispanic populations? Figure 2.5 below shows all Hispanic mayor cities in 2009 
as per the 2009 NALEO directory of Latino elected officials. In addition to showing the 
geographic distribution of the Hispanic mayor cities, the map denotes whether these cities 
are majority Hispanic or not. Specifically, all Hispanic mayor cities with a majority 
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Hispanic voting-age population (+50.1 percent) are represented by the light-colored 
circles. The dark-colored circles indicate Hispanic mayor cities with Hispanic voting-age 
populations less than 50.1 percent. Approximately 184 Hispanic mayor cities (75 percent) 
have a majority Hispanic voting-age population. On the other hand, 63 Hispanic mayor 
cities (25 percent) have less than a 50.1 percent Hispanic voting-age population. Thus, 
there is substantial variation in the demographic composition of Hispanic mayor cities in 
2009. Given this variation, it begs the question: Are there other majority Hispanic 
populated cities – locations where Hispanic mayors could potentially be elected – not in 
Figure 2.5? If not, how many more majority Hispanic populated cities do not have 
Hispanic representation in the mayoralty? 
 
 
N=	  184	  	  or	  75%
N=	  63	  or	  25%
Figure	  2.5	  Cities	  with	  Latino	  Mayors	  in	  2009
Source:	  National	  Association	  of	  Latino	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  &	  Appointed	  Officials	  (NALEO)
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To examine this question, I employ population data from the 2005-2009 American 
Community Survey estimates. I specifically use this data to account for all incorporated 
municipalities in the U.S. with majority Hispanic voting age populations. The data point 
to 439 cities in the U.S. that fit this demographic categorization. The light-colored circles 
in Figure 2.6 denote where these majority Hispanic cities are geographically located. The 
light-colored circles with black dots at their centroid are majority Hispanic populated 
cities with Latino mayors. According to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey 
population estimates, 42 percent of all majority Hispanic cities have a Latino mayor. 
However, 58 percent of all majority Hispanic cities do not have Latino representation in 
the city’s top executive office. 
 
 
Figure 2.7 Majority Latino Populated Cities
Source: 2005-2009 American  Community Survey Estimates
Figure	  2.6	   ajority	  Latino	  Populated	  Cities
Source:	  2005-­‐2009	  American	  Community	   Survey	  Estimates
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This is a notable finding from the descriptive statistics primarily because of the 
unexpected number of majority Hispanic populated cities without Hispanic mayors. In 
fact, there are approximately 255 incorporated municipalities in the U.S. where the 
Latino population is large enough (i.e., a majority) to have coethnic representation in the 
mayoralty but do not. Despite the fact that Hispanic mayor cities tend to have high levels 
of Hispanic populations, the evidence in Figure 2.6 suggests that the determinants of 
Latino descriptive representation must go beyond sheer numbers. Thus, another reason 
why the findings in Figure 2.6 are so notable is because they help justify the further 
investigation of Latino descriptive representation in municipal government. That is, one 
obvious empirical question that has not been studied to date is: What contributes to this 
variation in Latino representation in municipal government? As I will describe in the 
chapters below, the theoretical expectations for representation go beyond the size of the 
Latino population, and include racial demographics, city institutions, and electoral rules 
among other things. However, to further explore the racial and ethnic demographic 
context of cities where Latinos do not comprise a majority and have Latino mayors, in the 
following sections I describe the racial population of Hispanic mayor cities as well as 
their governing institutions.  
 
Exploring the Racial Context of Hispanic Mayor Cities 
Table 2.2 describes the proportion of the population for each racial/ethnic category in the 
American Community Survey’s 2005-2009 population estimates. In the Southwest 
region, cities that are not majority-Hispanic, but have Hispanic mayors, are on average 33 
percent Hispanic (voting age population), 51 percent non-Hispanic white population, 7 
percent black, and 6 percent Asian. In other words, the racial/ethnic minority voting-age 
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population is close to 46 percent and the non-Hispanic white population is 51 percent. 
The Southern region’s cities with Hispanic mayors also tend to have an interesting 
demographic makeup. Specifically, the average Hispanic and black voting-age population 
combined make up 50 percent of the city (see Table 2.2). The anomaly seems to be cities 
in the West region, which includes only 1 city (Port Townsend, WA). It has a 95 percent 
non-Hispanic white voting age population. 
 
Table 2.2 
 
Racial/Ethnic Context of Non-Majority Hispanic Cities with Hispanic Mayors 
Region 
Num. Non-
Maj. Cities 
with Hispanic 
Mayors 
Avg. Hispanic 
VAP  
Avg. White 
VAP  
Avg. Black 
VAP  
Avg. Asian 
VAP  
Avg. Native 
American 
VAP 
All 63 32% 52% 8% 6% 2% 
West 1 3% 95% 0% 1% 1% 
Southwest 52 33% 51% 7% 6% 2% 
Midwest 2 4% 87% 3% 4% 1% 
Northeast 2 29% 40% 18% 13% 0% 
South 6 34% 47% 16% 2% 0% 
Table describes the racial/ethnic context in cities that are not majority-Hispanic, but also with Hispanic mayors. 
Sources: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO)  
                U.S. Census Bureau, American Community Survey 2005-2009 Population Estimates 
 
The fact that there are Hispanic mayors in non-majority Hispanic cities raises the 
question about whether coalitions form along racial/ethnic lines. Some studies suggest 
that they have indeed formed in the past (see Hill, Moreno, and Cue 2001; Browning, 
Marshall, and Tabb 2003). However, there is no systematic evidence that goes beyond a 
single election or city. In the next dissertation chapter, I examine to see whether there is 
any evidence of minority coalitions. 
 
 
36 
 
 
 
Exploring the Institutional Characteristics of Hispanic Mayor Cities 
To also examine how cities (with Hispanic mayors) are politically structured, I rely on 
the International City and County Manager Association’s (ICMA) Form of Government 
Surveys conducted in five year survey waves from 1981-2006. The surveys ask city 
clerks/secretaries to describe the institutions of their city government such as whether the 
form of government is mayor-council or council-manager, whether the political party 
affiliation of municipal officials appears on the ballot, and how many council positions 
there are on the city council, among many other things.  
Because the survey instruments do not have a 100 percent response rate among all 
cities, I merged data on Hispanic mayors in 2009 with the ICMA data from all survey 
waves to have the most comprehensive dataset on municipal institutions as possible.8 To 
be more specific, I used data from the 2006 ICMA to include institutional information for 
74 cities, the 2001 ICMA for 35 cities, the 1996 ICMA for 31 cities, and the 1986 ICMA 
for 7 cities. Relying on the ICMA surveys provided institutional information for a total of 
163 cities or 66 percent of the cities with Hispanic mayors in 2009. To increase the 
coverage of institutional arrangements for cities with Hispanic mayors, I searched 
through city websites of the remaining 84 cities. Cities with Hispanic mayors and 
populations under 6,000 do not often have websites. This allowed me to obtain 
institutional information for 31 additional cities not covered by the ICMA surveys. 
Table 2.3 describes the institutional characteristics for 194 cities with Hispanic 
mayors in the United States in 2009. Approximately 64 percent of cities with Hispanic 
                                                
 
8 Granted, using the ICMA surveys from various waves other than the latest (2006) to more closely match 
the 2009 year of the NALEO data  may not be the most accurate because some cities may have changed 
their governing institutions. Further analysis may require investigating whether and when the 247 Hispanic 
mayor cities in 2009 changed their institutions. 
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mayors have Council-Manager form of governments. In addition, about 4 percent of 
cities have Commission form of governments. These reform-types of institutional 
structures are similar in that the mayor is institutionally weak compared to the city 
council (or city commission). Although these types of governments are more typical of 
Southwestern cities, 30 percent of the cities with Hispanic mayors have Mayor-Council 
governments. These cities, on the other hand, typically allow mayors to have the power to 
appoint city bureaucrats (i.e., police chiefs, city attorney) and veto legislation that is 
produced by the city council. Although the specific powers of mayors vary widely among 
cities with Mayor-Council governments (see Svara 1995), these cities’ mayors are 
considered to be more than just another member of the city council and are rather seen as 
major policy entrepreneurs. 
Table 2.3 
 
Institutional Characteristics of Cities with Hispanic Mayors 
Variable 
Num. 
Cities Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
City Population 193 56,293 279,076 486 3,796,840 
Mayor-Council Government 193 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Council-Manager Government 193 0.64 0.48 0 1 
Commission Government 193 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Council Size 193 6 2 2 16 
At-Large Districts 193 0.70 0.46 0 1 
Single Member Districts 193 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Mixed (at-large, SMDs) 193 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Partisan Elections 193 0.03 0.17 0 1 
Limit on Num. of Terms Served 175 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Table describes institutional characteristics of cities with Hispanic representation in the mayoralty 
Source: International City & County Management Association (ICMA) Form of Government Surveys 
 
Table 2.4 describes the geographic location of cities with Hispanic mayors with specific 
forms of government. 115 cities (93 percent) with Hispanic mayors have Council-
Manager governments that are particularly located in the Southwest region. This confirms 
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that this region’s municipal governments have power concentrated in the legislative body. 
The Commission form of government is also typical in the Southwest. However, among 
cities with Hispanic mayors in the Southwest, only Texas has these types of governments. 
The institutional arrangements of the city also include how city council members 
are elected. Although they could be elected several different ways, they are most 
commonly elected either at-large, in single-member districts, or by both methods. City 
council members elected at-large are elected by the entire city. Those in single-member 
districts are elected by a designated geographical area within the city. Table 2.3 (above) 
shows that approximately 70 percent of cities with Hispanic mayors in 2009 elected their 
city council members at-large. Close to 13 percent of cities with Hispanic mayors elect 
city council members by district. However, only 9 percent of cities with Hispanic mayors 
have part of their council members elected at-large or in single-member districts. 
Table 2.4 
States with Hispanic Mayors & Their Institutions 
State Region 
Cities with 
Latino 
Mayors 
Mayor-
Council 
Council-
Manager Commission 
Missing 
Institutional 
Data 
Arizona SW 15 2 11 0 2 
California SW 62 8 52 0 2 
Colorado SW 6 0 4 0 2 
Connecticut NE 1 0 1 0 0 
Florida South 13 7 6 0 0 
Indiana Midwest 1 1 0 0 0 
Maryland South 1 1 0 0 0 
Missouri Midwest 1 1 0 0 0 
New Jersey NE 5 4 0 1 0 
New Mexico SW 39 12 10 0 17 
Texas SW 96 18 38 7 33 
Washington West 6 2 1 0 3 
Wisconsin Midwest 1 1 0 0 0 
Total   247 57 123 8 59 
Table describes the institutions of cities across the U.S. that that have Hispanics mayors 
Sources: National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO) 
                International City & County Management Association (ICMA) Form of Government Surveys 
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The descriptive statistics in Table 2.5 show that 4 cities with Hispanic mayors have 
elections where the partisan affiliation is listed on the ballot during an election. The 
ICMA Form of Government Surveys show that these cities are located outside of Texas 
and California (two states with the most Hispanic mayors) such as Arizona, Connecticut, 
Indiana, and Washington. In fact, according to the previous literature it is rare for cities to 
have partisan municipal elections (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002). Moreover, this 
institution is rarer in the Southwest because most local governments in this area 
responded to Progressive Era government reforms to reduce the impact of political parties 
(see Davidson and Fraga 1988).9  
 
 
Table 2.5 
 
Cities with Hispanic Mayors & Partisan Elections 
 
City State Region 
 
South Tucson  Arizona SW 
 
Hartford  Connecticut NE 
 
East Chicago  Indiana Midwest 
 
Wapato  Washington West 
Sources:  
National Association of Latino Elected & Appointed Officials (NALEO) 
International City & County Management Association (ICMA)                 
 
 
  
                                                
 
9 The one city in Arizona with a Hispanic mayor, South Tucson, eliminated partisan elections in 2008 via a 
local initiative. Tucson (not South Tucson) is the only city in Arizona that continues to designate municipal 
candidates’ partisan affiliation on the electoral ballot (O’Dell 2008). 
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Conclusion 
The descriptive statistics provided in this chapter reveal a few notable patterns of cities 
with Latino representation in the mayoralty. For example, nearly 85 percent of Hispanic 
mayor cities are located in the Southwest. This seems to correspond with conventional 
wisdom that suggests that Latinos are more likely to be represented in places where the 
Latino population is most concentrated. This includes states such as Texas, New Mexico, 
Arizona, and California, and Florida. Additionally, 75 percent of cities with Latino 
mayors have a majority Latino population or above. However, Figure 2.5 indicates that a 
quarter of Hispanic mayor cities have a Hispanic voting-age population less than 50 
percent. Further investigation reveals that only 42 percent of cities with majority 
Hispanic voting age populations have Latino representation in the mayoralty. That is, 
58% of all majority Hispanic cities do not have Hispanic mayors. This unexpected, yet 
revealing finding indicates that Hispanic population size may not be the sole factor 
contributing to Hispanic representation in municipal government. Thus, the next obvious 
question that has not been studied to date is: What explains this variation in Latino 
mayoral representation? That is, what do some cities have Latino mayors and why others 
do not? Other factors may contribute to Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty 
beyond Hispanic population size, such as the presence of potential racial/ethnic coalition 
partners and various city-level institutions. The descriptive statistics in this chapter reveal 
a few patterns of Latino represented cities. For example, in non-majority cities, where no 
racial/ethnic group composes a majority of the voting age population, the combined 
Hispanic, black, and Asian population is rather sizeable - suggesting that possible 
minority led coalitions form to help elect Latino mayors. Also, most cities with Latino 
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mayors are council manager cities. Does this governing arrangement facilitate not only 
the formation of coalitions, but the ultimate election of racial/ethnic minority mayors, 
because less prestigious offices reduce the barrier to elective offices? As I will explain 
below, the previous literature suggests that council-manager governments are more 
conducive to minority representation. However, this has not been systematically 
examined beyond single cities or elections. Also, approximately 14 percent of Hispanic 
mayor cities have term limits. Does the presence of this electoral rule increase the 
probability of seeing Latino mayors? Does the impact of this rule further depend on the 
size of the Latino population? The previous research on Latino representation, in other 
levels of government, suggests that it does. Unfortunately, we do not know whether and 
when it influences Latino representation in the mayoralty. Therefore, in Chapter 3, I rely 
on a large sample of cities constructed from the ICMA Form of Government Surveys 
conducted from 1981-2006 to examine the causal determinants of Latino representation 
in the mayoralty. That is, I analyze the demographic, institutional, and political factors 
that are associated with Latino mayoral descriptive representation.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 LATINOS AT THE PINNACLE OF MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT: A BIRD’S EYE VIEW OF 
LATINO DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION IN U.S. MAYORALTIES FROM 1981-2006 
 
 
Natural disasters, economic downturns, and demands for various social services10 place a 
tremendous amount of pressure on municipal governments – particularly its leaders – to 
get things done. Often this pressure is compounded not only by federal and state laws 
requiring local governments to provide certain services, but also by rising operating 
budget expenditures as well as limited sources of revenue. Whether it is balancing 
social/cultural integration policies with economic demands for labor or having to decide 
where to implement economic development policies within the city limits, local 
governments are largely responsible for addressing everyday issues that people face (see 
Benavides 2008; Trounstine 2009).  
At the head of the table, often sits a city executive that is responsible for making 
these tough decisions. In some cases, city executives are elected (mayors); and in others 
they are appointed (city managers). Where mayors are part of the governing structure, 
they are known to be the major actors in the political system (Stein 2003). Although 
mayors’ specific impact on policy outcomes partly depends on the political structure of 
municipal government, they often have the freedom “to negotiate and compromise with 
key players…in order to implement an agenda” (Stein 2003, 150). In other words, mayors 
are typically seen as leaders in their communities regardless of their administrative 
authority and often play a role in the policymaking process by acting as entrepreneurs to 
                                                
 
10 Social services provided by local governments include: parks, pools, libraries, schools, garbage disposal, 
public transit, and police/fire protection. 
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define problems, offer solutions, and broker deals (see Kingdon 1984; Baumgartner and 
Jones 1993; Mintrom 1997; Marschall and Shah 2005). 
In addition to federal, state, and local laws (as well demographic changes) 
impacting mayors’ political behavior, some of the literature in political science shows 
that the racial and ethnic background of the mayor can have an independent effect on 
policy outcomes (Mladenka 1989; Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003). In fact, minority 
descriptive representation in municipal government has been shown to produce 
substantive benefits for coethnic populations including hiring more minorities in city 
government and city boards, contracting more with minority-owned businesses, and 
implementing criminal justice policies that are sensitive to racial/ethnic populations 
(Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003; see also Hero 1992, 124; Geron 2005, 172-6). 
However, Browning et al. (2003) suggest that in places where racial and ethnic groups 
have gained representation in municipal government, their powers and resources are 
limited to make policy change to adequately improve their social, economic, and political 
status. Thus, a debate continues about whether and to what extent the gains made as a 
result of representation have been largely symbolic (Browning et al. 2003, 7).  
Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty has not been systematically 
studied by anyone. Thus, before the relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation can be explored, we first need to explore the conditions under which 
Latino mayoralties rise. Beyond single-city case studies and small-N analyses, we do not 
know the extent to which Hispanic mayors have been successful in elections. Moreover, 
much of the research on descriptive representation in municipal government focuses on 
African American mayors (see Marschall 2010; Marschall and Ruhil 2006). Thus, the 
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questions that have yet to be answered in the contemporary research include: Does Latino 
representation in the mayor’s office simply depend on the strength of the Latino 
population in a city? If not, are there certain socioeconomic and political conditions that 
increase the likelihood of Latino representation? How do these conditions differ in 
contexts where no racial/ethnic group has a majority of the population? Also, do various 
demographic and institutional factors (i.e., term limits; partisan elections) impact whether 
we see Hispanics serving at the helm of municipal government?  
In this chapter, I specifically build on Marschall and Ruhil’s (2006) study of black 
mayors to explore the determinants of Latino mayoralties by combining data from the 
International City/County Management Association’s (ICMA) Form of Government 
surveys, the NALEO Latino elected official rosters, and data from the U.S. Census. The 
data is a pooled cross-section of cities that responded to the ICMA surveys in 1981, 1986, 
1992, 1996, 2001, and 2006. Below, I review the literature to build an appropriate 
theoretical model of Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty. 
 
Building a Theoretical Model of Latino Mayoral Representation 
To construct a theoretical model that examines the incidence of Latino mayors, I build on 
research that has examined Latino descriptive representation in legislative settings (Shah 
2009; Casellas 2009; Casellas 2011), case studies of mayoral elections with Latino 
candidates (Hero 1987; Hero 1992; Hero and Clarke 2003) as well as the research on 
African American and female descriptive representation in the mayoralty (Marschall and 
Ruhil 2006; Smith, Reingold, & Owens 2011). For example, conventional wisdom as 
well as early explanations of racial and ethnic minority political influence (within the 
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context of elections) suggests that the voting strength of a group is a necessary condition 
for representation (Hero 1992). In places where Latinos do not constitute a majority of 
the population, they will have to create bi- or multi-racial alliances in politics to gain 
political representation (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984). However, more recent 
studies of minority representation reveal that influence and representation is also a 
function of various political structures and institutions that can serve as either obstacles 
or opportunities for minority representation (Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Casellas 2009; 
Casellas 2011). Additionally, the research that goes beyond voting strength suggests that 
the capacity of the minorities to gain higher office depends on their representation in 
lower-level government (Marschall and Ruhil 2006). In sum, there are four general 
concepts that I expect to influence the incidence of Latino mayoralties: voting strength, 
the racial context of a city, political structures/institutions, and Latino political capacity. 
Below, I describe these concepts in more detail and outline how I expect each to 
influence the representation of Latinos in the city’s chief executive office. 
 
Latino Voting Strength 
To begin, a model of Latino descriptive representation depends on Latinos’ political 
strength within the context of elections. The foundational explanation for why Latinos do 
not enjoy parity in the government decision making process (and representation) is, as 
Hero (1992) explains, because: 1) Latinos constitute a small proportion of the population 
and 2) they are largely in the lower-end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Having limited 
socioeconomic resources is strongly associated with reduced levels of political 
participation (see Verba and Nie 1972). Given that most Latinos do not belong to the 
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middle and upper social strata of society, their role is primarily reduced to being 
recipients of policy rather than being involved in agenda-setting (Hero 1992, 196). When 
political outcomes in American politics are determined by majoritarian rules, Latinos 
generally have diminished political power and influence in the decision-making process. 
In other words, Latinos’ political clout in electoral contexts hinges upon their strength in 
numbers and their socioeconomic status.  
Current research has shown that the size of the minority population is a critical 
determinant of descriptive representation (see Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Lublin 1997b; 
Casellas 2009). In local government, higher proportions of minorities increases the 
chances that a minority candidate will win office (Karnig and Welch 1980); and that a 
minority group’s mobilization efforts will be more effective (Browning, Marshall, and 
Tabb 2003). Without a sizeable middle-class Latino population, representation is also less 
likely to occur because there is simply a limited supply of qualified Hispanic candidates 
to run for elected office.  
The literature examining the representation (and political incorporation) of 
African Americans has further found that the socioeconomic resources available to that 
community are particularly important for the election of black mayors (Karnig and Welch 
1980; Marschall and Ruhil 2006). For example, Robinson and Dye (1978) found that 
higher levels of education among the black population lead to more coethnic 
representation on the city council. In places where racial/ethnic minorities have achieved 
a higher social status are also presumed to be better able to not only field quality minority 
candidates (Meier and Stewart 1991), but sustain high levels of political and interest-
group activities among minorities. Given that these findings impact African American 
47 
 
 
 
descriptive representation, I expect that Latinos will also be more likely to be represented 
in the mayoralty the stronger they are numerically and socioeconomically.  
 
Racial Context 
The release of the 2010 Census data reveals that the Latino population is growing rapidly 
across the U.S. (Ennis, Ríos-Vargas, and Albert 2011). Additionally, not only are more 
cities becoming multi-racial because of these demographic changes, they are also 
becoming more Latino-dominant (Marschall and Shah 2011). These developments have 
implications for Latino representation – particularly in that the success of Latino 
candidates can hinge upon the presence of potential coalition partners. In other words, 
even though demographic trends suggest that Latino populations are becoming more 
dominant, the Latino population is still younger than whites (and blacks) – as well as 
having a larger segment of that demographic being ineligible to vote due to their 
citizenship status. Thus, Latinos may have to continue to form political coalitions to 
overcome barriers to access power within municipal government. Browning, Marshall, 
and Tabb (2003) explain that in order for racial/ethnic groups to be effectively 
represented in the policymaking process they can undertake an electoral strategy that 
involves the formation of these biracial or multiracial coalitions. 
Marschall and Ruhil (2006) provide real-world examples where coalitions 
between liberal whites and African American formed to elect Black mayors in New York, 
New Haven, New Orleans, and Los Angeles (Marschall and Ruhil 2006, 835). Browning 
et al. (1984) suggest that in ten cities in California, minorities formed liberal coalitions 
that included racial and ethnic minorities, poor whites, and white liberal Democrats – 
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usually from the middle- to upper-class. Hero (1992) describes that a black, Latino, and 
liberal Democrat coalition successfully elected Denver’s first Latino mayor in 1983. 
Although coalitions between Latinos and African Americans are most expected to form, 
due to their shared levels of socioeconomic and political circumstances, research has 
found that black-Latino coalitions are unlikely to form because of perceptions of 
competition or social distance between blacks and Latinos. Given these barriers to 
coalition formation between Latinos and African Americans, other research has shown 
that coalitions are more likely to form between Latinos and Anglos (see McClain and 
Karnig 1990; Meier and Stewart 1991b) and African Americans and Anglos (see Rocha 
2007).  
During the 1996 Miami-Dade County mayoral elections, Latinos and African 
Americans voted based on race rather than political party affiliation (see Hill, Moreno, 
and Cue 2001). Kaufmann (2003) suggests that in Denver during the election of a Latino 
candidate (Federico Peña) and an African American candidate (Wellington Webb) blacks 
and Latinos did not mobilize equally for one another’s coethnic candidates. In Los 
Angeles, during the 2001 mayoral election, a Latino-Black coalition failed to form – 
which was largely to blame for Antonio Villaraigosa’s losing his first bid to become Los 
Angeles’s first Latino mayor (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002). In fact, nearly 71 percent of 
African Americans supported the incumbent Anglo, James Hahn, while 62 percent of 
Latinos supported Villaraigosa (Sonenshein and Pinkus 2002, 69). Mollenkopf et al. 
(2006) find that Villaraigosa had much more wide-spread support among African 
Americans in the 2005 mayoral election, when Villaraigosa won his second bid to be 
mayor. Given the debate in the literature about whether biracial or multiracial coalitions 
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form during mayoral where Latinos bid for the mayoralty, further analysis is required to 
determine whether the presence of African Americans or liberal Anglos influence the 
incidence of a Latino mayoralties in the US. 
 
Institutions 
The evidence in the previous chapter found that 58 percent of majority-Hispanic cities in 
2009 did not have Hispanic mayors. Thus, in addition to sheer voting strength and 
multiracial coalitions potentially contributing to the incidence of Latino mayors, there are 
other factors that could either help or hinder the likelihood of Latino representation in the 
city’s top executive office. The research on black and Latino representation in 
subnational legislative settings (school boards, city councils, and state legislatures) 
suggests that institutions and political structures affect minority political empowerment in 
different ways. The institutions that have been found to influence minority representation 
include various Progressive Era reform such as, weak-mayor forms of government, non-
partisan elections, and term limits. However, a debate exists in the literature about which 
of these institutions influence minority representation, how they influence representation 
(positively or negatively), and whether they affect black, Hispanic, and women’s 
representation equally. Given this debate and lack of systematic analysis examining 
whether and how these factors influence the incidence of Latino mayors, the question 
remains: Which of these institutions can help or hinder Latino representation in the 
mayoralty? 
The research reveals that Progressive Era reforms weakened the influence of 
political parties and ultimately limited the influence of racial and ethnic minorities in 
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politics (Marschall and Ruhil 2006, 831; see also Davidson and Fraga 1988). However, 
the empirical evidence is mixed as to whether the institutions associated with Progressive 
Era reforms serve as obstacles or opportunities for minority representation. Specifically, 
Marschall and Ruhil’s (2006) research find that cities are more likely to have black 
mayors if they have council-manager or commission forms of government than cities with 
mayor-council governments. On the other hand, partisan elections decrease the 
likelihood of black (Marschall and Ruhil 2006) and female mayoralties (Smith, Reingold, 
and Owens 2011). Although Marschall and Ruhil (2006) find that partisan elections have 
a negative effect on black mayoralties in non-majority cities, these findings are surprising 
given that researchers have argued that political parties – particularly the Democratic 
Party – have historically incorporated racial/ethnic minorities and other low-income 
voters into the political arena.11  
However, because council-manager governments emphasize the 
professionalization of service delivery via independently appointed bureaucrats, the 
political environment is substantially less competitive. This may facilitate the inclusion of 
minorities in municipal government not only because minority candidates experience less 
resistance from other groups in the voting booth, but also because multiracial coalitions 
are more likely to form (Sonenshein 2003; Hero and Clarke 2003; Welch and Karnig 
1979). Researchers suggest that minority candidates can expect less resistance in cities 
with these institutional structures (see Sonenshein 2003; Hero and Clarke 2003).  
                                                
 
11 Davidson and Fraga (1988) write that the Democratic Party has been the “primary organization that 
educates and mobilizes lower-income voters” and removing this cuing mechanism for minorities has had 
deleterious effects on their representation (Davidson and Fraga 1988, 374). Moreover, reformed structures 
have been found to suppress minority political participation, therefore reducing levels of minority political 
incorporation (Hajnal and Lewis 2003). 
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Beyond these studies, Casellas (2009) further theorizes that Latinos seeking 
higher office are not likely to be as successful when seeking office in more prestigious 
legislatures because these are more financially desirable offices. Thus, underrepresented 
groups, such as Latinos, are more likely to experience an electoral obstacle if cities have 
prestigious executive office because the electoral context is potentially more competitive. 
Although Casellas (2009) does not find a statistically significant relationship between 
legislative professionalization and descriptive representation, it is important to consider 
whether the prestige of the mayoralty will serve as an obstacle to Latino representation. 
Rather than institutions serving as obstacles to minority representation, the 
research has outlined that they can create opportunities for underrepresented groups. One 
example is as term limits. However, a debate exists about whether and to what extent this 
electoral rule positively influences Latino representation – particularly in the mayoralty. 
First, term limits has not been systematically studied for their effects on black or Latino 
mayoralties. But Trounstine and Valdini (2008), who examine minority representation 
(blacks, Latinos, and women) in city councils, have mixed findings. Specifically, they 
shows that term limits have no impact on the proportion of black and Latino 
representation in city council, but that it has a positive and significant effect on the 
proportion of female city council members. Smith, Reingold, and Owns (2011) find no 
statistical relationship between term limits and the incidence of female mayors. Casellas 
(2009) also finds that the enactment of term limits is not statistically associated with the 
representation of Latino state legislators, but that the implementation of term limits has an 
independent and negative effect on Latino representation. Limiting the number of 
consecutive terms that incumbents can serve can, in theory, provide opportunities for 
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racial and ethnic minorities. Moreover, it is exponentially more difficult to unseat an 
incumbent – who like members of Congress tend to not only win more often, but win by 
larger margins (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Krehbiel and 
Wright 1983; Cox and Morgenstern 1993; Cox and Katz 1996; Ansolabehere and Snyder 
2002).  
Thompson and Moncrief (1993) suggest that term limits do not negatively affect 
female retention rates in state legislatures. However, the implementation of term limits 
may have unintended consequences. Thompson and Moncrief (1993) point out that term 
limits might negatively affect African American representation by ousting black 
incumbents. Although Thompson and Moncrief (1993) suggest that if coethnic 
incumbents might be negatively affected by term-limits, “it is improbable that 
nonminority candidates would be elected from predominantly minority districts” 
(Thompson and Moncrief 1993, 308). This finding points to the importance of the 
numerical strength of the minority population in that it works in conjunction with term-
limits. An analysis by Caress et al. (2003) examines the impact of term limits on minority 
representation in California and Michigan. The authors reveal that term limits and 
demographic shifts in the minority population impact levels of representation in state 
legislatures. In particular, they find that Hispanic representation increased in the 
California legislature following the implementation term limits in 1996 and because the 
Latino population grew rapidly over the previous decade. For African Americans in 
Michigan, a gain in representation was very modest after the implementation of term 
limits because blacks had already achieved overrepresentation in the state House of 
Representatives. Moreover, during this time period the African American population did 
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not grow (Caress et al. 2003; except see Carey et al. 2006 for a negligible effect of term 
limits on minority representation in state legislatures). Therefore, the relationship 
between numerical strength and term limits needs to be explored in terms of whether it 
influences Latino representation in the mayoralty.  
 
Latino Political Capacity 
In addition to Latino voting strength, the potential formation of multiracial coalitions, and 
institutional structures, previous research has pointed to the political capacity of minority 
leadership to increase the likelihood of representation in the city’s chief executive office. 
Specifically, when racial and ethnic groups have a supply of qualified minority elites with 
previous political experience, name recognition, political networks, and financial 
resources, they are more likely to run and serve in higher-level office. For example, 
Marschall and Ruhil (2006) find that cities with more African American city council 
members are more likely to have black mayors than cities with fewer descriptive 
representatives in the city legislature. Smith et al. (2011) also find that more women city 
legislators have a positive impact on the presence of female mayors. There is ample 
anecdotal evidence that successful mayoral candidates have previous experience serving 
in the city legislature. Thus, to see Latino mayoral candidates such as Julian Castro in 
San Antonio, Texas and Gus Garcia in Austin, Texas Latinos may require sufficient 
levels of descriptive representation in the city council.  
Given that mayoral candidates often have to be strategic in terms of when they 
decide to run, it is conceivable that Latino candidates must consider whether they can win 
based on the strength of the Latino population and the institutional context of the city. For 
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example, although prestigious institutions, in theory, detract minority candidates because 
of the ferocity of the electoral competition, it is possible that Latino candidates may have 
the capacity to win in those contexts if Latinos are strong enough within the context of 
city politics. In other words, Latino candidates may rely on the coethnic Latino 
population to help them win elections, and might be more likely to run for a more 
desirable office in contexts where Latinos are numerically (and socioeconomically) 
stronger. The interactive relationships between institutions and Latino voting strength 
have never been examined in terms of their effects on Latino political representation in 
the mayoralty. Thus, in this study, I analyze whether these conditions influence this 
political outcome.  
 
Modeling Latino Representation in the Mayoralty 
The conceptual model, outlined above, suggests that Latino descriptive representation in 
the mayoralty is a function of Latinos’ voting strength, the racial context of a city, city 
institutions, and the political capacity of Latino leadership. In this section, I will describe 
the measures used to operationalize the concepts of the following model:  
 
Latino Representation in the Mayoralty = Latino Voting Strength + Racial 
Context + Institutions + Political Capacity of Latino Leadership + Controls 
 
The data used to examine Latino descriptive representation in the mayor’s office (i.e., the 
presence of Latino mayors in U.S. cities) are drawn from the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996, 
2001, and 2006 Form of Government Surveys conducted by the International City/County 
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Management Association (ICMA). The combined survey waves provide information on 
the institutional structures (i.e., partisan elections, form of government, term limits, etc.) 
of 7,779 unique municipalities. All of the survey waves (conducted every five years) are 
combined in this study, thus making the unit of analysis the city-year. Combining the 
survey waves allows for election outcomes, occurring some time within the five year 
period, to be studied as a cross-section and over time. This is particularly useful when 
studying a large sample of cities that not only schedule elections at different times, but 
have terms that vary in length. Thus, with each survey wave we can assume that at least 
one election (and term) took place. Moreover, this method is particularly effective for 
exploring Latino representation in a large and representative sample of cities in the U.S. 
in that it provides substantial leverage to examine varying demographic, institutional, and 
political factors in municipalities.  
To match the ICMA sample cities with city-level demographic characteristics, I 
specifically use U.S. Census data from 1980 for the 1981 observations; the 1990 Census 
for the 1991 observations; the 2000 Census data for the 2001 observations; and the 2005-
2009 American Community Survey five-year estimates for the 2006 observations. 
Demographic data was linearly interpolated for the years in-between these observations 
(1986, 1996). 
The dependent variable examined here is whether a city has a Latino mayor. This 
measure is coded as 0 if a city does not have a Latino mayor and 1 if the city does have a 
Latino mayor. To identify cities that had Latino mayors, I relied on the directories of 
Latino elected officials provided by the National Association of Latino Elected and 
Appointed Officials (NALEO). The NALEO data from 1984 were used for the 1981 
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observations in the dataset, the 1986 NALEO data for the 1986 observations, the 1991 
NALEO data for the 1991 observations, the 1996 NALEO data for the 1996 observations, 
the 2001 NALEO data for the 2001 observations, and the 2006 NALEO data for the 2006 
observations. 
 
Latino Voting Strength 
The conventional wisdom and numerous empirical investigations indicate that the voting 
strength of the Latino population is a major factor influencing whether Latinos are 
represented in government. I specifically rely on two variables to measure the concept of 
Latino voting strength: 1) a binary variable indicating whether a city voting-age 
population12 is majority Latino and 2) the percent of the college educated Latinos in a 
city. I expect that cities that have a majority Latino voting-age population are more likely 
to have Latino mayors than cities where Latinos are less than 50.1 percent of the voting-
age population. Given that the political strength of a racial/ethnic group depends 
socioeconomic status of the due to the relationship between status and political 
participation rates, I expect that cities with a larger college educated Latino population to 
have a higher likelihood of having Latino mayors than cities with a smaller proportion of 
college educated Latinos. These demographic characteristics were gathered from the U.S. 
Census and the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS). 
 
                                                
 
12 Although, I would ideally like to rely on the proportion of the citizen voting-age Latino population to get 
the most accurate account of the voting strength of the Latino population, the 1990 Census data does not 
account for the citizen voting-age population by ethnicity. So, the next best measure of the proportion of 
eligible Latinos in a city is the proportion of Latinos voting-age to generate the majority Latino city dummy 
variable. 
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Racial Context 
In places where Latinos do not constitute a majority, there may be instances where 
multiracial coalitions form to help elect Latino candidates to the mayoralty. Thus, I 
include a binary measure for non-majority cities – where no racial or ethnic group 
constitutes more than 50.1 percent of the voting age population (1=yes; 0=no). However, 
the question remains as to whether the presence of African Americans or liberal Anglos 
influences the incidence of Latino mayoralties in non-majority cities. To examine 
whether the presence of African Americans in non-majority cities influences the 
incidence of Latino mayoralties, I include an interaction term for Non-majority 
City*Percent Black Voting-age Population. A statistically significant interaction term 
will point to the specific likelihood of observing a Latino mayoralty, given the specific 
black population size. For example, do Latino mayors rise when Blacks constitute 10 
percent of the population, 20 percent, or 40 percent? Perhaps, the size of the black 
population in a non-majority city is not statistically related to the probability of observing 
a Latino mayor. This indeed has to be further studied. In addition, I include an interaction 
term for Non-majority City*Percent College Educated Anglos to examine whether Latino 
mayoralties are more likely to occur as educated Anglo population varies. Given that 
previous research has established that college educated Anglos have liberal views toward 
race (see Glaser 2001; Jacoby 1991), I expect to see Latino mayoralties where no 
racial/ethnic group constitutes a majority and where the Anglo college educated 
population is numerically sizeable.  
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Institutions 
To examine whether and how various city-level institutions affect Latino representation 
in city government, I include binary measures indicating whether cities have Mayor-
Council Form of Governments, (1=yes; 0=no) and whether municipal elections have 
Partisan labels on the ballot to identify candidates’ political affiliation (1=yes; 0=no). 
These measures test the hypotheses regarding the influence of Progressive Era reforms. 
Additionally, as outlined above, the previous research further suggests that the 
desirability of the office may hinder minority candidates’ chances at success because the 
competition is more severe (Casellas 2009). To examine for the effect of prestige on the 
incidence of Latino mayoralties I include a binary measure for whether the city mayoralty 
is a full-time job. Full-time mayors may not only be compensated more than part-time 
mayors, but they may also have more responsibilities over city departments and policy.  
Although the literature suggests that reformed institutions such as council-
manager governments and non-partisan elections may be less competitive and increase 
minority representation, the effect of these institutions may vary based on the racial and 
ethnic composition the city. For example, the electoral context can be more competitive if 
no group has a majority of the population (Non-majority City*Mayor-Council 
Government). On the other hand, cities with majority Latino populations and mayor-
council governments or partisan elections may be less competitive – particularly because 
of established (and amicable) race relations. In other words, Latinos in majority Latino 
cities may experience less resistance to Latino leadership (in the mayoralty) even in 
contexts where the elective offices are more desirable because Latinos have already 
established some level of political incorporation. However, these relationships, in terms 
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of their effects on the incidence of Latino mayors have not been fully explored and in this 
chapter I fill this gap in the research by including various interaction terms, such as Non-
majority City*Mayor-Council Government, Non-majority City*Full-time Mayor, Non-
majority City*Partisan Elections, Majority Latino City*Mayor-Council Government, 
Majority-Latino City*Full-time Mayor, Majority Latino City*Partisan Elections. 
 Moreover, to examine the claim about whether and when term limits creates 
opportunities for Latino representation, I include a binary variable indicating whether a 
city has Mayoral Term-limits (1=yes;0=no). That is, I account for whether the city limits 
the total number of terms that mayors can serve consecutively using the ICMA Form of 
Government Surveys. I expect that this variable (alone) has a positive effect on the 
incidence of Latino mayoralties. Given that Latinos are generally underrepresented in 
government, limiting the number of terms a mayor can serve should open up doors for 
Latino candidates seeking the mayoralty. However, as Thompson and Moncrief (1993) 
and Casellas (2009) have found, term limits may have a negative effect on minority 
group representation if they constitute a significant proportion of the population. In other 
words, cities with a large Latino population may be negatively impacted by term limits 
since they may be more likely to already have descriptive representation in government.  
Although Latinos may have sufficient numbers to replace a term limited Latino 
mayor with another Latino mayor, having a majority of the population does not guarantee 
that a majority of voters will be Latinos. In local elections, where voter registration (and 
turnout) is low, electoral outcomes may depend on a small group of pivotal voter. Thus, 
to examine the variation of demographic context in term limited cities, I include an 
interaction for Majority Latino City*Mayoral Term Limits and Non-Majority 
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City*Mayoral Term Limits. This will help determine whether and when Latinos may 
benefit from term limits. 
 
Latino Political Capacity 
Given that the previous research on black (Marschall and Ruhil 2006) and female (Smith 
et al. 2011) representation in the mayoralty has found that minority representation on the 
city council is positively associated with minority representation in the city’s top 
executive office, I include a measure that accounts for the percent of Latinos that serve 
on the city council. This specifically tests the claim about whether Latinos have the 
political capacity to be successful in higher-level offices if they not only have a 
substantial supply of qualified candidates, but if they have been sufficiently politically 
incorporated in lower-level government. This measure will help determine the level of 
influence Latinos need to have in the city legislature (e.g., 50 percent of seats in the city 
council) to have a sufficient supply of quality candidates to gain the mayoralty. To gather 
this data I relied on the NALEO directories of Latino elected officials from 1984-2006. 
For the total number of seats in the city legislature I rely on the ICMA Form of 
Government Surveys.  
Controls 
Finally, I control for a variety of factors, such as whether the mayor is directly elected, 
whether a city is located in a Southwest state such as Arizona, California, Colorado, New 
Mexico, Nevada, and Texas, and the city size – which is measured as the natural log of a 
city’s total population.  
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Statistical Methodology 
Given the binary nature of the dependent variable, I employ a logistic regression to 
examine the incidence of Latino mayoralties. To model the dependence between 
“elections” (or panels) for the same city, I specifically use a random effects logistic 
regression because it provides robust standard errors clustered by city and year (see 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005, 42). A standard pooled model provides estimates that 
average across and within each city.13 Thus, to accurately determine whether most of the 
variation in the model occurs across cities or within each city (i.e., over time), I provide 
estimates for both a pooled model and a random effects model. As I will describe in more 
detail below, the estimates for both models are quite similar, thus indicating that the 
variation really lies between each city. In other words, the random effects model suggests 
that the data behave as a cross-section, rather than a time-series because there is little 
variation within each city. The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis 
are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 
13 To examine any intracity variation, that is, to “fix” the average effect of the independent variables across 
cities and see what impacts Latino mayoral representation over time (within each city), I would ideally use 
a fixed-effects model. However, fixed-effects models cannot estimate a fixed-effects parameter when a city 
is not in the sample at least twice and when there is no variation of the independent variables over time. 
Therefore, in this analysis I’ll focus on describing the estimates for the random-effects model. 
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Table 3.1 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Sample 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Latino Mayor in City 18,307 .01 .10 0 1 
Majority Latino City 18,307 .01 .10 0 1 
Pct. College Ed. Latinos 18,307 .01 .01 0 .36 
Pct. Black VAP 18,307 .08 .13 0 .98 
Pct. College Ed. Whites 18,307 .18 .13 0 1 
Non-Majority City 18,307 .04 .21 0 1 
Partisan Elections 18,307 .19 .39 0 1 
Mayor-Council Gov. 18,307 .44 .50 0 1 
Full-time Mayor 18,307 .13 .34 0 1 
Mayoral Term Limits 18,307 .08 .27 0 1 
City Population (log) 18,307 9.18 1.17 3.22 15.77 
Mayor Directly Elected 18,307 .80 .40 0 1 
Pct. Latinos on Council 18,307 .01 .08 0 1 
Southwest City 18,307 .21 .41 0 1 
 
 
Findings 
Table 3.2 presents the results that examine the determinants of Latino mayoralties across 
the US. However, the results in Table 3.2 specifically show three distinct models: a 
standard pooled model, a random effects model (to compare with the standard pooled 
model’s results) and a random effects model that includes an interaction term of Non-
majority City*Mayor-Council Government. The latter model, with the interaction terms, 
is the fully specified model and is included to help interpret the impact of each variable 
on the outcome. To prevent any misinterpretation of the effect of the independent 
variables on the outcome, all non-statistically significant interaction terms are not 
included in the analysis.  
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Table 3.2  
Modeling Latino Descriptive Representation in U.S. Mayoralties 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent Var. Latino Mayor in City (0,1) Pooled Logistic 
Regression 
Random Effects 
Logistic Regression 
Random Effects 
Logistic Regression 
Latino Voting Strength    
Majority Latino City 1.39*** 1.60*** 1.58*** 
 (0.30) (0.36) (0.36) 
    
Pct. College Ed. Latinos 19.62*** 24.03*** 24.45*** 
 (3.69) (4.85) (4.86) 
Racial Context    
Non-Majority City 0.99*** 1.10*** 0.89*** 
 (0.24) (0.28) (0.30) 
    
Pct. Black VAP -3.79** -4.73** -4.96** 
 (1.55) (1.91) (1.94) 
    
Pct. College Ed. Whites -8.81*** -9.38*** -9.56*** 
 (1.81) (2.05) (2.06) 
    
Non-Majority City*Pct Black VAP N.S. N.S. N.S. 
    
Non-Majority City*Pct College Whites N.S. N.S. N.S. 
Institutions    
Partisan Elections 0.42 0.53 0.55 
 (0.33) (0.39) (0.39) 
    
Mayor-Council Gov. 0.19 0.06 -0.23 
 (0.23) (0.28) (0.32) 
    
Full-time Mayor 0.40 0.38 0.39 
 (0.28) (0.34) (0.34) 
    
Mayoral Term Limits 0.52** 0.51* 0.52* 
 (0.26) (0.31) (0.31) 
    
Non-Majority City*Mayor-Council - - 0.95* 
   (0.51) 
Latino Political Capacity    
Pct. Latinos on Council 3.99*** 4.99*** 4.96*** 
 (0.38) (0.52) (0.52) 
Controls    
City Population (log) 0.14** 0.20** 0.20** 
 (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) 
    
Mayor Directly Elected 0.05 -0.03 -0.02 
 (0.21) (0.26) (0.26) 
    
Southwest City 2.37*** 2.43*** 2.37*** 
 (0.33) (0.37) (0.37) 
Constant -7.30*** -8.70*** -8.58*** 
 (0.73) (0.99) (0.99) 
Obs. (city-year/cities) 18,307/6,337 18,307/6,337 18,307/6,337 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  (Standard errors in parentheses) 
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The three models in Table 3.2 are very similar to one another where all the variables that 
are statistically significant remain in the same direction in each model. The only major 
difference between the standard pooled results (Model 1) and the random effects results 
(Model 2) is that the latter provides robust standard errors clustered by the panel variable. 
Model 3 in Table 3.2 is very similar to the results in Model 2, however, the impact of the 
independent variables on the outcome vary in degree. The estimates in Model 3 in Table 
3.2 show that Latino representation in the mayoralty is primarily a function of Latino 
voting strength. Not only are majority Latino cities positively associated with the 
incidence of Latino mayoralties, but the larger the college educated Latino population in 
a city the higher the probability that a Latino/a will serve at the head of municipal 
government.  
Figure 3.1 shows this relationship in graphic form. Latino political clout measured 
as a proportion of college educated Latinos increases the likelihood of observing a Latino 
mayor. Additionally, the figure shows that this effect is much larger in cities that have a 
Latino voting age population greater than 50 percent. To give an example just how much 
the voting strength of the Latino population, in terms of population size and education 
levels, matters for Latino mayoral representation, the figure suggests that, all else equal, a 
city with a relatively well educated Latino population (about 28 percent) in a majority 
Latino city, the probability of observing a Latino mayor is nearly 50 percent.  However, 
in a city with an equally educated Latino population, but where Latinos are a minority of 
the population, the probability of observing a Latino mayor is nearly 15 percent. 
Therefore, the voting strength of Latinos, in terms of their socioeconomic status and 
sheer population size, seems to play a substantial role in helping Latinos achieve 
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representation in the city mayoralty. In other words, without a sizeable, well educated 
population, Latinos’ political strength (within the context of elections) is severely limited. 
 
 
 
In addition to Latinos’ voting strength having a prominent impact on the rise of Latino 
mayors, the results in Model 3 of Table 3.2 indicate that Latino political capacity has a 
noteworthy role. Specifically, the greater Latinos’ political capacity, measured as the 
percent of Latino city council members, the greater the likelihood that cities will have 
Latino mayors. Figure 3.2 shows this relationship in graphic form. It is evident that cities 
with more Latinos on city council are statistically more likely to have Latino mayors.14 
However, the effect of Latino political capacity is more pronounced in cities where 
                                                
 
14 In Figure 3.2 the percent college educated Latino pop. is 20 percent. Other variables are held at the mean.  
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Latinos are a majority of the population. The probability of observing a Latino mayor in a 
majority Latino city tops the 50 percent probability threshold where Latinos make-up at 
least 45 percent of the city legislature. Thus, this shows how critical it is to have 
descriptive representation in lower level government to observe Latino mayoralties. 
 
 
 
The estimates in Model 3 of Table 3.2 show that the racial context of the city, in terms of 
the strength of the Black population and the presence of college educated Anglos, has a 
negative effect on Latino representation. This suggests that overall levels of non-Latino 
groups’ political clout vis-à-vis Latinos’ could preclude Latino representation in the 
mayoralty. Given that the interaction terms examining whether multiracial coalitions 
form in non-majority cities were not statistically significant, they were ultimately 
dropped from the final model. The only measure of racial context that has an impact on 
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Latino mayoralties is the indicator of a non-majority city. That is, if no racial/ethnic 
group has a majority of the population, then they are statistically more likely to have 
Latino mayors than cities where one group (other than Latinos) makes up a majority. 
Table 3.3 shows the predicted probabilities for cities having Latino mayors under non-
majority and majority cities. This variable has a minimal effect on the probability of 
observing a Latino mayor unless the Latino college educated population reaches 30 
percent. This further suggests that to see a Latino mayor serve as the city’s chief 
executive, Latinos cannot be a trivial proportion of the (educated) population in non-
majority cities. 
 As for any institutions that can serve as either obstacles or opportunities for 
Latino mayoralties, the results in Model 3 of Table 3.2 show that there are no notable 
obstacles. However, the implementation of mayoral term limits does increase the 
probability of observing a Latino mayor. Again, Table 3.3 shows that the substantive 
impact on Latino mayoral representation heavily depends on a non-trivial educated 
Latino population. In other words, in cities where Latinos are relatively well educated the 
probability of observing a Latino increases by 13 percentage points, particularly in cities 
with term limits compared to cities with a similar demographic makeup without term 
limits. Mayor council forms of government also seem to influence the probability of 
observing a Latino mayor, however, under certain demographic conditions. The model 
estimates in Table 3.2 show that the interaction term, Non-majority city*Mayor-Council 
Government has a positive association with Latino mayoralties. This finding points to the 
impact of mayor-council governments on Latino representation in cities where no 
racial/ethnic group composes a majority of the population. Table 3.3 shows that this 
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interaction has a very limited impact on the outcome (representation), unless the Latino 
college educated population reaches 30 percent. In other words, for institutions to have a 
notable impact on descriptive representation, the Latino (educated) population must be 
sizeable. Since Latinos are not a trivial proportion of the population in these demographic 
contexts, particularly where no group composes a majority of the population, mayor-
council governments seem to attract rather than deter Latino candidates from running and 
winning for more desirable elective offices. 
 
Table 3.3 
 
Predicted Probability of Observing Latino Mayors 
 
all vars. at mean 
15 Pct. Latino  
College Ed Pop.  
(other vars. at mean) 
30 Pct. Latino  
College Ed Pop. 
(other vars. at mean) 
Majority Latino City=0 .000 .01 .42 
Majority Latino City=1 .001 .05 .79 
	      
Non-Majority City=0 .000 .01 .41 
Non-Majority City=1 .001 .03 .63 
	      
Mayoral Term Limits=0 .000 .01 .41 
Mayoral Term Limit=1 .001 .02 .54 
	      
Non-Majority City*Mayor-Council=0 .000 .01 .33 
Non-Majority City*Mayor-Council=1 .002 .06 .71 
    
Southwest City=0 .000 .01 .31 
Southwest City=1 .002 .07 .82 
 
 
In summary, the results in Table 3.2 reveal three major factors that contribute to the 
descriptive representation of Latinos in the mayoralty. First, Latinos’ voting strength, in 
terms of population size and – especially education levels, is a necessary for observing 
Latino mayors. Second, institutions such as term limits and mayor-council governments 
seem to offer opportunities for Latino candidates vying for the mayoralty. Alone, 
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however, these factors seem to play a minimal role in helping Latinos gain access to 
municipal government. In other words, without Latinos being sufficiently strong (and 
well educated), these institutions are not very likely to help Latino candidates break 
barriers. Third, Latino descriptive representation in lower-level government has a strong 
and association with Latino descriptive representation in the mayor’s office. This 
highlights how important it is to see Latino candidates run for and be successful in city 
council elections to ultimately see Latinos more fully incorporated in municipal 
government. This third point is nearly moot if it not were for the first point (Latino voting 
strength) being so critical. That is, the substantive impact on the predicted probability of 
observing a Latino mayor, as a function of the proportion of Latinos on the city council, 
is minimal unless Latinos are sizeable and relatively well educated.  
 
Conclusion 
At the outset, I asked the following question: What explains Latino descriptive 
representation in the mayoralty? Having examined the various demographic, institutional, 
and political factors associated with representation using a large database constructed 
from six ICMA Form of Government Survey waves spanning from 1981 to 2006, the 
results from the statistical analyses yield several interesting results. First, the rise of 
Latino mayors is largely a function of the voting strength of the Latino population in 
terms of comprising a majority of the population and being substantially well educated. 
The conventional wisdom as well as previous research identifying the political behavior 
of racial and ethnic minorities suggests that Latinos tend not to vote in proportion to their 
population size, thus limiting their political clout. If we assume that coethnic voting 
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occurs (see Barreto 2007) in elections with Latino candidates, then Latinos need to 
compose a substantial proportion of the population in order to see Latinos serve in the 
mayoralty.    
The empirical results also show that beyond the mere demographic context, two 
institutions impact the incidence of Latino mayors, namely term limits and mayor-council 
governments. Granted, these institutions only impact the probability of observing Latino 
mayors within specific demographic settings that allow Latinos to be relevant in electoral 
contexts – particularly in settings where Latinos sizeable and well educated. Thus, under 
the right demographic context, cities that limit the number of consecutive terms that 
incumbents can serve may be necessary for Latinos to gain representation. Additionally, 
mayor-council governments do not pose a barrier to Latino mayoral representation, 
unlike previously expected, due to the prestige associated with this governing 
arrangement. In fact, in non-majority cities with mayor-council governments, Latinos are 
more likely to be represented in the mayoralty. Granted, that the effect of this institution 
depends on the demographic composition of the city. So, there may be something unique 
about non-majority cities with mayor-council governments that is suitable for Latinos to 
gain representation. For example, minority led coalitions may be more likely to form in 
these contexts. Also, minority voters may be more likely to be mobilized in elections with 
minority candidates in these types of cities. There is no empirical evidence here that 
suggests that the size of the black or liberal Anglo population influences Latino mayoral 
representation in non-majority settings. Thus, further research is needed to explain city 
politics and elections when Latino candidates vie for the mayoralty (see Barreto 2007).  
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Finally, what seems to play a very substantial role in increasing the representation 
of Latinos in the mayoralty is the extent to which Latinos are represented in the city 
council – or the capacity of Latinos to supply a pool of qualified mayoral candidates. 
Latino representation in the city legislature influences the rise of Latino mayors, 
particularly where Latinos are sizeable and well educated. Therefore, when modeling the 
representation of underrepresented groups it is important to take into account the extent 
to which they have previous experience serving in lower-level government.  
Given that the findings in this chapter seek explain Latino representation in the 
mayoralty, they also point to the conditions under which we can expect that Latino 
candidates will not only emerge, but also win elections. The fact that the strength of 
Latino population as well Latino political incorporation in lower-level government is 
positively associated with Latino representation also indicates that these factors should 
influence the emergence and success of Latino candidates. However, there is limited 
research that systematically studies Latino candidate emergence and success in elections 
beyond a single city or small sample of cities. Furthermore, we do not know whether the 
factors that are associated with Latino descriptive representation (studied in this chapter) 
will hold once taking into account various factors related to the election, per se (e.g., 
turnout, incumbency, and the number of competitive candidates vying office). Thus, it is 
essential to continue to unravel the complex relationships between demographic contexts, 
institutions, and political factors to understand the conditions that not only lead to Latinos 
emerging in mayoral elections but winning these political contests. In the next chapter, I 
employ an original dataset of 657 mayoral elections in 113 cities in 6 Southwestern states 
to examine the various conditions under which Latino mayoral candidates run and win.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE SCIENCE OF RUNNING & WINNING: EXAMINING LATINO CANDIDATE 
EMERGENCE & SUCCESS IN MAYORAL ELECTIONS 
 
 
When the Pew Hispanic Center asked U.S. Hispanics in a 2010 survey who the most 
important Hispanic leader was, almost two-thirds of the respondents said that they didn’t 
know (Taylor and Lopez 2010). Respondents – in the single digits – mentioned U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor while others mentioned Los Angeles Mayor 
Antonio Villaraigosa and Univision’s Jorge Ramos. In fact, there is no single prominent 
Hispanic political leader comparable to Jesse Jackson or Al Sharpton – both nationally 
recognized black leaders known to actively pursue a “black” agenda in political 
campaigns and elections. The media does however, herald several politicians including 
recently elected mayor of San Antonio, Julian Castro, U.S. Senator Marco Rubio (R-FL), 
Secretary of Labor Hilda Solis, California Assembly Speaker John Perez (D-CA), and 
Nevada Governor Brian Sandoval (R-NV) as future Hispanic leaders who will fill the 
national leadership void (see Chafets 2010; MSNBC.COM15). In other words, these are 
politicians with the chops much like new-era African American politicians that have 
strong (or growing) national name recognition and broad racial appeal similar to that of 
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick, Newark, New Jersey Mayor Cory Booker, and 
President Barack Obama. 
Given the diversity of the Latino population in terms of socioeconomic status, 
immigration status, regional concentration, and national origin, there may never be a 
single prominent leader that emerges to represent the entire Latino community in the 
                                                
 
15 http://powerwall.msnbc.msn.com/politics/10-latino-politicians-to-watch-9701.gallery 
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national political arena. However, recently noted changes in the U.S.’s demographic 
profile will certainly lead to the rise of many Hispanic leaders in the near future. With 
more than 80 percent of Latino elected officials serving as either school-board members, 
city council members, or county commissioners (NALEO 2009), future leaders are most 
likely to have political experience in state and local elective offices.16 So, what 
contributes to the rise of Latino candidates in subnational elective offices? 
More specifically, why are Hispanic mayoral candidates such as Angel Taveras 
(Providence, Rhode Island’s first Hispanic mayor), Ron Gonzales (first Hispanic Mayor 
of San Jose, California), Julian Castro (Mayor of San Antonio, Texas), and William 
Lantigua (First Hispanic Mayor of Lawrence, Massachusetts) not only more likely to run 
for the mayor’s office, but more likely to win? Also, why have others, including Orlando 
Sanchez (Houston, TX), Feliciano "Felix" Ramirez (Lake County City, FL), and Matt 
Gonzales (San Francisco, CA), not been successful in mayoral elections? Is there 
something about the demographic profile of the city that creates opportunities for Latino 
mayoral candidates to be successful? That is, does electoral emergence and success 
merely hinge upon the numerical strength of the Hispanic population? Or are these 
political outcomes conditioned on the context of the election (i.e., mobilization, candidate 
qualifications, incumbency, and campaign strategies)? Beyond newspaper accounts, a 
few case studies, and small-N analyses (Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 2003; Hero 1992; 
see also Marschall 2010), we really do not have generalizable answers to these questions 
about Latino candidate emergence and success in municipal elections. 
                                                
 
16  For example, Senator Robert Menendez (D-NJ) was once school board member, mayor of Union City, 
NJ, and state legislator before becoming U.S. Senator (http://menendez.senate.gov/biography/). 
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Focusing on candidate success in U.S. mayoralties is important because, in many 
instances, mayors serve as city executives with the authority (and visibility) to influence 
public policy outcomes (see Marschall and Shah 2005). Additionally, mayors – under 
most institutional arrangements – have the gravitas to garner strong name recognition, 
executive experience, and political savvy to win higher-level elective offices. In other 
words, mayoralties can serve as ideal stepping-stones for state- and national-level elective 
offices. Thus, it becomes important to know why Latino candidates run and win in these 
contexts. Also, since there are so few gubernatorial seats and four successful Hispanic 
governors in recent history,17 mayoralties are ideal venues to examine both successful 
and unsuccessful Hispanic candidates seeking to gain executive office experience. That is 
not to say that school boards, city councils, and state legislatures do not merit study, 
because they too play an important role in Hispanic political incorporation (Shah 2010; 
Marshall, Ruhil, and Shah 2010; Casellas 2009). But because Latino descriptive 
representation in U.S. mayoralties is understudied (see Marschall 2010) and because 
mayoralties provide candidates with enough resources to advance the political 
incorporation of Latinos, in this chapter, I focus on understanding key questions about 
Latino representation in municipal government. I specifically test models that examine 
candidate emergence and candidate success. Understanding why Latino candidates run 
for mayor and why they win elections will further help to inform future studies that 
examine representation in gubernatorial, state legislative, and Congressional elections.  
 The dataset used in this study contains information that goes beyond city-level 
context variables that can, in theory, impact the supply of Latino candidates. Because 
                                                
 
17 Raul Hector Castro – AZ (1975); Rill Richardson – NM (2003); Susana Martinez – NM (2011); Brian 
Sandoval – NV (2011). 
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election results provide information-rich data on the context of the election, I examine the 
strategic concerns that may face Latino candidates when deciding to run for elective 
office. These factors may include information about the competitiveness of an election, 
the degree of voter mobilization, and the quality of the candidates seeking the office. The 
nature of the data used in the Large-N analysis of the previous chapter does not allow for 
these types of campaign-specific details to be examined in order to address the question 
of why Latino candidates emerge and why they win. In the sections below, I outline 
theoretical models that describe the determinants of Hispanic candidate emergence and 
success. Following that, I describe the data, the operationalization of the variables, and 
the methodology used. 
 
Building a Theoretical Model of Latino Candidate Emergence & Success 
The previous research suggests that minority candidate emergence posits two major 
conditions: 1) an adequate supply of qualified minority candidates available to make a 
bid for an elective office and 2) on strategic factors that inform candidates about whether 
they can win. The supply of qualified minority candidates vying for the mayoralty stems 
from demographic, political, and institutional factors surrounding city politics. These are 
factors that influence minority representation in the candidate pool in the aggregate. The 
strategic costs and benefits that candidates weigh when deciding to run for office hinge 
upon the context surrounding the election. The previous research has not specifically 
examined how and whether these conditions apply to the emergence and success of 
Latino mayoral candidates, per se. Below, I provide further details about the factors that 
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influence the supply of Latino candidates vying the for mayoralty as well as the strategic 
factors that candidates weigh when considering to enter a political race.  
 
Latino Candidate Supply 
The supply of Latino candidates in mayoral elections primarily depends on a pipeline of 
qualified Latino candidates who are willing and able to run. This in turn depends on the 
political strength of the Latino population. Specifically, scholars have argued that the 
numerical strength of the minority population is directly related to having descriptive 
representation in local and state government (Bullock and MacManus 1990; Shah 2010; 
Casellas 2009). Branton (2009) confirms that the larger the minority population, the 
higher the probability of observing black and Latino candidates in Congressional primary 
elections. The research in the previous chapter reveals that cities with majority Latino 
voting-age populations are more likely to have Latino mayors. Without a sizeable Latino 
population, the city would lack a supply of potential Latino candidates – which reduces 
the likelihood that Latino candidates will emerge in mayoral elections. Given that the 
numerical strength of the Latino population is a key component of Latino descriptive 
representation, I also expect it to be a key component of Latino mayoral candidate 
success. 
In addition to Latino demographic characteristics playing a substantial role in the 
representation of Latinos in the candidate pool and in city government, the research 
outlined in the previous chapter suggests that Latino political incorporation in lower-
level government provides a pathway for representation in the city’s top executive office. 
Therefore, the more Latinos there are in lower-level government the higher the pool of 
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qualified candidates with political networks, financial resources, and name recognition to 
run and serve in higher-level office (see Marschall and Ruhil 2006; Smith et al. 2011). 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that many mayoral candidates perceived to have a good 
chance of winning have served in the city legislature. This is true for candidates such as 
Henry Cisneros to Julian Castro who both served in San Antonio municipal government 
as members of the city council prior to their successful bids as city mayors. Therefore, I 
expect to see Latino candidates more likely to emerge in mayoral elections as well as win 
elections the more Latinos are represented in lower-level government. 
Another factor that may influence the supply of Latino candidates is whether 
cities have history of Latino leadership in the mayoralty. Although Marschall and Ruhil 
(2006) and Smith et al. (2011) do not find a relationship between prior black and female 
mayoral representation and subsequent minority mayoralties, they suggest that previous 
experience under minority leadership should pave the path for subsequent representation. 
This may be as a result of voters from various racial/ethnic groups learning about how 
life under the leadership of black mayors is not as threatening as initially expected 
(Hajnal 2007). Moreover, having a Latino mayor in the past gives the Latinos sufficient 
political strength to gain control of the city’s top executive office in the future. Thus, 
cities with previous experience under a Latino mayoralty may positively influence the 
supply of Latino mayoral candidates vying for that office as well as increase the odds of 
winning it. 
While the supply of Latino candidates may greatly depend on various 
demographic and political factors, previous research on minority representation also 
suggests that cities’ institutional arrangements can influence the costs associated with 
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running for office for minority candidates. Specifically, Oxley and Fox (2004) find that 
more desirable/prestigious offices reduce the likelihood of observing female 
representation. This outcome stems from the expectation that more prestigious elective 
offices create a contentious political atmosphere that is not conducive to historically 
excluded and generally under-resourced racial, and ethnic minorities, or women more 
generally. Alternatively, there are institutions that can be conducive to the formation of 
political alliances across racial/ethnic groups in city politics, such as in reformed 
governments (see Hero 1992). Since reformed governments generally reduce political 
patronage, as intended from the Progressive Era reforms, cities with reformed institutions 
are thought to have less competitive contexts. If the context is less competitive, then 
racial and ethnic minorities should have a greater opportunity to be part of the governing 
coalition and are more likely to be represented in the candidate pool and win elections. 
Alone, the institutions mentioned above may create more or less competitive 
contexts – which may further impact the presence of Latinos in candidate pool as well as 
their probability of winning. However, the impact of these institutions may vary based on 
the size of the Latino population. Specifically, it is possible that costs decline for Latino 
candidates if the office sought-after is prestigious in a city with a large Latino voting-age 
population because a strong contingent of Latinos will, in effect, help Latino candidates 
be more competitive. In other words, the level of prestige associated with the office is no 
longer a barrier to entry (or success) if the size of the Latino population is sufficiently 
large to help coethnic candidates win. In fact, Latino candidates may be even more 
attracted to run in cities with more prestigious elective offices located in cities with 
numerically strong Latino populations. Given the expected variation of the impact of the 
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city’s governing arrangements, this relationship needs to be further explored in varying 
demographic contexts. 
In addition to city governing institutions, electoral rules are other mechanisms that 
can increase the costs of running – which may negatively impact the supply of Latino 
candidates – and reduce the likelihood of Latino candidates running and winning. For 
example,  the institution of the  runoff provision (i.e., a second-round election)18 
increases the costs for minority candidates to have to either 1) avoid a runoff election or 
2) raise money and other resources to succeed in two elections (see Bullock and Johnson 
1992). Given the scarcity of the research on this institutional mechanism and its impact 
on Latino representation, in this chapter I explore how it impacts Latino representation in 
the mayoral candidate pool as well as Latino candidates’ success in mayoral elections. 
Another electoral rule that has the potential to influence the supply of 
underrepresented groups in the candidate pool is term limits. This institution is also 
related to reducing the costs of running.  Although the previous research suggests that the 
evidence is mixed in terms of the effects on minority candidate emergence (see Oxley 
and Fox 2004; Trounstine and Valdini 2008), term limits, in theory give opportunities for 
minority candidates to emerge because they do not have to face entrenched Anglo 
incumbents (Schlesinger 1966; for more on incumbency advantage see Mayhew 1974; 
Fiorina 1977; Alford and Hibbing 1981; Krehbiel and Wright 1983; Cox and 
Morgenstern 1993; Cox and Katz 1996; Ansolabehere and Snyder 2002). Further analysis 
                                                
 
18 There are various ways in which winners are declared in mayoral elections including, two-round 
elections and one-round elections. Two-round elections are those that require a second election to be held 
between the top two candidates if one candidate does not meet a threshold of votes, typically a majority. 
One-round elections are either plurality elections – where candidates win if they have the most votes (no 
threshold) – or instant-runoff elections – where voters rank the candidates. In the latter election systems, if 
no candidate receives a majority of votes the votes from lower-ranked candidates get redistributed until one 
candidate receives a majority. 
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is needed to determine whether and when the implementation of term limits influences 
the supply of Latino candidates emerging in the candidate pool as well as their 
probability of winning.  
Similarly, the supply of Latino candidates and their prospective chances of 
winning can also be influenced by the magnitude of the political jurisdiction in question, 
particularly because larger contexts require more resources to raise money, mobilize 
voters, and wage a competitive political campaign. Thus, running in larger jurisdictions 
should increase the costs for candidates, while running in smaller jurisdictions should 
reduce the costs of running. Black (1972) and Hogan (2004) agree that larger 
jurisdictions are less conducive to candidate emergence because of the inhibited costs 
involved. For Latino candidates, this factor can also weigh on their decisions to seek 
office because these contexts may be more competitive.  
Mechanisms that increase the supply of minority candidates beyond mitigating the 
costs of running in elections are not limited to institutions that affect the competitiveness 
of the political office. For example, there are institutions designed to encourage political 
participation generally by fixing the timing of municipal elections to be held concurrently 
with federal elections. Hajnal (2010) explains that municipal elections are often low 
information and low salience elections. This occurs not only because local candidates do 
not receive media attention similar to that of presidential elections, but also because the 
elections are held at different times (see also Hajnal and Lewis 2003). Thus, elections 
held during presidential election years may have lower costs to entry because it is less 
costly to have to mobilize voters. For Latino candidates, the positive effect of election 
timing on entering the race and winning may be conditioned by the size of the Latino 
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population. So, this conditional relationship needs to be examined to determine when 
Latino candidates are more likely to be represented in the candidate pool and win 
mayoral elections. 
 
Latino Candidate Strategy 
In addition to looking at how contextual factors shape Latino representation, I will 
consider how election specific factors influence the representation of Latinos in the 
candidate pool as well as their success in mayoral elections.  
The seminal research examining candidate emergence indicates that candidates 
consider whether or not they can win before they decide to seek political office 
(Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972). Moreover, there is information about the electoral 
context that can help candidates determine whether or not they can win. For Latinos, 
information about their prospective chances of winning could depend on whether any 
Latino candidates have emerged in the past. The mere emergence of Latinos in prior 
elections (as incumbents or challengers) should signal that the political context has been 
conducive to the emergence of Latino candidates. In other words, if the conditions have 
been right for Latinos to run in the past, then they might continue to be right for them to 
run in the future. Specifically, I expect to see Latino candidates represented in the 
candidate pool and win elections if Latinos candidates have emerged in the past. 
Information about the electoral context, such as the presence of an incumbent, 
also affects the decision calculus of potential candidates. Congressional scholars point to 
an increasing advantage among incumbents because not only do incumbents win more 
often, but they also win by larger margins (see Schlesinger 1966; Black 1972; Maisel and 
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Stone 1997; Cox and Katz 1996). Open seats have been found to positively impact 
candidate emergence in city council elections (Krebs 1999), and particularly minority 
candidate emergence (see Branton 2009). Thus, I expect that Latino candidates are more 
likely to emerge and win in mayoral elections when there is an open seat than when an 
incumbent is on the ballot. It is also important to further examine whether an open seat 
election in contexts with a more sizeable Latino population further increases the 
possibility of Latino candidates running and winning. Strategically speaking, Latino 
candidates are more likely to win in open seat elections held in cities where Latinos are 
numerically stronger because larger coethnic populations will help propel Latino 
candidates to victory. Therefore, I expect that Latinos are more likely to be represented 
when incumbents are absent from mayoral elections, particularly in cities with large 
Latino populations. 
Besides the presence or absence of an incumbent, the literature examining 
individual attitudes of potential contenders in political races indicates that information 
about the candidate pool influences candidates’ strategic considerations about whether to 
enter a political race (Maisel et al. 2004). For example, a crowded field of viable or 
competitive candidates may detract other candidates from seeking office. So, on the one 
hand, Latino candidates may not be represented in the candidate pool (and in 
government) because the competition is too fierce. And for minority candidates, 
competitive contexts may not prove to be the most conducive environment for success.  
On the other hand, in elections with more competitive candidates, the election outcome 
may be more uncertain. Therefore, information about their chances of success can be 
more positive because uncertainty can indicate that a seat is up for grabs. My expectation 
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is that the information about the candidate pool sends signals to potential candidates, and 
it is up for debate about how this influences the emergence and success of Latino 
candidates. 
So far, I have outlined various supply and strategic factors that apply to both 
candidate emergence and success. However, the research on minority descriptive 
representation reveals that there are two factors that are critical for candidate success, per 
se: 1) previous political experience and 2) voter mobilization. Therefore, the model of 
Latino candidate success slightly deviates from Latino candidate emergence – which is 
one reason why these two electoral outcomes are studied in separate empirical models. 
Having experience serving in government, in any capacity, makes individual 
candidates more competitive because they have developed political networks, financial 
resources, and name recognition to succeed in an election (see Marschall and Ruhil 
2006). Unlike Latino representation in lower-level government that seemingly influences 
the overall supply of Latino candidates via an institutional pipeline, previous political 
experience is germane to the individual candidate. There are examples of Latino mayoral 
candidates serving in various levels of government. Specifically, Antonio Villaraigosa the 
current mayor of Los Angeles and Federico Peña the mayor of Denver in 1983 both had 
leadership positions within the state legislature. Although previous political experience 
may influence whether candidates win, for Latino candidates, previous political 
experience may be conditioned by the size of the Latino population. The demographic 
context can be particularly relevant for Latino candidates with previous political 
experience – especially if Latino candidates rely on fellow Latinos for electoral support.  
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Although previous political experience is considered to be a key factor driving 
candidate success, scholars point to the role of political participation in helping minority 
candidates win elections (see Hajnal and Trounstine 2005). The importance of voter 
mobilization was documented in Hero’s (1992) account of Federico Peña’s mayoral bid 
in 1983. As he explains, one strategy the campaign actively pursued was to ratchet-up 
turnout – particularly among a certain demographic (Latinos and African Americans). 
The research also points to Hispanic candidates’ effectiveness at mobilizing coethnic 
voters (see Barreto 2007). Hajnal (2010) and Hajnal and Trounstine (2005) assert that 
increasing voter mobilization – among minority groups – can indeed change the outcome 
of local elections. They claim that minority candidates are more likely to win in contexts 
where minorities are not only more numerous but also in contexts where voter 
mobilization is higher. Therefore, the effect of voter mobilization on Latino 
representation can be conditioned by the size of the Latino population. Additionally, 
quality Latino challengers may benefit more from higher levels of mobilization and thus 
be more likely to win elections – as described by Hero (1992) in the case of Federico 
Peña. However, because mobilization is theoretically related to candidates’ probability of 
success, I also look at whether this is related to the emergence of Latino candidates. That 
is, I examine whether elections with high voter participation are more likely to have 
Latinos represented in the candidate pool than elections with lower participation levels. 
In the following sections I will outline the data used to examine whether and how these 
aforementioned factors influence Latino candidate emergence and success. Additionally, 
I will describe how I operationalize candidate supply candidate strategy. 
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Data 
The data used to examine Latino candidate emergence and Latino candidate success are 
based from election results gathered from city, county, and state websites as well as from 
city and county clerks in a large and representative sample (by size and geographic 
location) of cities within the six southwestern U.S. states (Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas). In addition, I include demographic data from the U.S. 
Census; and local institutional arrangements from International City and County 
Management Association’s (ICMA) Form of Government Surveys – as well as from city 
charters, websites, and personally contacting city clerks. The sample used to examine 
candidate emergence includes 105 cities and 437 elections (first-round or general) 
spanning various years.19 I examine first round elections for Latino candidate emergence 
because emergence in the second round is conditional upon success in the first round – or  
at least finishing with the second most votes in case no candidate received at least 50 
percent of the votes. So, including second round elections in the analysis would not 
necessarily constitute an analysis of Latino candidate emergence, rather it would 
resemble an analysis of Latino candidate success. For a detailed discussion of the core 
sample used in this chapter please refer to Appendix A. 
To specifically examine Latino candidate success, I rely on a sample of 189 first 
and second-round elections in 69 cities with Latino candidates on the ballot. The fact that 
this sample only includes elections with Latino candidates on the ballot reduces the 
sample size from the previous analysis of candidate emergence. Additionally, each 
                                                
 
19 For example, I have gathered elections for Houston, TX from 1993-2009 (9 cycles), San Antonio, TX 
from 1991-2009 (10 cycles), Los Angeles, CA from 1997-2009 (4 cycles), Denver, CO from 1991-2007 (3 
cycles).  
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election has at least two challengers. In other words, no elections are unopposed. Because 
I analyze Latino candidate emergence and Latino candidate success separately, the 
analysis below will describe the supply and strategic factors that influence these 
outcomes in two separate tables. Although the supply and strategic factors are expected to 
work similarly for emergence and success, the models are not completely identical. This 
is one key reason for studying these political outcomes in separate models.  
 
Variables 
The election results provide information not only on the outcome of the election (e.g., the 
winner, margin of victory, total number of votes cast), but also information on all the 
candidates who participated in the election (e.g., the vote shares, surname, and 
incumbency). The candidate information is the basis for the dependent variables used in 
this chapter. However, in this analysis I use two sets of dependent variables – one for 
emergence and the other for success. For candidate emergence, I specifically examine 
three binary dependent variables: 1) the emergence of a Latino candidate on the ballot, 2) 
the emergence of a Latino incumbent, and 3) the emergence of a quality (non-incumbent) 
Latino challenger. Specifically, for the first dependent variable 1=the presence of at least 
one candidate that is of Latino descent and 0=otherwise. For the second dependent 
variable 1=the presence of a Latino mayoral incumbent and 0=otherwise. For the third 
dependent variable 1=the presence of at least one Latino non-incumbent challenger with 
previous political experience and 0=otherwise. These dependent variables are included in 
this study to see how the various supply and strategic factors influence the emergence of 
different types of Latino candidates (any candidate of Latino descent, Latino candidates 
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that have previously served as mayors, and Latino candidates with previous political 
experience). To determine the racial/ethnic background of the candidates, I relied on the 
directories of Latino elected officials provided by the National Association of Latino 
Elected Officials (NALEO) from 1984-2009 as well as the U.S. Census Spanish Surname 
Lists (Word & Perkins 1996).20 For candidates’ previous political experience (or 
qualifications), I relied on newspaper and website searches as well as NALEO directories 
to determine whether candidates have held previous office such as in the school board, 
city council, county government, and state legislature (1=yes, 0=no). To determine 
incumbency, I simply accounted for whether a candidate on the ballot was running for 
reelection. This information was based on the previous election results (time T-1).  
For candidate success, I analyze two dependent variables: 1) a binary variable 
indicating whether a Latino candidate won the election (1=yes, 0=no) and 2) the percent 
of the votes received in the mayoral election – or vote share – of the Latino candidate. 
The vote share is based on the sum of the votes cast for all mayoral candidates on the 
ballot. Although my main interest is to examine why candidates win, success does 
depend on candidates reaching a minimum threshold of votes – usually 50.1 percent of 
the votes cast – which is why I examine vote share in this study. To examine the 
determinants of both candidate emergence, success, and vote share, I include a variety of 
independent variables that I categorize as either the supply or strategy of Latino 
candidates. 
 
                                                
 
20 Admittedly, this is not the most accurate method to identify Latinos especially since women married to 
Latinos may take-on their surname or in other cases Latinos who do not have Spanish surnames would be 
overlooked. However, it is the best method available.  
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Modeling Latino Candidate Emergence & Success 
Before I outline the specific details regarding how I operationalize the strategy and 
supply variables used to examine Latino candidate emergence and success, I first present 
a summary of the empirical models: 
 
Latino Emergence = Supply (Latino Voting Strength + Latino Political 
Incorporation in City Government + Institutional & Demographic Costs) + 
Strategy (Latino Candidate Emergence in t-1 + Election Competitiveness) + 
Supply*Strategy 
 
Latino Success = Supply (Latino Voting Strength + Latino Political 
Incorporation in City Government + Institutional & Demographic Costs) + 
Strategy (Previous Political Experience + Mobilization + Election 
Competitiveness) + Supply*Strategy 
 
The models reveal that the emergence and success of Latino candidates, particularly in 
mayoral elections is expected to be a function of supply and strategic factors. Supply 
factors include the strength of the Latino population, the degree of Latinos’ political 
incorporation in city government, and the costs for potential candidates influenced by the 
institutional arrangements and the demographic context of the city. Strategic factors are 
specifically related to the context of the election. For running, strategic factors include 
the emergence of Latino candidates in time T-1 and other factors (in the election) that 
influence the level of competitiveness. For winning, strategic factors include the previous 
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political experience of Latino candidates, voter mobilization, and other factors that 
influence the level of competitiveness in elections. In the next section, I will provide 
more detail about how the various supply and strategic factors are operationalized.  
 
Operationalizing Supply Factors 
Latino voting strength is operationalized as the percent Latino voting-age population in a 
city. This data was gathered using the 1980, 1990, and 2000 U.S. Censuses to match the 
appropriate election dates. For data on elections in cities after the year 2000, I relied on 
the 2005-2009 American Community Survey population estimates. I expect that the 
supply of Latino candidates will grow given the numerical strength of the Latino 
population21 in a city – therefore, increasing the likelihood of a Latino candidate not only 
emerging, but also winning elections. 
To measure the level of Latino political incorporation in municipal government, I 
rely on NALEO directories of Latino elected officials to account for the city’s history of 
having a Latino mayor at any point from 1984 up to the election date in question (1=at 
least one mayor during this period; 0=no Latino mayors); and the number of Latino city 
council members in office in a city at time T. These variables are independent measures 
of this concept of incorporation and I expect the more Latinos are politically incorporated 
in city government, either via city council or historically in the mayoralty, the more likely 
Latino candidates will be represented in the candidate pool and also more likely to win. 
                                                
 
21 Ideally, I would include a measure for the citizen voting-age Latino population in a city to get a more 
accurate measure of the Latino population’s voting strength, however the 1990 Census does not account for 
citizenship status by ethnicity. 
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 Increased costs for potential Latino candidates are linked to a city’s institutional 
profile – particularly the governing arrangements and electoral rules. To measure the 
level of prestige of city governments, I include a binary measure for whether the city is a 
mayor-council government (1=yes, 0=no).22 To test whether the strength of the Latino 
population conditions the influence of prestigious elective offices, I include an interaction 
term for mayor-council government*Percent Latino VAP. Other city-level institutions 
that in theory impact the emergence of Latino candidacies via influencing the costs of 
potential candidates to emerge include electoral rules that establish whether incumbents 
can serve a maximum number of consecutive terms (term limits), whether elections 
require a minimum threshold of votes – usually 50.1 percent – to avoid a 2nd round 
election (runoff provision), and whether municipal elections are held concurrently with 
presidential election years (concurrent elections). For all these variables 1=yes, and 0= 
otherwise. Given that term limits and the timing of the election can be influenced by the 
strength of the Latino population in a city, I include interaction terms in the analysis:  
term limits*percent Latino VAP and concurrent election*percent Latino VAP. 
 Finally, I use U.S. Census data to generate a measure of the natural log of the city 
population during the year the election was held. This measure of the city’s demographic 
context is an indicator of the general costs involved in running a campaign in larger cities 
(versus smaller cities). Given that the Census data is available for 1980, 1990, 2000, I 
imputed the data for the election years held in-between those dates. For election years 
later than 2000, I relied on the 2005-2009 American Community Survey Estimates. This 
                                                
 
22 Although there is much variation in terms of the power of the mayor (see Svara 1995), generally 
municipal governments have mayors that serve as independent executives of the city’s bureaucracy or city 
managers that are appointed by the mayor at the consent of the city council. 
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measure will test the notion that larger, more populated cities suppress minority candidate 
emergence given how costly it is to have to mobilize more voters in a larger city to win. 
 
Operationalizing Strategic Factors 
In addition to the factors associated with the supply of Latino candidacies, a model of 
Latino descriptive representation must account for the strategic factors that influence a 
potential candidate’s decisions about whether they can win the election in question. 
These factors are specifically related to the context of the election. For candidate 
emergence, this includes information about who is running, particularly whether a Latino 
ran in time T-1. Given that I have three dependent variables for candidate emergence I 
include lagged dependent variables for 1) any Latino candidate, 2) a Latino incumbent, 
and 3) a Latino non-incumbent challenger with previous political experience. I 
operationalize each of these concepts as binary variables where 1=yes, 0= otherwise. For 
candidate success, two major strategic factors include whether the top vote earning 
Latino candidate is a quality candidate and whether the top vote earning Latino is an 
incumbent. Latino candidate quality=1 if the candidate has held any previous political 
office; 0=otherwise. Latino incumbent=1 if the winner in time T is Latino and won in 
time T-1; 0=otherwise. To gather information on the Latino candidate’s previous political 
experience, I relied on NALEO directories to investigate whether they had served in 
school board, the city legislature, county government, or in state government. I also 
searched campaign websites, online and print media accounts of elections to determine 
whether a Latino candidate had previous political experience. I do not include a lagged 
dependent variable for candidate success because it reduces the number of observations 
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in the analysis. However, having a binary variable for whether Latino incumbent on the 
ballot (where 1=yes and 0=no) essentially functions as a lagged dependent variable 
because it denotes whether a Latino candidate won in time T-1. In addition, I include a 
lagged variable for the presence of Latino incumbents in time T-1 to examine the 
emergence of quality Latino challengers. That is, since previous success should in theory 
pave a path for future Latino candidates (with previous experience in other offices 
besides the mayoralty), the lagged Latino incumbent variable should test for whether this 
indeed occurs.  Finally, I test for whether Latino candidates with previous political 
experience are more likely to run and win in cities with strong Latino populations by 
including an interaction term for Latino Candidate Quality*Percent Latino VAP.  
 To operationalize the competitiveness of an election, I include a variable 
accounting for the number of number of viable or competitive candidates, which is 
measured as a fractionalization score: 1/(sum of the squared vote share of each 
candidate). Because this formula determines which candidates had the larger share of 
votes out of the entire pool of candidates, it provides an estimate of the number of 
competitive or viable candidates.23 For both candidate emergence and success, 
information about whether a non-Latino incumbent is on the ballot is critical to examine. 
Incumbency was determined by accounting for whether a non-Latino candidate in time T 
won in time T-1. Based on this information, the measure of incumbency used in this 
analysis accounts for whether the election has an open seat (1=yes, 0=no). I also include 
a measure of turnout as a proportion of the votes cast for mayor to the total voting-age 
                                                
 
23 To illustrate the measure that accounts for the number of competitive candidates, take a hypothetical 
election with three candidates: Candidate A received 50% of votes, Candidate B 40%, and Candidate C 
10%. (1/.50^2+.40^2+.10^2=2.38 competitive candidates). 
93 
 
 
 
population in a city at time T. This information is obtained from the mayoral election 
results. However, to test for whether the influence of open seat elections and the level of 
political mobilization (turnout) on candidate emergence and success is conditioned by the 
size of the Latino population I include interaction terms for open seat*percent Latino 
VAP and turnout*percent Latino VAP. As described in the theory section, it is possible 
that quality Latino candidates may increase their chances of success in contexts with high 
levels of political mobilization. To test this hypothesis I include an interaction term for 
quality Latino candidate*turnout.  
 
Methodology 
The first round elections are of main interest, when examining Latino candidate 
emergence, because emergence in the runoff is conditional upon either winning or being 
the candidate with the second highest vote share – that is, in case no candidate wins a 
minimum threshold of votes (usually 50.1 percent). Additionally, there are no partisan 
elections, and thus no party primaries, in the elections data that I have gathered.24 
Therefore they cannot be included in this analysis of candidate emergence. Additionally, 
to study candidate emergence, I include elections where candidates are opposed and 
unopposed. Although there may be many reasons for why elections are unopposed, I am 
still interested in seeing what factors contribute to at least one Latino candidate being 
represented in the candidate pool.  
To empirically examine Latino candidate emergence, I employ a random effects 
logistic regression for all first-round elections. The cross-sectional, time-series structure 
                                                
 
24 There is a lack of data on party primaries since partisan elections are rare in the Southwestern U.S., the 
geographical area where the data used in this study was collected. 
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of the data as well as the binary nature of three dependent variables: 1) emergence of at 
least one Latino candidate, 2) the emergence of a Latino mayoral incumbent, and 3) the 
emergence of a quality Latino challenger, requires implementing such a method. The 
random effects model provides robust standard errors clustered by city and year (see 
Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005) and describes the average effect of the impact that 
independent variables have between each city. 
 I also employ a similar methodology to examine Latino candidate success. 
However, in this analysis I do include both first and second round elections where at least 
two candidates (i.e., an opposed election) are on the ballot. Latino candidate success is 
measured as a simple binary variable where “1” indicates that a Latino candidate won and 
“0” indicates otherwise. To examine this dependent variable, I also employ a random-
effects logistic regression. However, to examine the vote share of the top Latino 
candidate on the ballot, I implement a random-effects OLS regression. 
 
Findings 
The descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis of Latino candidate 
emergence are presented in Table 4.1. The table indicates that in 36 percent of the 437 
elections, there is at least one Latino candidate on the ballot. Among these 437 elections 
(in 105 cities) 13 percent have a Latino incumbent on the ballot and 12 percent have at 
least one Latino candidate with previous political experience that is not an incumbent. 
Nearly 35 percent of the 437 elections have open seats, where no incumbent is running 
for reelection. This indicates that in the mayoral elections have a high proportion of 
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incumbents running for reelection. Although in this dataset only a small proportion of the 
incumbents are Latinos. 
 Table 4.1  
Descriptive Data for Sample 
Variable (elecs/cities) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Latino Candidate 437/105 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Latino Incumbent 437/105 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Quality Latino Challenger (non-incumb) 437/105 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Elections w/ Unopposed Candidates 437/105 0.20 0.40 0 1 
1st Round Election (General Election) 437/105 1 1 1 1 
Pct. Latino VAP 437/105 0.29 0.22 0.02 1 
Mayor-Council Government 437/105 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Mayoral Term Limits 437/105 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Runoff Provision 437/105 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Concurrent Muni/Fed Elections 437/105 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Open Seat Election 437/105 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Num. of Competitive Candidates 437/105 2.02 0.87 1 6.30 
Turnout 437/105 0.19 0.13 0 0.67 
City Population 437/105 39,340 6.61 478 3,836,227 
Num. Latinos on Council 437/105 0.90 1.47 0 8 
History of Latino Mayoralty 437/105 0.18 0.38 0 1 
 
The estimates in Model 1 in Table 4.2 show that the emergence of at least one Latino 
candidate in a mayoral election depends on both supply and strategic factors. The 
estimates indicate that the strength of the Latino population in the city has an independent 
and positive effect on the emergence of Latino candidates. No institutional arrangements 
or electoral rules have an independent effect on the representation of Latinos in the 
mayoral candidate pool. However, the interaction between Latino voting strength and the 
institutional arrangement of city government (Mayor-Council Gov*Pct. Latino VAP) has 
a positive effect on the emergence of Latino candidates. However, Figure 4.1 shows that 
the effect of mayor-council governments on Latino candidate emergence is conditional 
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on the size of the Latino voting age population.25 As the size of the Latino population 
increases, the effect of mayor-council government on the Latino candidate emergence is 
stronger. However the effects are only statistically significant for a range of values – that 
is, when Latinos are between 40 and 80 percent of the population. For example, in a city 
that is 40 percent Latino and has a less prestigious mayoralty (council-manager or 
commission form of government), the probability of observing a Latino mayoral 
candidate is about 40 percent. However, in a similar sized city with a more prestigious 
mayoralty (mayor-council government) the probability of observing a Latino mayoral 
candidate increases to nearly 80 percent. To get that same probability of observing a 
Latino candidate in non-mayor-council cities, the city has to have a nearly 80 percent 
Latino voting age population. What these findings essentially illustrate is that once you 
take demographic context into account, higher prestige offices are no longer a barrier to 
Latino descriptive representation in the candidate pool when the Latino population is 
sufficiently large. 
  
                                                
 
25To estimate these predicted probabilities the values of all other variables are set at their mean. 
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The estimates in Model 1 of Table 4.2 also reveal that Latino political incorporation in 
lower-level government increases the probability of observing at least one Latino 
mayoral candidate on the ballot. Figure 4.2 shows the predicted probability for Latinos 
emerging in mayoral elections as the number of Latino city council members in a city 
varies from 0-8. To get over the 50 percent probability threshold of observing a Latino 
mayoral candidate, the city should have at least 3 Latino city council members. Having at 
least 5 Latino city council members increases the probability of observing a Latino 
candidate to nearly 80 percent. The positive association between Latino representation on 
the city council and the probability of observing a Latino candidate running for mayor 
suggests that political incorporation in lower-level government is key to providing supply 
of Latino candidates to achieve representation in the mayoralty. 
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Model 1 in Table 4.2 shows that in addition to the supply factors associated with a Latino 
candidate emerging in a mayoral election, a few strategic concerns impact Latino 
representation in the candidate pool. Specifically, the lagged dependent variable, an 
indicator of Latino candidates emerging in the previous mayoral election (time T-1), is 
associated with Latino candidates emerging in the contemporary mayoral election (time 
T). The predicted probabilities of Latino candidate emergence indicates that if no Latino 
candidate was present in the previous mayoral election, the probability that a Latino 
candidate will emerge is 27 percent.26 
                                                
 
26 To estimate this predicted probability all other variables are held at the mean values. 
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Interestingly, the results in Table 4.2 also show that elections where there are 
more viable or competitive candidates vying for the mayoralty, measured as the 
fractionalization score described above, the more likely that at least one Latino candidate 
will be represented in the mayoral candidate pool. All else equal, an election with three 
competitive candidates the probability of observing a Latino candidate rises to nearly 80 
percent.27 This factor seems to play a particularly substantial role in the emergence of 
Latino candidates. Given the debate about whether and when Latino candidates will 
emerge given the competitiveness of the candidate pool – particularly as is comes to the 
uncertainty about who will win, the data in this analysis suggest that the stronger the 
candidate pool overall the more likely Latino candidates will emerge. Strategically 
speaking, Latino candidates may find elections more accessible if there are more viable 
candidates are vying for the mayoralty overall – which is why we see a positive 
relationship between the number of competitive candidates on the ballot and the 
emergence of at least one Latino candidate on the ballot. 
The results in Model 2 in Table 4.2 estimate influence that supply and strategic 
factors have on the likelihood of observing a Latino incumbent emerge in a mayoral 
election. Given that I include a lagged dependent variable for Latino incumbent, the 
sample size is reduced from the analysis of the emergence of a Latino candidate.28 
Among the largest contributors to the emergence of Latino incumbents include the size of 
the Latino voting age population. Turnout (in time T) also has a positive relationship to 
the emergence of Latino incumbents, but the effect is not as strong. Figure 4.3 shows 
                                                
 
27 The measure of competitiveness accounts for the vote share of each candidate. The candidates with a 
non-trivial vote share (based on total votes cast) are considered viable or competitive candidates. 
28 I coded incumbency based on the election results of time T-1. If I could not determine who the 
incumbent was, then this variable was coded as missing. This leaves some gaps in the data. 
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these relationships. The graphs indicate that the Latino voting age population has to be 
over 80 percent to have a 50 percent probability that a Latino incumbent will emerge for 
reelection. Similarly, the turnout rate has to reach 65 percent – a very high rate relative to 
typical turnout rates in municipal elections – to have a 50 percent probability of having a 
Latino mayoral incumbent run for reelection. Additionally, the estimates reveals that 
there is a 39 percent probability of observing a Latino incumbent emerge in time T if 
there is a Latino incumbent in time T-1. 
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Table 4.2 
Examining Latino Candidate Emergence in Mayoral Elections 
 (1) 
Emergence of a 
Latino 
Candidate 
(2) 
Emergence of a 
Latino 
Incumbent 
(3) 
Emergence of a 
Quality Latino 
Challenger 
Candidate Supply    
Pct. Latino VAP 3.93*** 5.13*** 2.10 
 (1.26) (1.30) (1.68) 
    
History of Latino Mayoralty (0,1) 0.17 -0.40 0.13 
 (0.51) (0.54) (0.73) 
    
Num. Latinos on Council 0.49** 0.09 0.52** 
 (0.20) (0.16) (0.24) 
    
Mayor-Council Government -1.22 0.41 1.14* 
 (1.22) (0.51) (0.68) 
    
Mayoral Term Limits -0.17 -0.22 0.78 
 (0.40) (0.49) (0.61) 
    
Runoff Provision -0.06 -0.27 -0.51 
 (0.43) (0.51) (0.67) 
    
Concurrent Muni/Fed Elections 0.07 -0.05 0.71 
 (0.52) (0.61) (0.74) 
    
City Population (Log) 0.17 0.33** 0.01 
 (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) 
    
Mayor-Council*Pct. Latino VAP 6.93* - - 
 (4.32)   
Candidate Strategy    
Latino Candidate (time T-1) 0.76** - - 
 (0.38)   
    
Latino Incumbent (time T-1) - 2.47*** -2.23*** 
  (0.44) (0.85) 
    
Quality Latino Challenger (time T-1) - - -1.04 
   (0.80) 
    
Open Seat Election -0.07 - 1.76*** 
 (0.33)  (0.49) 
    
Num. of Competitive Candidates 0.86*** -0.51* 0.71** 
 (0.23) (0.27) (0.31) 
    
Turnout (time T) 3.05* 5.61*** 4.59* 
 (1.64) (2.00) (2.67) 
Constant -6.81*** -7.87*** -7.50*** 
 (1.67) (1.88) (2.42) 
Obs (elections/cities) 437/105 390/105 390/105 
             Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
102 
 
 
 
There are a few things that make Model 1 different from Model 2 in Table 4.2. The latter 
model, examining the factors that determine the emergence of Latino incumbents, shows 
that the number of Latinos on the city council is not significant and neither is the 
interaction between mayor-council government and percent Latino population (mayor-
council*pct. Latino VAP). City population size is associated with Latino incumbent 
emergence, but not with any Latino candidate regardless of incumbency. Also the number 
of competitive candidates in the election has a positive relationship to the emergence of a 
quality Latino challenger, while a negative effect on the emergence of a Latino 
incumbent. 
 The results examining the likelihood of a quality Latino challenger (non-
incumbent) emerging (Model 3) are quite distinct from the results examining the 
emergence of a Latino incumbent in Table 4.2. For example, the effect of the size of the 
Latino voting age population on the emergence of quality Latino candidates is not 
statistically significant. Also, quality Latino challengers are more likely to emerge in 
mayor-council governments regardless of the size of the Latino population in a city. The 
emergence of quality Latino candidates does seem to be influenced by the supply of 
Latinos in the city legislature. However, what is most evident in the data regarding the 
emergence of quality Latino challengers is the fact that they are most likely to emerge as 
a result of strategic factors regarding the electoral context. For example, if there was a 
Latino incumbent in time T-1 election, quality Latino challengers are less likely to 
emerge. So, the results indicate that if Latino candidates were successful in the previous 
election (time T-1), quality Latino challengers are less likely to emerge in time T. You 
would think that success in time T-1 should beget success in time T for other Latinos, but 
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the data does not indicate that this is the case. In fact, these data suggest that quality 
Latino challengers will wait to run if a Latino incumbent has recently been in office. On 
another note, there is no evidence that if a quality Latino challenger in time T-1 emerged 
(lagged dependent variable) a quality Latino challenger will emerge in time T.  The 
findings further suggest that quality Latino challengers are strategic in that they are more 
likely to emerge in open seat elections. Furthermore, quality Latino challengers are not 
only more likely to emerge if there are more competitive candidates on the ballot, but if 
the turnout rate is higher. It must be noted that the substantive impact of the number of 
viable candidates is quite limited on the outcome. Figure 4.4 shows that as the number of 
Latinos in the city council increases to 3, the probability of observing any Latino 
candidate emerge is nearly 60 percent; and when compared to a model predicting the 
emergence of a quality Latino challenger the probability is only 10 percent. 
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 It is clear from the results in Table 4.2 that there are different mechanisms at work that 
influence the emergence of different types of Latino candidates. The thing to consider is 
that nearly 36 percent of elections with Latino candidates on the ballot the Latino also 
have Latino incumbents on the ballot and nearly 1/3 of Latino candidates are quality 
challengers. Thus, there is good reason to examine the factors that determine the 
emergence of these two types of Latino candidates separately. For the Latino incumbents, 
it seems that both supply and strategic factors equally influence their emergence, while 
for quality Latino candidates it seems to be mostly driven by strategic factors. So the next 
question is: Why do Latino candidates win? It is important to next investigate whether 
supply and strategic factors influence the success of Latino candidates and their 
proportion of votes received in an election. In the following section, I will discuss the 
results of the empirical analysis conducted on a subsample of elections and cities where 
1) a Latino candidate was on the ballot, 2) candidates were opposed by at least one other 
candidate, and 3) the election was a 1st round (General) or 2nd round (Runoff) election. 
 
Examining Latino Candidate Success & Vote Share 
Table 4.3 shows the empirical model estimates for Latino candidate success and Latino 
candidate vote share. For each dependent variable there are two sets of models, one that 
does not include any interaction terms and the other that is the fully specified model. This 
is simply included for making comparisons of the independent variables that form the 
interaction terms. Given that I am primarily interested in the results of the fully specified 
models, I will be reporting the results of Model 2 and Model 4. Moreover, in these 
models I solely investigate elections where Latino candidates were on the ballot; and also 
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including first and second round elections. That said, Model 2 (Table 4.3) shows Latino 
candidate success is not independently influenced by the size of the Latino population. In 
fact, the effect of the size of the Latino population on Latino candidate success is not 
statistically significant. 
 However, the results indicate that two city-level institutions seem to suppress the 
likelihood that Latino candidates will win, particularly mayoral term limits and runoff 
provisions. All else equal, Latino candidates running in cities that do not have mayoral 
term limits have a 64 percent probability of wining, whereas Latino candidates running in 
cities that do have term limits have only a 30 percent probability of winning. The 
interaction of the size of the Latino population and the term limit rule (Percent Latino 
VAP*Mayor Term Limits) is not statistically significant. In addition, Latino candidates 
running in cities that do not have a runoff provision that requires the top two vote-
receiving candidates to run in a second election in case one candidates does not receive a 
minimum number of voters, has 67 percent probability of winning – all else equal. 
Despite these electoral institutions, the results show that the supply of Latino candidates 
in terms of the number of Latinos serving in city council has a positive effect on the 
likelihood that Latino candidates will win. Figure 4.5 shows that, all else equal, having 
three sitting Latino city council members increases the probability that a Latino candidate 
will win to nearly 55 percent. Thus, the more Latinos are politically incorporated in 
lower-level government the more likely they will be represented in the city’s top 
executive office. 
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The results in Table 4.3 (Model 2) also show that Latino incumbents are more likely to 
win than Latino candidates who are not incumbents. Specifically, there is a 93 percent 
predicted probability that a Latino incumbent will be successful in the election (all else 
equal) compared to a 30 percent probability that a non-incumbent Latino candidate will 
win. That is, a 210 percent change in the expected outcome of success in the mayoral 
election. Therefore, it seems that Latino mayoral incumbents enjoy a comfortable 
advantage in municipal government. 
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Table 4.3 
Examining Latino Candidate Success & Vote Share 
 Latino Success (0,1) Latino Cand. Vote Share 
 (1)  
Random 
Effects 
Logistic Model 
(2)  
Random 
Effects  
Logistic Model 
(3)  
Random Effects 
OLS Model 
(4)  
Random Effects 
OLS Model  
Candidate Supply     
Pct. Latino VAP 1.97 0.22 0.12 0.05 
 (1.43) (1.65) (0.09) (0.10) 
Mayor-Council Government -0.76* -0.62 -0.04 -0.04 
 (0.46) (0.47) (0.04) (0.04) 
Mayoral Term Limits -1.29** -1.42** -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.54) (0.57) (0.04) (0.04) 
Runoff Provision -0.99* -1.19** 0.00 -0.00 
 (0.52) (0.56) (0.04) (0.04) 
Num. Latinos on Council 0.25* 0.28* 0.01 0.01 
 (0.15) (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) 
History of Latino Mayoralty (0,1) -0.55 -0.52 -0.03 -0.03 
 (0.55) (0.57) (0.04) (0.04) 
Concurrent Muni/Fed Elections 0.39 0.11 0.06 0.05 
 (0.68) (0.71) (0.04) (0.04) 
City Population (Log) 0.28* 0.28* -0.00 -0.00 
 (0.16) (0.17) (0.01) (0.01) 
Candidate Strategy     
Latino Incumbent (time T) 3.44*** 3.83*** 0.29*** 0.31*** 
 (0.63) (0.69) (0.03) (0.03) 
Quality Latino Challenger (time T) 1.22** -0.22 0.17*** 0.10** 
 (0.48) (0.77) (0.03) (0.05) 
Open Seat Election (time T) 1.05** -0.43 0.09*** 0.01 
 (0.49) (0.91) (0.03) (0.05) 
Num. of Competitive Cands (time T) 0.24 0.32 -0.07*** -0.07*** 
 (0.21) (0.22) (0.01) (0.01) 
Turnout (time T) 0.66 -2.67 0.04 -0.07 
 (2.19) (2.59) (0.14) (0.15) 
Quality Latino Challenger*Turnout  - 8.40*** - 0.37** 
  (3.10)  (0.17) 
Pct. Latino VAP*Open Seat Election - 3.56* - 0.21** 
  (1.94)  (0.10) 
Constant -5.83*** -4.85** 0.35** 0.38*** 
 (2.10) (2.14) (0.15) (0.15) 
Obs (elections/cities) 189/69 189/69 189/69 189/69 
      Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
      Observations include all 1st & 2nd elections with opposed candidates.  
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In Model 2, I test the hypothesis that Latino challengers with previous political 
experience are more likely to be successful in elections with higher turnout than in 
elections with lower turnout. The statistical evidence shows a positive relationship for the 
interaction term (Latino Political Experience*Turnout). Figure 4.6 shows that Latino 
candidates having previous political experience running in an election where turnout is 
.20 percent of the voting age population have nearly a 70 percent probability of winning – 
all else equal, of course. What this indicates is that not only is experience important for 
Latino challengers, but so is the level of mobilization among the electorate to increase 
their chances of winning in mayoral elections. 
  
 
 
The results in Table 4.3 (Model 1) corroborate the story that Latino candidates are 
strategic in that they not only emerge when they think they can win, such as when an 
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incumbent is not on the ballot, (see the results in Model 3 in Table 4.2) but that they are 
actually more likely to win if they do run in open seat elections. 
Model 2 in Table 4.3 shows that there is an additional relationship that needs to be 
considered when determining why Latino candidates are more likely to win. Specifically, 
Latino candidates are more likely to win if they run in open seat elections and when the 
Latino population is sizeable. Figure 4.7 shows that, all else equal, Latino candidates 
running in a city that has a 45 percent Latino voting age population and run in an open 
seat the probability of success is about 60 percent. However, if a Latino candidate runs in 
a city that is 65 percent Latino (VAP), particularly in an open seat election, their 
probability of winning increases to 80 percent – which is about a 20 percentage point 
difference.  
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Given that Latino candidates are more likely to win based on both supply and strategic 
factors, it is important to further explore whether and which of these factors influence 
their share of votes in mayoral elections. Specifically, the interaction term (Pct. Latino 
VAP*Open Seat Election) in Model 4 of Table 4.3 is statistically significant, meaning 
that Latino candidates running in open seat elections are more likely to receive more 
votes. However, this relationship is conditioned by the size of the Latino population. So, 
the larger the city’s Latino population the more votes Latino candidates will receive in 
open seat elections. Figure 4.8 shows that this relationship is statistically significant for a 
set of values (e.g., when the Latino population varies from 35 to 95 percent of the 
population). Moreover, the graph specifically shows that Latino candidates running in 
open seat elections – in contexts where Latinos make up 65 percent of the voting age 
population – are likely to reach the typical minimum threshold of votes (50.1%) to win.29 
Figure 4.7 (above) corroborates this relationship in that Latino candidates in the exact 
same demographic and electoral context are nearly 80 percent likely to win the election.30 
 
                                                
 
29 The predicted probabilities are estimated with all other variables held at their mean. 
30 This is based on the model examining a binary variable for Latino candidate success rather than the 
percent of votes received in the mayoral election. 
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What also corroborates the results from the model (Model 2 in Table 4.3) of Latino 
candidates success is the interaction between a Latino candidate’s previous political 
experience and the level of mobilization in an election (Quality Latino 
Challenger*Turnout). As Figure 4.9 shows, Latino candidates with previous political 
experience running in electoral contexts where the turnout rate is between 20 and 25% of 
the voting age population are more likely to reach the threshold for winning (50.1%) than 
Latino candidates running in similar contexts but without previous political experience. 
This indeed shows how critical it can be for Latino candidates to not only have previous 
political experience but to implement effective voter mobilization strategies. All else 
equal (including turnout), however, Latino candidates with previous political experience 
are expected to receive 47 percent of the votes compared to 37 percent for Latino 
candidates who do not have previous political experience. 
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Other results worth noting include Latino incumbents on the ballot (in time T) are 
expected to receive more votes than non-incumbents Latinos by a wide margin. 
Specifically, holding all variables at their mean, the predicted share of votes for a Latino 
incumbent is 62 percent while the expected votes for the non-incumbent Latinos is 31 
percent. Clearly, Latino incumbents are expected to win and have a larger share of the 
votes in mayoral elections. However, in all, the Latino candidate’s vote share is largely 
determined by the factors in the election ranging from the candidate’s previous political 
experience to whether the seat is vacated by an incumbent. Factors such as mayor-council 
governments, term limits, and runoff provisions are not statistically associated with 
Latino candidates’ vote share. Surprisingly, Latinos’ political incorporation in city 
government, particularly in city council, was not statistically significant. Whereas, this 
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variable had been consistently significant in determining the emergence of Latino 
candidates and their success (measured as a binary variable in the previous model). 
Perhaps in the grand scheme of things Latino representation on the city council does 
contribute to the ultimate success of Latino candidates, but the results reveal that it does 
not necessarily help Latino candidates increase their share of votes in mayoral elections. 
 
Conclusion 
At the outset, I raised various questions as to why Latino candidates are likely to emerge 
and succeed in mayoral elections. Moving beyond traditional studies of candidate 
emergence that focus primarily on non-minority candidates and also focusing on the 
systematic analysis of Latino candidate success, this chapter reveals a great deal about 
Latino representation. The analyses point to a few major findings about why Latino 
candidates win. First, Latino candidate emergence is largely a result of the political 
strength of Latinos in the population and in local government. Without a sizeable share of 
the population or a sizeable share of representation in lower-level government Latino 
candidates are not very likely to emerge. The institutional arrangements of a city together 
with the size of the Latino population seem to play a particularly influential role for the 
rise of Latino candidates – as is evident by the form of government and Latino population 
interaction term. Second, it seems that the context of the election, in terms of the level of 
voter mobilization, consistently influences whether a Latino candidate emerges and wins. 
We cannot underestimate the effect of turnout on Latino descriptive representation and 
further research is needed to understand the various mobilization strategies implemented 
in campaigns to increase turnout. Another strategic factor that is associated with the 
114 
 
 
 
emergence of quality Latino challengers is whether the seat is open. That is, the strategic 
behavior of quality Latino candidates seems to occur in mayoral elections where 
incumbents are absent from the ballot. The results estimating Latino candidate success 
also indicate that Latino candidates are more likely to win if they run in open seat 
elections – particularly if the Latino population is at least 35 percent. In fact, what is so 
compelling about the results examining Latino candidate success is that strategic factors 
play a large role in the process of representation. For example, Latino candidates are 
more likely to win if they have previous political experience and if they run in elections 
with markedly higher levels of voter turnout.  
 One point of disjuncture between Latino candidate emergence and success is 
Latinos’ political incorporation in lower-level government. Although having more 
Latinos serving in city council is associated with Latino candidates being represented in 
the candidate pool, it is not statistically associated to the success of Latino candidates or 
to their vote share. But, this is a minor point of contention between the two analyses 
because despite the level of political incorporation in city council (as measured in this 
study), a more influential determinant of representation is the previous political 
experience of the individual candidate. Thus, the body of work in this chapter points to 
the importance of Latino representation in other levels of government – which allows 
Latinos to climb the political ladder and improve their overall political clout. In other 
words, if Latinos want to gain representation in proportion to their large and expanding 
size, Latinos need to continue to run for office in other levels government.  
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CHAPTER 5 
CLOSE ENCOUNTERS: EXAMINING THE IMPACT OF LATINO ETHNICITY ON 
MUNICIPAL ELECTION OUTCOMES	  
 
 
In the previous chapter, I examined the determinants of Latino candidate emergence and 
success. In this chapter, I further explore the consequences of Latino representation by 
examining whether the presence of Latino candidates influences election outcomes such 
as turnout and margin of victory. Prior research reveals that a candidate’s race/ethnicity 
can be an important heuristic for voters in municipal contexts because local elections are 
typically low-information, low-salience events.31 In these contexts voters may rely on 
racial/ethnic cues to vote rather than partisanship or the media – which are more typical 
cues used in national elections (see Campbell et al. 1960). To adequately examine the 
impact of race/ethnicity on turnout and margin of victory, I use data assembled and 
combined from multiple sources, including state, county, and city election departments, 
the National Association of Latino Elected Officials (NALEO), the U.S. Census of 
Population and Housing, and the International City/County Management Association 
(ICMA). More specifically, the unique dataset used here examines 575 elections in 112 
cities located across six southwestern states. To date, no study has included a sample this 
large or over so many time points to examine these election outcomes. Before delving 
into the theoretical model of the determinants of turnout and margin of victory, in the 
following section, I describe a few anecdotes of recent elections where Latino candidates 
                                                
 
31 Previous research has found that turnout in local elections  is typically “half of that of national elections” 
or less than “one-quarter of the voting-age population” (Morlan1984; Bridges 1997 in Hajnal 2010, 1-2) 
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ran for mayor. These accounts will illustrate how and why race and ethnicity might 
influence election outcomes. 
To begin, it is important to note that cities that have experienced demographic 
shifts over the past decade have seen an emergence of Latino candidates in mayoral 
elections such as Jose Tosado in Springfield, Massachusetts (2011) and William Lantigua 
in Lawrence, Massachusetts (2009). These cities are not only different in terms of overall 
population size, but also in terms of the voting strength of the Latino population. 
According to the 2010 Census, Latinos make up 40 percent of the population in 
Springfield and 75 percent in Lawrence. These candidates were seeking to be each city’s 
first Latino mayor.  
In the weeks running up to these elections, newspaper reports had investigated the 
electoral prospects and strategies for these candidates. The following four major points 
were made in the news coverage: 1) the candidate’s Latino ethnicity was a prominent 
issue in the campaign 2) the demographic makeup of the city influenced the formation of 
potential electoral coalitions and ultimately the election outcome 3) elections were 
expected to be won by a narrow margin and 4) elections were expected to have high 
levels of political participation. In sum, the demographic makeup of the city made it 
newsworthy that one of the mayoral candidates was a viable Latino candidate; and this 
led to speculations about election outcomes. 
The outcome in Lawrence, Massachusetts revealed that Latino candidate, William 
Lantigua, won the 2010 election by 1,038 votes (Russell 2011). In fact, Lawrence, MA 
has a history of close elections when a viable Latino candidate was on the ballot. In 2001, 
the Latina mayoral candidate lost the election by less than 1,000 votes (Russell 2011). On 
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the other hand, in Springfield, Massachusetts, the Latino candidate, Jose Tosado, lost the 
election by 8,900 votes. Despite having a competitive Latino candidate on the ballot, the 
election was not as close in Springfield as it was in Lawrence, Massachusetts. So the 
outcome, according to newspaper coverage, varied based on the demographic makeup of 
the city as well as the strategies used by the candidates to court voters from specific 
racial/ethnic groups. 
Looking at what some of the voters had to say about these elections further 
reveals how race/ethnicity can shape voter attitudes, political behavior, and ultimately 
election outcomes. In the case of Springfield, newspaper reports asked individuals of 
different races to comment on Jose Tosado’s mayoral bid. An African American resident 
said, “‘If [Tosado] gets in, he’ll look out for his people, where the current mayor is 
looking out for everybody’” (Russell 2011). On the other hand, an elderly woman of 
Latino descent says, “‘The Time Has Come [for a Latino mayor]…He’s my race – he’s 
Puerto Rican like me…He’s very good - I’ve known him since he was a boy – and we 
need it. There are a lot of people who don’t care about us’” (Russell 2011).  
Granted, that these quotes do not reveal aggregate public opinion in the city. But, 
they highlight that race/ethnicity can be a very real issue in the minds of voters. And, in 
local elections where political party platforms and partisan issues are not front-and-
center, race can be an influential motivator for voters’ decisions at the polls. Additionally, 
in contexts where voters have to choose the city’s top executive (the mayor), stakes could 
be high and feelings about race can further influence election outcomes.  
Another case study in San Jose, California reveals how campaigns have dealt with 
the issue of Latino ethnicity. Specifically, Jude Berry, a lead strategist for Latino 
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candidate, Ron Gonzales’s mayoral campaign in 1998 explained that the campaign 
suspected that race could be an important factor in the election. The campaign had to 
quickly determine whether and how big of an issue it was because this was the first time 
a competitive Latino candidate was seeking to become the city’s first Latino mayor. 
Therefore, the campaign decided to poll San Jose residents by asking them the following: 
Do you agree or disagree with this statement - ‘to tell you the truth, San Jose is not quite 
ready for a Latino mayor.’ The poll results revealed that 25 percent of San Jose residents 
agreed that the city was not ready for a Latino mayor (Barry 2005). Despite the 
substantial portion of residents having negative views of a potential Latino mayoralty, 
Ron Gonzales did become San Jose’s first Latino mayor. Gonzales won by only 4,293 
votes (or 51.7 percent of the votes cast). This anecdotal evidence from the vantage point 
of political campaigns reveals that elections can be close when viable Latino candidates 
are on the ballot. 
 Beyond these case studies, the previous literature has studied whether turnout and 
the margin of victory varies as a result of minority candidates being on the ballot. 
However, these studies almost entirely focus on African Americans rather than on 
Latinos (see Lublin and Tate 1995; except see Hajnal et al. 2002). Admittedly, turnout 
has been studied at the local level by many scholars, however, none has adequately 
examined the impact of Latino candidacies on this outcome, either as incumbents or 
challengers, over time, and in various demographic contexts. Current research has 
primarily examined the impact of African American candidates and has relied on case 
studies or small-N examinations of turnout in limited socio-economic contexts (Hajnal 
2007; Kaufmann 2004). Studies have examined a limited number of election cycles with 
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Latino candidates (Caren 2005; Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 2002) or black or Latino 
behavior independently rather than examining overall turnout when Latinos are on the 
ballot (Lublin and Tate 1995; Barreto 2007). Additionally, there is merely a descriptive 
analysis of the effect of incumbent black candidates on turnout (Hajnal 2007; Kaufmann 
2004), rather than a full empirical analysis of overall turnout over time with variation in 
the racial/ethnic makeup of the mayoral candidate pool.  
 
Theoretical Development of Turnout & Margin of Victory in Local Elections 
In the following sections, I outline a conceptual model that places the various correlates 
of turnout and margin of victory into one of three specific categories including 
Race/Ethnicity, Institutions, and Electoral Context.  
 
Race & Ethnicity 
From the Civil War to the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, race has played a prominent 
role in politics and society (McClain and Stewart 2002; Garcia and Sanchez 2007; 
Garcia-Bedolla 2011). Race and ethnicity continue to shape various political debates 
today – which is evident from instances where pundits and scholars alike considered 
whether Barack Obama could win the presidency without a black majority in several key 
states; whether the controversial Arizona “self-deportation” immigration law is 
disproportionately discriminatory towards Latinos; and whether the large and expanding 
Latino population in key swing states will help determine the winner in the 2012 
presidential elections.  
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Additionally, the 2010 Census revealed that Latinos are nearly 50.5 million strong 
and make up 16 percent of the population. The reported 43 percent growth over the past 
decade also suggests that Latinos are also increasingly becoming part of the social and 
political fabric of society – which further indicates that more and more Latinos could be 
vying for elective offices. The National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed 
Officials (NALEO) reveals that a supermajority of Latino elected officials serve in city, 
county or school board government. Since these elective offices are primarily non-
partisan and low salience elections and the (implicit and explicit) persistence of race and 
ethnicity in contemporary American politics, it is necessary to consider whether the 
presence of Latino candidates increases the competiveness in mayoral elections.  
The previous research reveals that candidates can elicit emotions among people, 
which can range from positive to negative, and everything in between. Specifically, 
Marcus and MacKuen (1993) suggest that emotions elicited by race can further impact 
individuals’ vote choice, candidate evaluations, interest in politics, attentiveness to 
campaigns, and decision to participate (Marcus and MacKuen 1993, 673). What this 
indicates is that ascriptive characteristics (like race and ethnicity) can provide 
information cues to voters about a candidate’s policy preferences, priorities, and 
leadership style. The response from voters as a result may be to not only participate in the 
election, but to have a specific candidate preference as well. Therefore, turnout rates and 
the margin of victory – which is one indicator of the competitiveness of elections – can 
vary based on the presence of a minority candidate on the ballot. 
The previous research including Lublin and Tate (1995), Caren (2005), and 
Hajnal (2007), finds that overall turnout does increase when there are minority candidates 
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on the ballot. However, Lublin and Tate (1995) and Hajnal (2007) focus on African 
American mayoral candidacies. More specifically, Lublin and Tate’s (1995) analysis of 
315 mayoral elections in 26 cities (+100,000) from 1969-1991 shows that turnout 
increased by 4 percent when black candidates were on the ballot. Another work that 
explicitly examines the impact of race on turnout is Caren’s (2005) analysis of mayoral 
elections in 38 large cities (+500,000) over time (1979-3003). The author finds that the 
presence of a multi-racial mayoral election (i.e., Anglo vs. black, Anglo vs. Latino) 
increases turnout by about 2 percent.  However, a cross-sectional analysis of overall 
turnout in both mayoral and city council elections in California, Hajnal, et al. (2002) do 
not find that turnout is impacted by race, while controlling for a wide variety of 
institutional factors (e.g., election timing).  
Case studies in Kaufmann (1998; 2004) and Hero (1992) have confirmed that 
turnout, under certain circumstances, is higher when minority candidates are on the 
ballot. For example, Federico Peña’s successful mayoral candidacy in 1983 had 10% 
higher turnout than the previous election (Hero 1992). Kaufmann (2004) describes the 
1969 Los Angeles mayoral primary election between a black candidate (Tom Bradley) 
and the white incumbent (Sam Yorty) and shows that turnout was 6% higher than the 
previous election; and 11% higher in the runoff (Kaufmann 2004, 69). In the Los Angeles 
case, Kaufmann (2004) attributes this outcome to the racialized context in the city, 
particularly that results from the Watts riots. 
Other research has shown that political behavior (e.g., participation) of specific 
racial/ethnic groups varies depending on whether minority candidates are on the ballot. 
For example, research reveals that the presence of African American candidates in local 
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elections increases turnout and reduces voter roll-off (non-voting for races down the 
ballot) among African American voters (Bobo and Gilliam 1990; Gilliam and Kaufmann 
1998; Vanderleeuw and Liu 2002). Barreto (2007) examines the effect of Latino 
candidacies on Latino turnout in mayoral races in five large cities and finds that turnout 
increases among coethnics when Latinos are on the ballot (see also Barreto, Segura, and 
Woods 2004). This indicates that, for coethnic voters, the presence of a Latino could 
increase their levels of political participation. Reuters reported that when Antonio 
Villaraigosa ran for mayor in 2001 and 2005, he captured over 80 percent of the Latino 
vote; and in 2005 exit polling data indicated that Latinos made up a record 25 percent of 
the overall vote in that election (Krolicki 2005). The symbolic benefits, or affective 
feelings that someone who shares the same racial/ethnic background as a leader within 
government, seems to partly explain why coethnic candidates are more likely to not only 
get more coethnics to participate in the election, but to also win their vote. This may stem 
from greater trust placed on representatives who share their racial or ethnic background 
(Mansbridge 1999). Additionally, the increased levels of coethnic support may stem from 
the prospective benefits from public policies that may be implemented to directly impact 
minority communities (i.e., substantive representation). 
On the other hand, Hajnal’s (2007) research reveals that Anglo participation 
increases when black challengers are vying for the mayoralty. This indicates that Anglos 
are initially concerned about the potential consequences of minority leadership in that 
resources could be redistributed or that they could lose their political status. Over time, 
however, Anglos’ levels of threat subside from learning that life under a black mayor 
does not have a negative impact on their social and political status. Despite the 
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aforementioned research we still don’t know whether the presence of Latino candidates 
affects overall turnout as well as the margin of victory in mayoral elections. In fact, 
Lublin and Tate (1995) are among the only scholars that examine whether the margin of 
victory is impacted by the presence of quality black candidates (i.e., one with previous 
political experience). They do find that the presence of black candidates reduces the 
margin of victory – which suggests that these elections are more competitive. 
Thus, in addition to the race/ethnicity of the candidate, one important factor that 
could raise the stakes, so to speak, in elections and increase the turnout rates make 
elections closer is whether the minority candidate is a viable candidate. If any Latino 
decides to run, regardless of previous political experience, the local media, challengers, 
and even voters (of all racial/ethnic backgrounds) may not take him or her seriously. In 
this situation, the race/ethnicity of a candidate may not be salient. Thus, the viability of 
the candidate should play a substantial role in these election outcomes.   
In sum, race/ethnicity is expected to play a role in the outcome of elections by 
influencing the perceptions of individuals who belong to different groups. There is 
evidence in the previous literature that suggests that voters could be more interested in 
participating to protect (or enhance) their interests. Regardless of whether members of 
some groups are encouraged to participate based on feelings of empowerment or feelings 
of threat, the previous research as well as the case studies outlined in the introduction 
suggest that elections with quality Latino candidates on the ballot will be closer between 
the winner and the loser and experience markedly higher levels of turnout. 
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Institutions 
In addition to race and ethnicity, the electoral outcomes of turnout and the margin of 
victory can be influenced by city institutions and the context of the election. A few 
institutional factors including the timing of an election, term limits, and the form of 
government can influence these factors because they are associated with individuals’ 
costs and benefits for participating in an election. Specifically, if elections are held 
concurrently with presidential elections, then voters are more likely to go to the polls 
because are they more likely to be aware of who the candidates are and when to vote. 
Interest in participating can also stem from having more knowledge about the election 
(Caren 2007; see also Geys 2006). Many scholars studying turnout at the local level have 
found that this is a major factor explaining levels of turnout (Hajnal, Lewis, and Louch 
2002; Hajnal and Lewis 2003; Caren 2007). Thus, I would expect that when mayoral 
elections are held concurrently with presidential elections turnout is likely to be higher 
than when mayoral elections are held during any other time. Because interest is likely to 
increase when local elections are held together with presidential elections, I would also 
expect that elections are closer, and thus the margin of victory should decline. 
 In addition to election timing, the form of government conveys information about 
whether elections matter in terms of the distribution of political values/resources. 
Previous literature suggests that council-manager forms of government substantially 
reduce turnout compared to cities with mayor-council forms (Caren 2007; Alford and Lee 
1968). Reform-type governments (i.e., council-manager systems) were implemented to 
redirect political power from the local party bosses to appointed bureaucrats in order to 
reduce corruption (progressive era reforms). In these contexts, the incentive to ask for 
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votes in return for “pork” in council-manager systems is substantially reduced. Therefore, 
I expect that cities with mayor-council governments are more likely to have higher 
turnout than cities with council-manager governments. The fact that mayor-council 
governments give more political authority to mayors than council-manager governments, 
may also indicate that more is at stake for candidates and voters alike. Therefore, I expect 
that, all else equal, elections held in cities with mayor-council governments to have a 
closer margin of victory than elections in cities with council-manager governments. 
While the form of government may play a role in the costs associated with voting, 
another institution that might influence election outcomes is whether there are limits for 
the number of consecutive terms that elected officials can serve. I expect that, in general, 
cities with term limits have higher turnout rates and closer elections on average than 
cities without term limits because there are likely to be periodic instances where the seats 
are vacated by incumbents than cities where incumbents can run for reelection an 
unlimited number of times.  
 
Electoral Context 
Rather than simply relying on city-level factors to model turnout and margin of victory, 
the previous literature suggests that the context of the election is highly influential. For 
example, studies of U.S. Congress reveal that incumbents have been winning elections 
more often and by larger margins of victory (Mayhew 1974; Fiorina 1977; Alford and 
Hibbing 1981; Krehbiel and Wright 1983). Thus incumbency must be accounted for when 
modeling margin of victory. I expect that when incumbents are on the ballot elections 
will not be as close as when the seats are open.  
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Additionally, because voters may be aware that incumbents are the likely winners, 
they be less inclined to vote. Downs (1957) suggests that voters are less inclined to 
participate if they are less likely to determine the outcome (by casting a vote). Granted, 
there may be instances where incumbents face serious challengers and therefore influence 
the outcome of elections regarding turnout and the margin of victory. However, I expect 
that incumbents usually have the upper hand and when they are on the ballot turnout will 
be down while the margin of victory up.  
Another set of factors about the election that should be taken into account when 
analyzing the determinants of turnout and margin of victory include whether the election 
has one candidate that is unopposed and whether the election is a runoff or second-round 
election. In the instances where no candidate in the general election received more than 
50.1 percent, and a runoff was needed to break the “tie,” I would expect that they would 
be more competitive and experience higher levels of turnout than first-round elections. 
Downs (1957) also suggests that when voters expect elections to be close they are more 
likely to participate because they are more likely to influence the outcome of the election.  
Therefore, another factor to take into account is the number of competitive candidates 
vying for office. I expect that elections will be closer when more competitive candidates 
are on the ballot because this may generate enthusiasm among the media and different 
groups of voters. Also, when more competitive candidates are vying for office there may 
be more residents that vote, and thus overall levels of participation should increase.  
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Demographic Context 
While race/ethnicity, institutions, and the electoral context can impact the overall levels 
of political participation and the margin of victory, it is necessary to control for the 
demographic context of the city. For example, Oliver (2000) finds that the size of the city 
plays an important role in aggregate-level political behavior, because smaller cities tend 
to have residents who are more socially connected. Voters tend to be more informed in 
more intimate social settings and therefore increases their propensity to participate 
(except see Kelleher and Lowery 2009). In larger cities, residents are not as likely to be 
involved because the lack of social connectedness increases the costs of acquiring 
information – and subsequently of voting.  
Given the discussion of race and ethnicity in American politics and the fact that 
this chapter specifically examines the impact of Latino candidacies on turnout and the 
margin of victory, it is important to control for the size of the Latino population. 
Specifically, the racial composition of a city, such as the size of the Latino population, 
can condition the impact of the presence of a quality Latino candidate on the mayoral 
ballot. That is, when quality Latino candidates are vying for mayor in cities with a strong 
Latino population, elections can be closer and experience higher levels of political 
participation than in cities where quality Latino candidates run where the Latino 
population is trivial. Caren (2005) suggest that when minority populations are stronger 
vis-à-vis the dominant Anglo population, elections are closer because larger size indicates 
losses in social, economic, and political status (see Caren 2005, 89). Additionally, the 
larger size of the Latino population in a city the higher the turnout because the group’s 
chances of success are higher at the polls (see Lublin and Tate 1995 for their study of 
128 
 
 
 
African American mayors). In other words, it is an argument suggesting that minorities 
feel more efficacious in politics (and more likely mobilized) if they are less likely to be 
defeated in elections – that is, if a quality Latino candidate emerges in the election. 
Without a quality Latino candidate turnout rates may be lower since Latinos tend to 
participate at lower rates than Anglos. In the following section, I describe the data used to 
examine turnout and margin of victory in mayoral elections. 
 
Data 
Although the data used in this chapter is constructed from multiple sources, the major 
source includes mayoral election results for a large sample of cities located in the six 
southwestern U.S. states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and 
Texas) spanning various years32 (for more details on the sample see Appendix A). In 
addition, I include demographic data from the U.S. Census; and local institutional 
arrangements from International City and County Management Association’s (ICMA) 
Form of Government Surveys – as well as from city charters, websites, and personally 
contacting city clerks. The analytic sample used to examine turnout and margin of victory 
includes 575 elections in 112 cities. This includes elections where candidates are both 
opposed and unopposed, general elections, and runoff elections. 
 
 
 
                                                
 
32 For example, I have gathered elections for Houston, TX from 1993-2009 (9 cycles), San Antonio, TX 
from 1991-2009 (10 cycles), Los Angeles, CA from 1997-2009 (4 cycles), Denver, CO from 1991-2007 (3 
cycles). The analysis also includes elections with unopposed candidates. 
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Variables 
The election results provide information on the outcome of the election, such as the 
winner, the loser, the total number of votes cast, and the share of votes that each 
candidate received. This information is the basis for the two dependent variables: turnout 
and margin of victory. Turnout has been measured several different ways in the previous 
literature (see Geys 2006) however, here I measure turnout by taking the ratio of total 
votes cast for all mayoral candidates (including write-ins) in each election to the total 
number of eligible voters (citizens over 18 years old) in the respective city. The 
denominator in this equation was constructed using the U.S. Census on Population and 
Housing’s statistics on the citizen voting-age population (people +18yrs). To calculate the 
voting-eligible population for the years in-between Census cycles, I imputed the data 
based a linear rate of change. The other dependent variable examined here that is based 
on electoral information is the margin of victory. This measure is a calculation of the 
difference between the winner’s vote share and the second place candidate’s vote share.33  
 
Modeling Turnout and Margin of Victory 
The turnout rate and the margin of victory, is based on the following conceptual model: 
 
Turnout & Margin of Victory = Latino Ethnicity + Institutions + Electoral 
Context + Demographic Context + Demographic Context*Latino Ethnicity 
 
                                                
 
33 For example, in an election where Candidate A received 60% of votes and Candidate B received 40% the 
margin of victory in the election is 20 percentage points. 
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As outlined above, turnout and margin of victory are expected to be a function of Latino 
ethnicity, city-level institutions, the context of the election, the demographic context of 
the city, and the interaction of city demographics and Latino ethnicity. In this section, I 
will outline the various operational measures used to examine these electoral outcomes. 
 
Operationalizing Candidate Latino Origin  
To examine the impact of the presence of quality Latino challengers on the ballot on 
turnout and margin of victory, I determined whether 1) a candidate was of Latino descent 
2) whether the Latino candidate had previous political experience and 3) whether the 
Latino candidate was a non-incumbent.  So, if the election had at least one candidate that 
fit this description it would be coded as “1” and “0” otherwise.  
To determine the ethnic origin of the candidates, I relied on the directories of 
Latino elected officials provided by the National Association of Latino Elected Officials 
(NALEO) from 1984-2009 as well as the U.S. Census Spanish Surname Lists (Word & 
Perkins 1996). Using the election results collected for the cities in my sample, I searched 
through the NALEO directories to see whether the successful candidates were listed. I 
also checked to see whether unsuccessful Latino candidates had been successful in other 
local offices (i.e., city council, county commission, school board, and state legislative 
government) and thus checked the rosters for their names. Among those who were on the 
ballot but not in the NALEO directories34 I used U.S. Census Spanish Surname Lists 
(Word & Perkins 1996).  
                                                
 
34 Although the methodology used by NALEO has changed over the years in terms of how they include 
elected officials in the directories, the most recent method relies on contacting candidates and asking them 
to self-identify as Latinos. So, some Latino elected officials without Latino surnames are included in the 
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In addition, I determined whether Latino candidates are quality candidates. That 
is, I determined whether Latino candidates in my dataset have previous political 
experience in the school board, city council, state legislature. Candidate backgrounds 
were obtained from NALEO rosters – to see whether they have held previous office in 
another level of government – and from newspaper accounts and campaign websites.  
Finally, I determined whether each Latino candidate was a non-incumbent 
challenger by noting whether they had won the election in time T-1. Outside of 
California, the election results do not indicate whether candidates were sitting 
incumbents. So, I relied on the elections data that I gathered. If it could not be determined 
whether Latino candidates were present in time T-1, then it was coded as a missing. 
Given that the previous research suggests that elections should have lower levels 
of political participation and higher margins of victory after they have experienced 
leadership under a minority mayor (see research in Hajnal 2007), I also include a binary 
variable that indicates whether a city has a history of electing a Latino mayor from 1984 
up to the point of the election. Here, if the city has elected a Latino mayor at some point 
between 1984 and the election (in time T) it was coded as “1” and “0” if otherwise. To 
code this variable, I relied on NALEO directories that go as far back as 1984. Granted, 
with the data collected here, it is not possible to determine when exactly cities elected 
their first Latino mayor. Rather information on every mayor spanning the time when 
cities were first incorporated would be needed. However, this is an ongoing project where 
I am continually investigating the backgrounds of each city/election in more detail. So, 
                                                                                                                                            
 
directory. Additionally, NALEO relies on previous list of Latino candidates to update current lists and in 
the past they may not have surveyed all U.S. cities and elections. Given these factors, there are some 
candidates coded as Latinos in my sample that are not in the NALEO directories.  
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the best information available to measure Latino representation in the Latino mayoralty 
stems from 1984-2009.  
 
Operationalizing City Institutions 
Part of the rules governing elections include when the elections are held. In this dataset I 
use a binary variable to specify whether the election was held concurrently with 
presidential election years where 1=yes and 0=no. City government institutional data was 
partly provided by the Form of Governments Surveys conducted by the International 
City/County Management Association (ICMA).35 To measure the prestige of the mayoral 
office, I include a binary measure for a mayor-council government, where 1=yes and 
0=no. I also include a binary variable indicating whether municipal elections were held 
on cycle in November of presidential election and mid-term election years to measure 
whether cities have concurrent elections, where 1=yes and 0=no. Finally, to 
operationalize whether cities have electoral rules that limit the maximum number of 
terms for incumbents, I include a binary measure for term limits, where 1=yes and 0=no. 
 
Operationalizing the Electoral Context 
To operationalize the context of each election, I account for whether the election has an 
open seat using a binary measure to determine whether an incumbent is on the ballot or 
not (1=yes, 0=no). Additionally, I included a variable for whether the election had an 
unopposed candidate (1=yes, 0=no) vying for the mayoralty and whether the election was 
                                                
 
35 Given that the surveys are conducted every five years and not all participants (city officials) choose to 
respond every time, there was a lot of missing and inconsistent data. Therefore, I took the time to verify 
whether there were term limits, partisan elections, and any changes in forms of government by reviewing 
city charters (posted online) or contacting city clerks. 
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a runoff – or a second-round election that took place in case no one candidate received 
more than a minimum threshold of votes (usually 50.1 percent of the votes). All these 
variables are coded “1” if yes and “0” otherwise. I also include a variable accounting for 
the number of number of competitive candidates, which is measured as a fractionalization 
score: 1/(sum of the squared vote share of each candidate).36 In the analysis of turnout 
rates, I control for the margin of victory. As for the analysis of margin of victory, I also 
control for the turnout rate. This will help determine whether elections that are closer 
also have higher participation rates and vice versa.  
 
Operationalizing the Demographic Context 
 I also rely on the U.S. Census of Population and Housing to include indicators for the 
demographic context of a city such as, the size of the Latino population, measured as the 
percent of the Latino voting age population in a city and the city’s total voting age 
population (logged). To measure the interactive effect of Latino ethnicity and 
demographic context I include the interaction term of Quality Latino Candidate*Percent 
Latino Population.  
The descriptive statistics in Table 5.1 show that average turnout across all 
observations is 25 percent (as a proportion of citizen, voting-age population). 
Additionally, candidates win by an average of 41 percentage points. These data reveal not 
only that turnout is quite low compared to presidential elections that usually have nearly 
50 percent turnout, but that mayoral candidates win by very large margins. Also, only 
                                                
 
36 To illustrate the measure that accounts for the number of competitive candidates, take a hypothetical 
election with three candidates: Candidate A received 50% of votes, Candidate B 40%, and Candidate C 
10%. (1/.50^2+.40^2+.10^2=2.38 competitive candidates). 
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about 37 percent of the mayoral elections in the dataset have open seats where no 
incumbent is on the ballot. Among those candidates that run unopposed, the margin of 
victory is also quite high. Specifically, when the write-in candidates are taken into 
account they win by a margin of 98 percentage points. However, candidates that do run 
opposed win by an average of 30 percentage points. As for the independent variable of 
primary interest, Latino ethnicity, the descriptive data shows that 13 percent of the 575 
elections in 112 cities a quality Latino challenger on the ballot. 
 
Table 5.1 
  
Descriptive Data for Sample 
Variable 
Obs 
(elecs/cities) Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Turnout (CVAP) 575/112 .26 .16 0 .90 
Margin of Victory 575/112 .41 .36 0 1 
Quality Latino Challenger 575/112 .13 .34 0 1 
History of Latino Mayor 575/112 .16 .37 0 1 
Mayor-Council Government 575/112 .19 .39 0 1 
Concurrent Election 575/112 .11 .31 0 1 
Runoff Election 575/112 .10 .30 0 1 
Mayoral Term Limits 575/112 .34 .47 0 1 
Open Seat Election 575/112 .37 .48 0 1 
Num. of Competitive Candidates 575/112 2.02 .82 1 6.30 
Unopposed Election 575/112 .17 .37 0 1 
Population Size (logged) 575/112 10.65 1.99 6.17 15.16 
Percent Latino Population 575/112 .29 .21 .02 1 
 
Findings From the Turnout Model 
To estimate the impact of race/ethnicity, institutions, electoral context, and demographic 
context on turnout and margin of victory, I employ random & fixed effects OLS 
regression models. These methods are commonly used to examine time-series, cross-
sectional data because they provide robust standard errors clustered by city and year (see 
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Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2005). In other words, the estimates describe the average 
effect of the impact that independent variables have between cities and within cities, 
respectively. 
 The estimates of turnout in Model 1 of Table 5.2 show that Latino ethnicity, 
measured in terms of the presence of a quality Latino challenger, is not statistically 
associated with city-wide levels of political participation. Additionally, the election of a 
Latino mayor in the recent history of the city (from 1984-2009) does not explain the 
variation in aggregate turnout rates across cities. Given that the interaction between 
Latino voting age population*Quality Latino Challenger was not statistically significant, 
it was dropped from the final model. These null results hold in Model 2 examining 
turnout within cities (using a Fixed Effects model). 
 As for the influence of cities’ institutional mechanisms on turnout rates across 
cities, only one factor seems to play a major role: the timing of elections. The estimates in 
Model 1 of Table 5.2 show that cities that have municipal elections held during 
presidential election years are predicted to have a turnout rate that is 14 percentage points 
higher than cities without concurrent elections. In other words, all else equal, the average 
turnout rate in cities with concurrent elections is 39 percent of the citizen voting-age 
population, while the turnout rate for cities without concurrent elections is 25 percent. 
This seems to make a great difference in aggregate levels of electoral participation. 
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Table 5.2  
 
Examining Turnout in Mayoral Elections 
 Between Cities Within Cities 
 (1)  (2)  
DV: Turnout (CVAP) Random  
Effects OLS 
 Fixed  
Effects OLS 
 
Latino Ethnicity     
Quality Latino Challenger 0.01  0.01  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
     
History of Latino Mayor -0.01  -0.01  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  
Institutions     
Mayor-Council Government -0.00  -  
 (0.03)    
     
Mayoral Term Limits -0.02  -0.04*  
 (0.02)  (0.03)  
     
Concurrent Election 0.14***  0.12***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
Electoral Context     
Unopposed Election -0.05***  -0.05***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
     
Num. of Competitive Candidates 0.01**  0.01**  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
     
Open Seat Election -0.01  -0.01  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
     
Runoff Election 0.05***  0.05***  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  
     
Margin of Victory -0.04**  -0.03**  
 (0.02)  (0.01)  
Demographic Context     
Percent Latino (VAP) -0.02  -0.03  
 (0.04)  (0.05)  
     
Population Size (logged) -0.01**  0.05*  
 (0.01)  (0.03)  
     
Latino VAP*Qlty Latino Challenger N.S.  N.S.  
     
     
Constant 0.40***  -0.27  
 (0.06)  (0.29)  
R-Squared .43  .38  
N 575/112  575/112  
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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 The estimates in Model 2 in Table 5.2 show that this relationship is very similar within 
cities (over time). That is, when city elections are held on-cycle in November turnout is 
higher by 13 percentage points than when city elections are held off-cycle. This does not 
necessarily indicate that cities change the timing of elections. Rather, the data indicate 
that some cities have elections every two years (on even years) in September. If there is a 
runoff election, then it is might be held in November of the same (even-numbered) year – 
which is now on-cycle with either presidential elections or mid-term elections. Also, 
when cities implement term limits turnout is likely to be reduced by 5 percentage points. 
Competitiveness seems to be reduced when incumbents are required to serve a limited 
number of consecutive terms. Even though the estimates in Model 2 of Table 5.2 show 
that cities that adopt term limits is statistically associated with reduced levels of turnout, 
there are only five cities in the dataset that have implemented term limits – that is, within 
the timeframe of the elections gathered here.37 Thus, this result should be interpreted 
cautiously.  
In addition to examining the impact of institutions Model 1 of Table 5.2 examines 
the impact of electoral context on turnout. The results indicate that it is a critical 
determinant of aggregate levels of political participation in elections. For example, all 
else equal, turnout is likely to be 5 percentage points lower in elections with unopposed 
candidates vying for the mayoralty than in elections where there are at least two – if not 
more – candidates on the ballot. In fact, as more competitive candidates vie for the 
mayoralty the higher the turnout rate is expected to be. Figure 5.2 shows that, all else 
                                                
 
37 These cities include Fresno, CA; Carson City, NV; Henderson, NV;  Las Vegas, NV; Austin, TX. 
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equal,38 for every additional candidate that runs, turnout increases by 1 percent. The 
results also show that when runoff elections are held (across and within cities) turnout 
increases by 5 percentage points.   
 
 
 
In summary, aggregate political participation (turnout) seems to be primarily 
impacted by the timing of the election. The context of the election in terms of whether 
candidates are unopposed or whether the election is a runoff between the top two 
candidates also help explain turnout rates across and within cities – but are not as 
influential as the election timing. The empirical model also reveals that Latino ethnicity is 
not statistically associated with city-level turnout rates. 
                                                
 
38 To estimate predicted probabilities all variables were held at their mean. 
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Findings from the Margin of Victory Model 
In this section, I specifically test to see whether elections with Latino candidates have 
smaller margins of victory.39 The estimates in Model 1 of Table 5.3 show that although 
the presence of a quality Latino candidate has a negative effect on the margin of victory 
the relationship is not quite statistically significant. The Fixed Effects model (Model 2) in 
Table 5.3 also indicates that Latino ethnicity does not influence the closeness of elections 
over time (within cities). Unlike previously expected, the effect of Latino ethnicity is not 
conditioned by the size of the Latino voting age population. Because the interaction term 
Latino VAP*Quality Latino Candidate was not statistically significant it was ultimately 
omitted from the analysis. 
 Despite the null effect of Latino ethnicity, the results in Model 1 of Table 5.3 
reveal that various institutions influence election closeness. However, the impact of 
mayor-council government and term limits are opposite of the hypothesized direction. I 
expected that mayoral elections held in cities with mayor-council governments to be 
closer than council-manager governments because mayor-council governments are 
institutions that carry a higher level of prestige that would generally make for competitive 
elections. Specifically, the results show that, all else equal, cities with mayor-council 
governments are likely to have winners win elections by an average of 47 percentage 
points; while elections in cities without mayor-council governments winners are expected 
to win by 39 percentage points. Winning by 39 percentage points is still quite a large 
margin of victory, and the predicted probabilities (where all variables are held to their 
mean) indicate that the form of government would not make elections less competitive in 
                                                
 
39 Margin of victory is measured as the difference between the vote share of the top two candidates 
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realistic terms. That is, unless differences between cities with mayor-council 
governments and council-manager varied from the single digits to the mid double-digits, 
then it really would not make mayoral campaigns take a closer look at the competitive 
nature of the governing arrangements. In Model 2 of Table 5.3 the governing 
arrangement was omitted form the model because there was no variation over time within 
cities. In other words, the cities in the sample did not change their governing 
arrangements from council-manager to mayor-council (and vice versa); and a Fixed 
Effects Model could not be estimated using that independent variable. 
So, in addition to the form of government, the other institutional variable that 
influences election closeness is term limits. On average, cities with term limits have 
margins of victory that are 4 percentage higher than elections without term limits. 
Perhaps the notion that seats are systematically up for grabs due to incumbents being 
forced to step down (after serving a series of consecutive terms) reduces the closeness of 
elections rather than increases it. In Model 2 of Table 5.3, the impact of the adoption of 
term limits within cities does not impact the average margin of victory over time. But, 
given the limited variation of changes in term limits within cities, this result is expected.  
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Table 5.3 
  
Examining Margin of Victory in Mayoral Elections 
DV: Margin of Victory 
Between Cities Within Cities 
(1)  (2)  
Random  
Effects OLS 
 Fixed  
Effects OLS 
 
Latino Ethnicity     
Quality Latino Challenger -0.02  0.00  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
     
History of Latino Mayor 0.02  0.05  
 (0.03)  (0.06)  
Institutions     
Mayor-Council Government 0.08***  -  
 (0.02)    
     
Mayoral Term Limits 0.04**  0.10  
 (0.02)  (0.08)  
     
Concurrent Election -0.02  0.00  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  
Electoral Context     
Unopposed Election 0.48***  0.46***  
 (0.03)  (0.03)  
     
Num. of Competitive Candidates -0.16***  -0.17***  
 (0.01)  (0.02)  
     
Open Seat Election -0.11***  -0.11***  
 (0.02)  (0.02)  
     
Runoff Election -0.18***  -0.22***  
 (0.03)  (0.04)  
     
Turnout (CVAP) -0.18**  -0.33**  
 (0.07)  (0.15)  
Demographic Context     
Percent Latino (VAP)  -0.06  0.01  
 (0.05)  (0.17)  
     
Population Size (logged) 0.02***  0.02  
 (0.01)  (0.09)  
     
Latino VAP*Qlty Latino Challenger -  -  
     
     
Constant 0.52***  0.58  
 (0.07)  (0.92)  
R-Squared .76  .63  
N 575/112  575/112  
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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The estimates in Table 5.3 show that in both Random and Fixed Effects models, 
the context of the election is really what is driving the margin of victory. Table 5.4 
provides the predicted40 margin of victory for elections that are unopposed, elections with 
incumbents on the ballot, and in runoff elections. Elections are closer (within and across 
cities) when incumbents are not vying for reelection and in the second-round runoff 
election between the top two candidates. Finally, Figure 5.4 shows the impact that turnout 
rates have on the margin of victory. Despite the positive impact of turnout on the margin 
of victory, the model estimates indicate that turnout needs to be particularly high to make 
elections quite competitive between the first and second-place candidates. 
 
Table 5.4 
 
Predicting  Margin of Victory 
 Predicted 
Probability 
  
Council-Manager Government .39 
Mayor-Council Government .47 
  
No Term Limits .39 
Term Limits .44 
  
Unopposed Election .80 
Opposed Election .33 
  
Incumbent on Ballot .45 
Open Seat Election .34 
  
General Election .43 
Runoff Election .24 
Note: all vars. held at mean  
 
                                                
 
40 The predicted probabilities are estimated by holding all other variables at their mean. 
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Conclusion 
The principal aim of this chapter was to examine the impact of Latino ethnicity on 
electoral outcomes, namely turnout and margin of victory. The expectation, based on 
anecdotal evidence and academic research, is that Latino ethnicity is not only a relevant 
(and non-trivial) factor in elections, but that it has the potential to determine election 
outcomes by increasing political participation and making elections closer. Granted, 
increased political participation could result from coethnics being enthused, interested, 
and ultimately mobilized; or from non-coethnics – in this case Anglos and Blacks – being 
encouraged to participate to avoid relinquishing their social and political status. Since the 
impact of Latino ethnicity has not been examined to date, this study fills the gap in the 
literature by specifically studying whether and when the presence of quality Latino 
challengers influences aggregate political participation and the margin of victory. 
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Moreover, I focus on studying the impact of Latino ethnicity on mayoral election 
outcomes because this is the optimal setting to determine whether race and ethnicity have 
a role to play in political outcomes. Due to the frequency of non-partisans elections and 
off-cycle election timing, media effects are expected to be minimal in determining 
election outcomes – which is not expected in high profile congressional and presidential 
elections. 
 The results provided in the analyses of turnout and margin of victory find that 
Latino ethnicity, measured by the presence of quality Latino challengers, is not 
statistically associated to aggregate measures of political participation and election 
closeness.  That is not to say that Latino ethnicity is not relevant in mayoral elections. In 
fact, local elections are complex and this analysis is just the tip of the iceberg. The 
limitations in the data do not allow me to fully examine the historical experience of 
Latinos in these cities. The measure for whether Latinos have ever served as mayors does 
not indicate the first time a viable Latino candidate sought the mayoralty. Additionally, 
further investigation should test whether the same Latino candidate ran for mayor 
multiple times – and more importantly, whether the fact that Latinos candidates won or 
lost had any impact on turnout rates and the margin of victory. Controversial issues that 
were raised during the campaign between could also influence the election outcomes 
discussed - which needs to be further explored. Finally, the impact of Latino ethnicity on 
election outcomes could depend on whether the mayoral election was contested between 
a Latino and an African American candidate, or a Latino and an Anglo candidate. In the 
dataset used here, I have only coded for whether a candidate was Latino or not. Thus, 
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race could play a significant role in elections and more research is needed to determine 
the conditions under which it influences election outcomes. 
  Although Latino ethnicity is a major interest in this chapter, it is merely one 
variable among many that is examined to understand the determinants of election 
outcomes. The virtual non-existence of a centralized database on municipal election 
results (until recent developments made by the Local Elections in America Project by 
Marschall, Shah, and Ruhil 2011), has prohibited scholars from systematically studying a 
variety of political phenomena that are frequently studied by congressional,  presidential, 
or state legislative scholars alike. Among these rarely studied phenomena beyond a single 
state, single city, or single time period is city-wide turnout and margin of victory. As 
many scholars rely on single city studies, they cannot examine the impact of the electoral 
context on these election outcomes more systematically. My results confirm previous 
studies of California elections in that the timing of elections is critical for determining 
aggregate participation rates (see Hajnal et al. 2002; Wood 2002). But, the margin of 
victory or the closeness of elections (as studied by Lublin and Tate 1995) is heavily 
influenced by the context of the election. Not only does it matter whether incumbents are 
on the ballot, but how many viable candidates are running, and whether the election is 
held to beak a previous “tie” between the top two candidates. I challenge scholars 
interested in examining everything from incumbency advantage to the representation of 
women to take the research presented here much further. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
Having dedicated this dissertation to studying Latino descriptive representation in the 
mayoralty, I have shed light on the following questions: Where are Latino mayors 
currently serving? Why do some cities have Latino representation in the mayoralty and 
other do not? What are the conditions under which Latinos emerge as mayoral 
candidates, and why do they win? Finally, are election outcomes such as turnout and 
margin of victory influenced by the presence of Latino candidates?  
By studying the causes and consequences of Latino descriptive representation, the 
research here has essentially explored the lifecycle of a key component of Latino political 
incorporation in municipal government – that is, descriptive representation. Knowing the 
causal determinants of Latinos’ representation in municipal government and elections is a 
fundamental contribution to American politics because it allows us to further understand 
the political consequences of an increasingly diverse body politic at a level of 
government that is severely understudied.  
Furthermore, because local government has a tremendous impact on the lives of 
individuals of different racial and ethnic backgrounds given the services provided for 
police protection, education, healthcare services, among other things, then it is critical to 
explore how these groups fare in gaining access to decision-making bodies (via 
representation). Thus, this concluding chapter not only highlights key findings from the 
previous chapters, but also discusses some of the anomalous results that examine 
different aspects of representation. Finally, this chapter points to new directions for future 
research regarding Latino descriptive representation in subnational government. 
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Discussion of Key Results 
One of the most revealing findings in Chapter 2 is that despite most Latino mayor cities 
having a very large Latino population, 58 percent of majority Latino populated cities do 
not have representation in the city’s top executive office. That is, there are approximately 
255 incorporated cities (according to the 2005-2009 American Community Survey) that 
could have Latino mayors, due to the numerical strength of the Latino population, but 
simply do not. There is no question that the numerical strength of the Latino population is 
an influential factor for Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty. However, the 
findings in Chapter 2 indicate that representation in the mayoralty may extend beyond the 
numerical voting strength of the Latino population. For example, representation could 
depend on the demographic context of the city, its governing institutions, and electoral 
rules, among other things. The descriptive analysis of cities with Latino mayors – which 
has never been done before up to now – provides insight as to where Latino mayors are 
elected and describes the demographic and institutional characteristics of Latino mayor 
cities. Additionally, the descriptive statistics in Chapter 2 also justifies the subsequent 
chapters of the dissertation that inquire about the causal determinants of Latino mayoral 
representation in cities and in elections. 
 To study Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty beyond descriptive 
statistics and to further examine the various demographic, institutional, and political 
determinants of this political phenomenon, I relied on a large sample of cities constructed 
from six ICMA Form of Government Survey waves spanning from 1981 to 2006. The 
empirical results confirm that Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty is largely 
a function of the voting strength of the Latino population in terms of not only being a 
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large proportion of the population, but also being relatively well educated. Thus, on the 
one hand, Latinos are projected to increase their political clout given their large and 
expanding population size in both traditional and non-traditional immigrant destinations. 
On the other hand, these demographic trends may not necessarily yield to the expected 
political consequences if Latinos continue to lag behind in education. That is, for Latinos 
to realize their full potential in domestic political affairs, they need to work towards 
encouraging Latino youths to stay in school, go to college, and graduate. The seminal 
research in American political behavior reveals how important education levels are for 
political participation and ultimately political incorporation (see Verba and Nie 1975; 
Browning, Marshall, and Tabb 1984).  
 The results in Chapter 3 also reveal that Latino descriptive representation goes 
beyond the sheer numerical strength of the Latino population. In fact, institutions seem to 
matter for achieving representation in the mayoralty. For example, when examining a 
large sample of cities across the U.S., cities with term limits are more likely to have 
Latino mayors than cities without term limits. Moreover, the results indicate that to have 
any substantive effect on the probability of observing a city with a Latino mayor, term 
limits should be implemented in cities with a non-trivial Latino population 
(approximately 30 percent of the voting age population). This finding, in one way, 
confirms the notion that term limits provides opportunities to underrepresented 
racial/ethnic minority groups where they make up a substantial portion of the population.  
Another institution that seems to have a positive influence on the representation of 
Latinos in the mayoralty is mayor-council governing arrangements. This institution was 
expected to negatively impact Latino representation due to the competitiveness largely 
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associated with prestigious offices that often expects to shut out underrepresented 
minorities from gaining leadership positions in government. However, the results show 
that in cities where no racial/ethnic group comprises a majority of the population and 
have mayor-council governments, Latinos are more likely to be represented in the 
mayoralty than in cities that do not meet these two requirements. In short, the 
combination of demographic context and institutions should influence whether or not 
Latinos are able to gain access to decision-making bodies in municipal contexts. This 
finding further attests to the notion that Latino representation goes beyond the mere 
numerical strength of Latinos in a given city.  
 In fact, one of the most prominent findings of Chapter 3 besides Latinos’ mere 
numerical strength is the percent of Latinos serving on city council. The more Latinos are 
represented in the city legislature, the higher the likelihood that cities will have Latino 
mayors. This relationship is, however, clearly impacted by the numerical strength of the 
Latino population in the city. For example, cities with majority Latino populations with a 
majority of the seats in the city legislature are nearly 60 percent likely to have Latino 
mayors. That probability is reduced to 20 percent if Latinos have the same political clout 
in the city council but have less than a majority of the voting age population in the city. 
Again, this finding reveals that representation in the city’s top executive office goes 
beyond Latinos’ mere numerical strength. And in this case, the combined institutional-
demographic and political-demographic factors are key to Latino mayoral representation. 
 Although these findings confirm the theoretical expectations as to why Latinos 
are more likely to be represented in the mayoralty across the U.S., they only reveal one 
piece of the puzzle on descriptive representation. That is, the analysis in Chapter 3 does 
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not examine why Latino candidates emerge and win the mayoralty. To fully understand 
the conditions that contribute to this process of descriptive representation in the 
mayoralty, in Chapter 4, I examine unprecedented original data on 648 mayoral elections 
in 113 cities in six southwestern states (AZ, CA, CO, NV, NM, and TX). 
 One major message extracted from the findings examining Latino candidate 
emergence in Chapter 4 is that representation in the election (i.e., observing at least one 
Latino running for mayor) is a function of the combination of Latinos’ numerical voting 
strength and a city’s governing institutions. This essentially extends the findings from 
Chapter 3. More specifically, the findings in Chapter 4 indicate that when Latinos make 
up 40 percent of the population in cities with mayor-council governments, the probability 
of observing at least one Latino on the ballot is over 80 percent. On the other hand, in a 
similar Latino-sized city where the governing arrangements are council-manager or 
commission forms of government, the probability of observing a Latino candidate is 
reduced to about 40 percent. Unlike previously expected, mayor-council governments do 
not seem to detract Latino mayoral candidates, particularly if the Latino population is 
large enough. This indicates that Latino candidates are more likely to run in city contexts 
that are not only worth pursuing (i.e., a prestigious elective office), but also when they 
have the capacity to win due to the numerical strength of potential supporters in the 
Latino community.  
Also, as in Chapter 3, the results of the model examining candidate emergence 
indicate that the more Latinos are incorporated in the city council, the more likely at least 
one Latino candidate will run. So, this confirms the expectation that when the ranks of 
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city council are swelled with Latinos the more likely they will percolate into mayoral 
elections. 
Relying on election results further helps to determine the extent to which quality 
Latino candidates (i.e., those with previous political experience) exhibit strategic 
behavior when deciding to run. The statistical results suggest that quality Latino 
candidates are more likely to emerge when more candidates run for mayor, when more 
people participate in politics, and when an incumbent is not vying for reelection. Thus, 
beyond Latinos’ numerical strength and city institutions, the findings in Chapter 4 
indicate that there are conditions that make it particularly suitable for quality Latino 
candidates to emerge. Because quality Latino candidates are more likely to win (as I will 
elaborate more below), it is important to know why they are more likely to enter the 
political race. In short, it seems that the greater the competitiveness of the electoral 
context the greater the level of uncertainty in the outcome (in that the election is up-for-
grabs), and thus the higher the likelihood that Latino candidates will emerge to contest 
the mayoralty. 
Given these findings, the next obvious question is: Why are Latino mayoral 
candidates more likely to win? In Chapter 4, I examine a subset of elections where Latino 
candidates emerged to determine the conditions for their electoral success as well as their 
vote shares. The results point to electoral factors that create strategic opportunities for 
Latino candidates. For example, if Latino candidates have previous political experience 
and run in contexts with high political participation rates, the more likely Latino 
candidates will not only win, but receive a higher share of the votes cast. This finding 
dovetails quite nicely with the results on candidate emergence because the emergence 
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model suggests that quality Latino candidates are more likely to emerge when political 
participation is higher. The uncertainty of the expected political outcome in high-turnout 
elections does indeed improve the quality Latino candidate’s chances of success. So, the 
strategic considerations for running in these contexts are borne out in the data – thus, 
making it advisable to potential Latino candidates to not only get previous political 
experience but to run when they expect turnout to be high. Granted, the measure of 
political participation is considered after-the-fact. However, there are reasons for 
expecting high turnout rates, such as an incumbent was recently vacated, there was a 
political scandal in municipal government, or perhaps a hot-button issue was raised 
during the campaign.  
On a similar note, Latino candidates are more likely to win in contexts where 
Latinos are sizeable and when the seat is not being contested by an incumbent. Thus, 
Latino candidates considering whether to run should pay attention to whether an 
incumbent is running for reelection and the numerical strength of potential supporters in 
the Latino community. Potential Latino candidates should not be wary of the level of 
competitiveness of an election. The data in Chapter 4 reveal that a more competitive 
context actually improves the chances for quality Latino challengers to be successful. 
Also, Latino candidates should not shy away from running for school board or some 
lower-level government office where the risks of losing might be low given the scarcity 
of voters and money needed to win in those contexts. The more Latinos serve in city 
council, or have previous political experience elsewhere, the more Latino candidates are 
likely to win – as shown in the southwestern election results studied here. So, one major 
implication of the research here is that to see Latinos run and serve in the city’s top 
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executive office they need to run and serve in lower-level government. To extend 
Latinos’ representation beyond the municipality perhaps this same trend should carry, 
that is: get more Latinos to run and serve in local governments.  
Beyond these findings, the statistical results in Chapter 4 do not completely 
correspond to the findings in Chapter 3. Although both chapters examine the causal 
determinants of Latino descriptive representation, they do so in distinct contexts. Chapter 
3 looks at aggregate (city-level) factors that contribute to the presence or absence of 
Latino mayors in a sample of cities across the United States. On the other hand, Chapter 4 
examines Latino descriptive representation in the Southwest – particularly in elections. 
Chapter 4 also narrows down the analytic sample to cities in the Southwest with Latino 
candidates already on the ballot to examine candidate success. Thus, in Chapter 3, 
mayoral term limits and mayor-council forms of government have a positive and 
significant effect on the likelihood of observing a city with a Latino mayor in 
government. In Chapter 4, mayor-council government is not statistically associated with 
the success of Latino candidates (only with emergence). Additionally, contrary to the 
findings in Chapter 3, mayoral term limits has a negative effect on Latino candidate 
success. There are a few possible explanations for this. For example, it is possible that the 
limited scope of the data in Chapter 4 alters the electoral environment in which Latino 
success is examined. Recall that in Chapter 4 the analytic sample only includes elections 
in the Southwest U.S. – particularly where Latino candidates are on the ballot. These are 
cities with abnormally high proportions of Latinos. In fact, the average Latino population 
is 40 percent of the voting age population in the analytic sample. These are places where 
Latinos have substantial numerical strength and possibly have already achieved a level of 
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political incorporation (representation) that could be negatively affected by term limits. 
That is, if Latinos have already gained access to municipal government’s top executive 
office, then term limits might reverse the gains that Latinos have made – as suggested by 
Thompson and Moncrief (1993). Another factor that might contribute to this outcome is 
that in Chapter 4 various electoral factors are included in the model to estimate Latinos 
candidate success which could alter the impact of the city-level factors. More research is 
needed to further explore the long-term impact of term limits. Perhaps the analysis needs 
to expand beyond the Southwest and include a longer time-frame to fully examine the 
effect of term limits on Latino representation in subnational government.  
In addition to examining the causes of Latino descriptive representation in cities 
and in mayoral elections, Chapter 5 examines the consequences of Latino representation 
in elections on electoral outcomes.  I particularly focus on analyzing the impact of Latino 
ethnicity on turnout and the margin of victory using the elections data gathered to study 
Latino candidate emergence and success in the Southwest. Mayoral elections are optimal 
settings to determine whether ethnicity has a role to play in political outcomes due to the 
frequency of non-partisans elections and the off-cycle election timing. In other words, 
political parties do not usually have a formal role in organizing elections and influencing 
political behavior in local elections. Thus, unlike in high profile congressional and 
presidential elections where partisanship is often the focus for voters and campaigns, 
voters in local elections may rely on other cues such as race and ethnicity to influence 
their voting decisions. The results in Chapter 5 show that Latino ethnicity, measured by 
the presence of quality Latino challengers running for mayor, is not statistically 
associated to aggregate measures of political participation and election closeness. Despite 
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the null findings regarding the main hypothesis, the study reveals a great deal about the 
causal determinants of local election outcomes. For example, Chapter 5 reveals that the 
timing of mayoral elections – particularly when held during month and year of 
presidential elections – is among the most influential determinant of turnout rates. 
Besides this electoral rule, turnout seems to be primarily driven by the context of the 
election such as whether the election is unopposed or whether the election is a runoff 
between the top two candidates. These findings point to the consequences of competitive 
electoral contexts. Specifically, more residents are expected to participate in politics 
when the stakes are raised – either when the top two candidates are competing for the 
mayoralty or when more candidates contest the mayoralty. 
To further explore the closeness of elections, I examined the causal determinants 
of the margin of victory in mayoral elections. The presence of quality Latino challengers 
does not seem to impact the margin of victory. However, both institutions and the context 
of elections influence this outcome. Specifically, the institutions of mayoral-term limits 
mayor-council governments are positively associated with closer mayoral elections. As 
for the context of the election, it has the largest and most comprehensive effect on the 
margin of victory in mayoral elections than institutions or city demographics. For 
example, when more candidates vie for the mayoralty, when the seat is not being 
challenged by a sitting incumbent, and when turnout is high, mayoral elections are 
expected to be closer. Chapter 5 essentially fills the gap in the literature that has remained 
unfilled by previous research due to the lack of a sufficiently large sample that expands 
beyond a handful of cities and a specific point in time. Now, we can say with more 
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certainty what the causal determinants of turnout and the margin of victory are – 
partiularly in the Southwest context.  
To briefly reconcile the research in Chapters 4 & 5 it is important to note that 
competitive city and electoral contexts do not seem to detract Latino candidates. Factors 
such as mayor-council governments, turnout, open-seat elections, and the number of 
candidates vying for the mayoralty, increase the likelihood that quality Latino candidates 
will emerge. With the exception of term-limits, a similar pattern occurs with regard to 
Latino candidate electoral success. So, one message from the research conducted here is 
that competition is an opportunity – especially for Latino candidates. Potential Latino 
candidates should not shy away from competitive contexts (i.e., when outcomes are 
expected to be uncertain or close) – especially if Latinos are sizeable.  
 
Future Research 
Although the systematic analysis of Latino descriptive representation in the mayoralty in 
this dissertation has provided key insights about how Latinos fare in American 
subnational politics, there are many more questions that can be further explored. In this 
section, I will outline three major avenues for future research that extend what has 
already been done for this dissertation. 
 Given that the research in Chapter 4 specifically studied elections, it provides us 
with aggregate-level measures of strategy and competition with regard to their impact on 
the emergence and success of Latino mayoral candidates. The positive aspect of this 
methodological approach is that it provides general patterns of Latino representation 
across a wide array of contexts. On the other hand, it lacks a precise understanding about 
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the strategic concerns of candidates and voters from various racial and ethnic groups. In 
other words, although the data used in Chapter 4 describe many aspects about the election 
such as the number of candidates, their Latino ethnicity, and their previous political 
experience, we do not know about the specific challenges and advantages that candidates 
perceived before and after entering the political race. We also do not know who the 
Latino leaders are in the city that could have run for mayor but chose to not to – or why. 
Therefore, there is great potential in not only investigating more details about the mayoral 
candidates and their strategic decisions to run for mayor, but also inquiring about 
potential candidates who could have run but did not. Additionally, it is imperative to 
study city leaders and organizations who hold the levers of power in terms of providing 
votes and money to different mayoral candidates. In depth case studies could reveal a 
great deal about how Latino candidates were chosen and supported among the city elites. 
This could also reveal how specific coalitions form and the conditions under which 
Latino candidates were able to overcome various obstacles to win the mayoralty. This is 
particularly interesting because it could further determine whether and how political 
parties are involved in recruiting and supporting Latino candidates. In the advent of a 
recent Republican primary to replace Texas Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, where Latino 
candidate and Tea Party favorite, Ted Cruz, beat the establishment Republican candidate, 
David Dewhurst, in a conservative state where the Latino population is 37.6 percent, it is 
clear that more research is needed to further understand how these dynamics play out at 
the local level. That is, are there conservative mayoral candidates like Houston’s Orlando 
Sanchez and Roy Morales that have been recruited by conservative city leaders and 
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organizations precisely because of their ethnicity to target conservative Anglos and 
undecided Latinos?  
The headlines in various newspapers and findings in political surveys reveal that 
Latinos, although historically lean Democratic, can very well support the Republican 
Party because neither party has solidified their support. So, how does this work in 
municipal contexts where political parties do not have a formal role? Also, previous 
research has suggested that minority candidates benefit from the support of non-profit 
organizations that have a minority or low-income focus. Understanding how these groups 
unite in support of candidates of various racial and ethnic backgrounds will require more 
in-depth case studies. In short, this is one avenue of future research that needs to be 
pursued to improve our knowledge about the dynamics of Latino political incorporation 
in municipal government. 
 In addition to in-depth case studies, future research needs to expand the election 
data collected for this project beyond the Southwest US. Moving beyond this region can 
answer questions about how Latinos fare politically outside traditional immigrant 
destinations. Additionally, once expanding the Southwest data, other racial and ethnic 
groups become more prominent. So, collecting data on race rather than solely Latino 
ethnicity could allow scholars to compare and contrast models of Asian, Black, and 
Latino descriptive representation for the first time ever. The typical approach, such as in 
this dissertation, is to focus on one underrepresented group at a time. Thus, the research 
could greatly benefit from modeling representation across race and ethnicity. 
Minority representation in the mayoralty also varies by gender – which is 
information that further limits the data used in this dissertation. The intersectionality of 
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race, ethnicity, and gender should inspire future studies of descriptive representation in 
subnational government because women of color have a unique experience in politics that 
can place them at a great advantage. Previous studies of women in politics reveal that 
women may have unique leadership styles that embrace cooperation over conflict – 
which in part makes them quite successful in politics and elections. For scholars deeply 
interested in understanding how and why Latinos (in general) could improve their status 
in politics, female leadership could be a key component to solving the problem of 
underrepresentation. I say this because female Latina candidates are considered to be less 
threatening to non-minority populations when they run and thus more successful in state 
legislative elections than their male counterparts (see Garcia et al. 2008). Additionally, 
Latinas are in a unique position to influence the political socialization of Latino youths. It 
is amazing to hear anecdotes about mothers participating in their children’s schools and 
volunteering in local organizations because they understand that active community 
involvement is a key mechanism that may not only improve their personal circumstances, 
but also improve their community. Beyond key case studies of prominent Latinas in 
Texas (see Garcia et al. 2008), we simply do not know enough about why they decide to 
run and why they win in municipal government settings. Concentrating on a data 
collection project that analyzes representation of different racial/ethnic groups in 
municipal executive office can shape future studies that explore the relationship between 
descriptive representation and substantive representation. With the list of minority office 
holders generated in this study, scholars could focus on what these office holder do while 
in office. That is, inquiries can be made about the types of policies that minority mayors 
propose, pass, and implement in city government to solve problems in minority 
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communities. These policies can range from policing to healthcare, and scholars can 
focus on how these policies diffuse and adapt as minority leaders assert their preferences. 
In sum, there is a lot to be gained from comparing and contrasting models of 
representation that expand beyond the Southwest and beyond Latinos, per se.  
Because one of the key findings in this dissertation points to the influence of 
Latino descriptive representation in lower-level government on the representation of 
Latinos in higher-level offices, the third avenue for further research needs to determine 
where Latino mayors serve once they leave office. That is, do former Latino mayors 
eventually run for county executive office or the state legislature? There is some 
anecdotal evidence that this is true, particularly in the case of the Robert Menendez, U.S 
Senator from New Jersey, who is the former mayor of Union City, NJ. But, no study has 
systematically explored the progressive ambition of Latino mayors. Therefore, such a 
study would help bridge the gap between studies that focus on urban politics with those 
that focus on state and Congressional politics. Collaborative efforts such as these would 
surely help to accurately portray the current state of the Latino political condition – which 
in an era of increased diversity (dominated by Latinos) – would essentially help with 
understanding the state of American politics.  
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Appendix A: Discussion of Data & Sample 
 
Sample size 
The data used in this chapter is constructed from multiple sources. However, the main 
source comes from mayoral election results procured from city, county, and state 
websites and city/county clerks. I first began collecting election data on the cities with the 
most available data. Typically larger-sized cities have sufficient resources in terms of 
staff and money to make their election results available online. After scouring the web for 
all Southwestern cities above 50,000 population, I was able to collect election results for 
39 cities. Using this as my starting point, I based the sample selection on two major 
criteria: 1) population size 2) and geographic location across the Southwest. As for 
population size, the sample of cities selected for analysis had to fit with within a certain 
category among all central southwestern cities (above 1,000) including: large (50,000 - 
300,000 or more), medium (5,000 - 49,999), and small (1,000 - 4,999) cities.  
Each state in the Southwest used in this data collection project (Arizona, 
California, Colorado, Nevada, New Mexico, and Texas) has a certain number of cities 
that fall within these categories. The population categories listed in Table 1 of Appendix 
A shows that there are 17% large-sized cities, 47% medium-sized cities, and 36% small-
sized cities, in six southwestern states: Arizona, California, Colorado, New Mexico, 
Nevada, and Texas. Thus, any additional city elections that I collect will have to be 
distributed similarly to Table 1 of Appendix A. For example, of the 221 cities above 
50,000 in six southwestern states 5% of those cities are in Arizona, 64% in California, 
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6% in Colorado, 4% in Nevada, 2% in New Mexico, and 21% in Texas. This indicates 
that Texas and California have the majority of large-sized cities in the Southwest.   
Appendix A Table 1. Distribution of Large, Medium , and Small Cities in Six SW States  
city size universe of cities Arizona California Colorado Nevada New Mexico Texas 
N1 % N2 N2/N1 N3 N3/N1 N4 N4/N1 N5 N5/N1 N6 N6/N1 N7 N7/N1 
50,000 - 
300,000 or 
more (large) 221 17% 10 5% 142 64% 13 6% 6 3% 4 2% 46 21% 
5,000 - 49,999 
(medium) 596 47% 26 4% 251 42% 40 7% 5 1% 22 4% 252 42% 
1,000 - 4,999 
(small) 450 36% 8 2% 44 10% 16 4% 7 2% 8 2% 367 82% 
Total 1,267  100% 44   437   69   18   34   665   
 
To determine the size of my sample (i.e., the number of cities I needed to collect 
elections data) based on the universe of cities in the six southwestern states, I first divided 
39 by .17 to get a sample of 229 total cities (see Table 2 of Appendix A). After 
determining the distribution of the cities by category group (39 large, 108 medium, 82 
small), I halved the total medium and small cities to have a manageable set of cities to 
analyze. The final distribution for the proposed sample includes 39 large-sized cities, 54 
medium-sized cities, and 41 small-sized cities for a total of 134 cities in the Southwest. 
 
Appendix A Table 2. Distribution of Large, Medium , and Small Cities in Six SW States in Proposed Sample 
city size 
Sample of 
cities Arizona California Colorado Nevada New Mexico Texas 
 
N1 % N2 
% = 
Table 1 N3 
% = 
Table 1 N4 
% = 
Table 1 N5 
% = 
Table 1 N6 
% = 
Table 1 N7 
% = 
Table 1 
50,000 - 
300,000 or 
more 
(large) 39 29% 2 5% 25 64% 2 6% 1 3% 1 2% 8.2 21% 
5,000 - 
49,999 
(medium) 54 40% 2 4% 23 42% 4 7% 1 1% 2 4% 23 42% 
1,000 - 
4,999 
(small) 41 31% 1 2% 4.1 10% 2 4% 1 2% 1 2% 34 82% 
Total 134   5   52   8   3   4   64   
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Criteria for Proposed Representative Sample 
Once stratifying the population by city size, I calculated the proportion of cities in each 
state within each size strata to determine the number of cities to select (see Table 2 of 
Appendix A). The percentages for each state, within each size strata add up to 
approximately 100 percent41.  
 
Selecting the Sample 
To select my sample of cities, I organized a list of all the central cities in the six 
southwestern states acquired by the 2000 U.S. Census into the three size categories 
mentioned above. Because the list of cities was originally in alphabetical order, I 
assigned a random identification number to each city – within each size category. This 
provided a “master” list of cities that fit each category in Table 2 of Appendix A. I then 
searched for elections information using city, state, and county websites as well as 
personally contacting city and county clerks for each city on this list. If I was successful 
at acquiring election information for more than one election cycle in the appropriately 
sized city in each state, I eliminated it from the “master” list. If not, then I went to the 
next city on the “master” list to try and find election information. I repeated this process 
until I acquired a sizeable sample of cities that closely resembled Table 2 of Appendix A. 
I was able to gather election information for at least three electoral cycles in 113 cities in 
six SW states. Table 3 of Appendix A. describes my analytical sample. Specifically, there 
are 4 cities in my analytical sample from Arizona, 43 from California, 6 from Colorado, 7 
from Nevada, and 48 from Texas. 
                                                
 
41 In Appendix Table 1 adding (N2/N1)+(N3/N1)+(N4/N1)+(N5/N1)+(N6/N1)+(N7/N1)=100% 
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Appendix Table 3. Distribution of Large, Medium , and Small Cities in Six SW States in Analytical Sample  
city size 
Sample of 
cities Arizona California Colorado Nevada New Mexico Texas 
  N1 % N2 N2/N1 N3 N3/N1 N4 N4/N1 N5 N5/N1 N6 N6/N1 N7 N7/N1 
50,000 - 
300,000 or 
more (large) 39 29% 2 5% 15 38% 3 8% 5 13% 3 8% 11 28% 
5,000 - 
49,999 
(medium) 48 36% 1 2% 23 48% 2 4% 1 2% 2 4% 19 40% 
1,000 - 4,999 
(small) 26 19% 1 4% 5 19% 1 4% 1 4% 0 0% 18 69% 
Total 113   4   43   6   7   5   48   
 
Comparing Appendix Tables 2 & 3, there is a slight underrepresentation of cities 
in California, in terms of the proportion of large-sized cities. Colorado, Nevada, New 
Mexico, and Texas have a slight overrepresentation of large-sized cities. In terms of 
medium-sized cities in my sample, Texas is slightly underrepresented in this category. 
The largest discrepancy between the proposed sample (Table 2 in Appendix A) and the 
analytical sample (Table 3 in Appendix A) is in the small-sized city category. In fact, 
cities with fewer than 4,000 inhabitants are less likely to have websites and full time 
staff, thus making it difficult to acquire election results. The only state that is fully 
representative in terms of size and location in the SW are cities in California. The data I 
have collected for Texas, on the other hand, is under-representing the small-sized cities. 
Overall, however, the sample is largely representative of the cities in six southwestern 
states according to the size and location of cities within the Southwest. 
 
